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It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that 
people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or 
immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this 
retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and 
actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature, 
then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible 
for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment. 
It has recently been suggested that this argument can be backed up 
by neuroscience, since neuroscientific explanations of human 
behavior leave no room for non-determined free actions. In this 
thesis, an argument of this sort is discussed. According to this 
argument, that I call “the Revision Argument”, we should revise the 
legal system so that any retributivist justification of punishment is 
removed. I examine some objections to the Revision Argument 
according to which compatibilism about free will and responsibility is 
a morally acceptable basis of retributive punishment. I argue that 
these objections have difficulties in providing a plausible account of 
the relevant difference between people who deserve punishment for 
their actions and people who do not. Therefore, I argue that they fail 
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1.1 Background and outline of the thesis 
According to retributive theories of punishment, someone who 
commits a wrongful act can morally deserve to be punished. 
Retributivism is, arguably, part of common sense morality, in the 
sense that people in general think that someone who commits a 
wrongful act may deserve to be punished. This moral judgment is, at 
least partly, based on a particular common sense understanding of 
human behavior: that people can choose how to act and are therefore 
responsible for their actions. In this thesis, I will refer to common 
sense morality as “folk morality”, and common sense understanding 
of behavior as “folk psychology.” Retributivism is, moreover, also an 
element in many legal systems, in the sense that at least part of the 
moral justification for punishing people who commit crimes is that 
they deserve it. 
In this thesis, the discussion will proceed from an argument that I 
call “The Revision Argument.” According to this argument, the folk 
moral judgment that people can deserve punishment when they 
commit wrongful actions is built upon the folk psychological belief 
that people in such cases can act freely, since people in general have 
a libertarian free will. But, according to the Revision Argument, we 
have evidence pointing in the direction that there is no libertarian free 
will. This means that the folk moral judgment that people can deserve 
punishment lacks justification (since according to folk morality, 
people deserve punishment only if they have acted out of libertarian 
free will, but the belief that people can act out of libertarian free will 
turns out to be false.) Since the legal system, according to the Revision 
Argument, gains legitimacy from folk psychology and folk morality in 
the sense that people in general must, to a sufficient degree, support 
the way the legal system works, including its reasons for punishment, 
legal retributive punishment turns out to lack moral justification. 
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Hence, the legal system should be revised in the sense that we should 
remove retributive elements from its punishment practices.  
The Revision Argument is a version of an argument originally put 
forth by Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen in their seminal article 
“For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything” 
(2004). Greene & Cohen argue that neuroscience provides an 
explanatory framework for human thinking and action that makes us 
realize that many of our folk psychological assumptions of why 
people act in certain ways are false. For example, the assumption that 
people can act freely, in the sense of choosing how to act on the basis 
of their libertarian free will, has no support in a neuroscientific 
explanation of actions, since the brain, regardless of its complexity, 
works strictly in accordance with input-output principles. Greene & 
Cohen argue, further, that if there is no libertarian free will involved 
when people act, people do not deserve punishment in the way 
required according to retributivism. And then we should not punish 
people according to retributive principles. 
Greene & Cohens’s argument has gained considerable attention, 
especially within an interdisciplinary research field called ”neurolaw” 
in which the implications of neuroscience to the law and legal 
practices are discussed (see e.g., Meynen, 2018 for an overview.) The 
main aim in this thesis is to scrutinize three major objections to the 
claim that we have reasons to revise our legal punishment practices. 
These objections all defend the view that compatibilism about free 
will and/or responsibility can provide what is required for desert-
attribution and, consequently, justify legal retributive punishment.  
The main focus in the discussions to follow is whether 
compatibilism is able to account for what will be referred to as “basic 
desert”, which, according to many philosophers (and I agree) is a 
necessary condition for legal retributive punishment to be morally 
justified. I will explain what basic desert is in chapter two. The 
arguments considered in this thesis are all such that they are supposed 
to be compatible with the metaphysical doctrines of physicalism and 
determinism. Basic desert must, hence, be compatible with 
determinism and physicalism. I will describe how “physicalism” and 
“determinism” are interpreted in sections 1.3 and 1.4. In addition to 
these metaphysical constraints, I argue that the justification of legal 
CHAPTER ONE 
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retributive punishment also must meet the demands of what will be 
referred to as “the Principle of Relevant Difference.” This principle 
is related to what R.M. Hare (1952) calls the ”ethical supervenience 
thesis”, according to which there can be no moral difference between 
two states of affairs, events, actions or agents without there being 
some natural difference between them. I will suggest that this thesis 
can be developed in light of the plausible view that it is not enough 
to have a natural difference: any natural difference cannot do the job 
with regard to a specific moral difference – it has to be a difference 
that is intuitively of a relevant kind. However, it is not a straightforward 
matter to determine what is a relevant difference and what is not, and 
different natural properties may be relevant in relation to different 
moral properties. One of the premises in the Revision Argument 
states that libertarian free will is the relevant difference with regard to 
basic desert: possession of libertarian free will is, according to the 
Revision Argument, the relevant difference between two people who 
commit similar wrongful acts, but where only one of them deserves 
punishment. Thus, if none of them has libertarian free will, none of 
them deserves punishment. However, according to the objections to 
the Revision Argument that are to be discussed, libertarian free will is 
not the relevant difference between someone who deserves 
punishment and someone who does not. Instead, according to these 
objections, the relevant difference between someone who deserves 
retributive punishment and someone who does not has to do with 
certain mental capacities to identify and react on reasons, and these 
capacities are fully compatible with determinism.  
I will argue that in order to successfully defend such a compatibilist 
claim one must be able to pick out a natural property that is intuitively 
relevant for basic desert, and which is sufficiently different from other 
natural properties, properties that are not base properties of basic 
desert.1 This analysis will play a central role in my argument. Relying 
                                    
1 That there must be a relevant difference between cases in which we ascribe moral 
responsibility and cases in which we do not is also argued for by Derk Pereboom 
(2001, 2002), although he focuses on (the absence of) a relevant difference between 
manipulation cases in which we, intuitively, do not want to hold someone morally 
responsible, and “ordinary” cases in which we, intuitively, want to hold the agent 
morally responsible.  
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on the Principle of Relevant Difference, based on Hare, I will argue 
that if compatibilist theories cannot provide such an intuitively 
relevant difference between the base properties of basic desert and 
other natural properties that are not base properties for basic desert, 
then desert-attribution violates what Jaegwon Kim calls the 
“consistency requirement”, which is based on the well-established 
moral principle known as “the principle of universalizability.” This 
principle, in turn, relies on the intuition that ethical judgments should 
be generalizable in some sense, i.e., the idea that that like cases should 
be treated alike (Kim, 1984, pp. 161-162).  
It is worth pointing out that while the Principle of Relevant 
Difference is a normative principle, this thesis is not primarily 
intended to be a contribution to the normative discussion of what is 
required for desert-attribution. Rather, the Principle of Relevance 
Difference is considered to be part of folk morality, and folk morality 
is, in turn, the enterprise that legitimizes the legal system. If there are 
features in the legal system that violate fundamental folk moral 
intuitions – for example, if the legal system attributes basic desert to 
people in a way that violates the consistency requirement – the 
legitimacy of legal responsibility attribution is jeopardized. Legal 
practices must be legitimate, or they need to be revised (as a 
consequence of folk morality.) To be clear, even though legal 
responses to wrongdoing are the topic of this thesis, the thesis itself 
is philosophical in nature. Its basic arguments are general arguments 
that are not derived from one particular legal system. In fact, the 
arguments that are discussed are fundamental theoretical arguments 
that have been developed in the neuro-legal and philosophical debate 
about the implications of neuroscience – and other allegedly 
deterministic branches of science – for the law and legal practices.2 
The structure of the book is as follows: in chapter one, Introduction, 
I will provide a brief overview of some philosophical discussions that 
are in focus in this thesis. In chapter two, The Revision Argument, I 
introduce the Revision Argument. After outlining the argument, I will 
                                    
2 This approach is in line with the analysis by many other authors, for instance, it 
can be found in the work of Pardo & Patterson (2010, 2013), Vincent (2013), Moore 
(1997, 2016), Morse (2004, 2009), Greely (2011), Sapolsky (2006).  
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discuss some different notions of responsibility in order to analyze 
what responsibility means in the Revision Argument. In chapter 
three, First Objection: Legal Retributive Punishment Does Not Require Free 
Will, I will discuss an objection put forward by Stephen Morse, 
according to which the Revision Argument is flawed because (1) 
libertarian free will is irrelevant for legal responsibility, and (2) 
libertarian free will is also not a requirement for responsibility and 
retributive punishment according to folk psychology and folk 
morality, and (3) to the extent that people do talk about free will as a 
requirement for responsibility and retributive punishment, free will 
compatibilism provides a theoretical framework that can meet these 
requirements.  
I will show that there is a substantial disagreement among both 
legal scholars and philosophers about the first claim. Regarding the 
second claim, I turn to some experimental philosophy studies 
concerning people’s intuitions about the compatibility of 
determinism, free will, and responsibility. These studies do not seem 
to provide any straightforward answers about people’s intuitions of 
these things, besides the fact that the responses seem to be sensitive 
to the set-up of the experimental case. The third claim is analyzed in 
chapter four, Is Compatibilism a Secure Basis of Retributive Punishment? in 
which the question is discussed in light of some central compatibilist 
ideas about sufficient conditions for basic desert, mostly centered 
around reasons-responsiveness.  
 From the discussions in chapter three and four, I will argue that 
this first objection fails. The compatibilist theories considered cannot 
meet the demands provided by the Principle of Relevant Difference 
in combination with the metaphysical constraints of physicalism and 
determinism.  
In chapter five, Second Objection: Conceptual Confusion about the Nature 
of Mental States, I will discuss an objection put forward by Michael 
Pardo & Dennis Patterson against the Revision Argument but also 
against to the argument I provided in chapter four. Pardo & Patterson 
argue that the Revision Argument, but also my argument to the effect 
that Morse’s objection fails to refute the Revision Argument, are 
based on a conceptually confused view of mental states. If their 
argument is sound, it may still be the case that free will compatibilism 
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can provide what is required for basic desert. However, I will argue 
that this objection fails, too. Even though I agree that a plausible 
account of mental states allows for multiple realizability and, hence, 
rule out the possibility of reducing them to brain states in a 
straightforward manner, mental causation cannot plausibly be 
disconnected from brain processes. And since mental causation plays 
a central part of basic desert, I will conclude that the second objection, 
too, fails to meet the requirements of the Principle of Relevant 
Difference in combination with the metaphysical constraints of 
physicalism and determinism.  
In chapter six, Third Objection: The Limited Relevance of Neuroscience & 
Philosophy for Folk Psychology, Folk Morality & the Law, I will discuss the 
worry that regardless of the theoretical relevance of the discussions in 
chapters three to five, legal practice is ultimately legitimized by folk 
psychology and folk morality. For different reasons, this point would 
render the law and legal practices “immune” to the theoretical 
concerns regarding retribution raised in this thesis. I will, however, 
argue that the “folk” understanding of the world is not immune to 
such theoretical concerns, and that this fact implies that the sciences 
are also of relevance for the law – in a substantial sense.  
Moreover, I will offer an alternative description of folk psychology 
and folk morality, according to which it is plausible that folk 
psychology and folk morality implicitly support the Principle of 
Relevant Difference as it has been discussed in the previous chapters. 
If this account is accurate, and my conclusion that the arguments 
provided by Morse, Pardo & Patterson fail to account for basic desert, 
the Revision Argument stands: the retributive element in the current 
legal system lacks justification and thus, these parts needs to be 
revised.  
In chapter seven, Summary & Concluding Remarks, I provide a 
summary of the discussions in chapters two to five, and move on to 
briefly discuss some implications of the conclusions in these chapters, 
as for example, what the consequences may look like if we revise the 
legal system in accordance with the conclusion of the Revision 
Argument.  
The structure of the remaining parts of this introduction is as 
follows: section 1.2 will provide a brief overview of the neurolaw 
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debate, in order to illustrate the context in which the Revision 
Argument is developed. In section 1.3 and section 1.4, I will describe 
how “physicalism” and “determinism” are interpreted in this thesis. 
Section 1.5 will be concerned with an introduction to the difference 
between compatibilism and incompatibilism about free will, a 
difference that will play a central role throughout the book. Section 
1.6 will be briefly concerned with some philosophical theories of 
mental states. This topic is not explicitly addressed in the Revision 
Argument but is of importance to the discussions to come, especially 
in chapter five. The chapter ends with a short summary in section 1.7.  
1.2 Neurolaw 
Neurolaw is an interdisciplinary field that links neuroscientific 
research findings to the law and legal practices. Neuroscience has 
developed quickly in the past decades and it has received much 
attention from scientists from other branches, as well as from the 
political sphere. There are a number of politically initiated projects 
that receive immense funding. For example, the European Union’s 
Human Brain Project is a ten year project (it started in 2013) and aims 
to build a research infrastructure to help advance neuroscience such 
as brain simulation and neuroinformatics (i.e., access to shared brain 
data), medicine (e.g., access to patient data, identification of disease 
signatures) and computing (e.g., development of brain-inspired 
computing, (e.g., use of robots to test brain simulation) but also 
ethical and societal implications of the technical developments in 
these areas (“Human Brain Project”, 2017). A project called “the 
Brain initiative” was announced by the Obama administration in the 
U.S. in 2013, with the goal of supporting the development of 
innovative neuroscientific techniques in order to deepen the 
understanding of the of the human mind and to improve how to treat, 
prevent, and cure disorders of the brain (The Brain Initiative, 2019). 
Neuroscience is regularly appearing in the courtroom, and the fast 
development of different techniques that enable more detailed 
information about the correlations between brain functions and 
behavior have made neuroscience increasingly used in order to, for 
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example, provide data, supposedly relevant for the question of legal 
responsibility.3 
The Anglo-American adjudicatory system has long attempted to 
include the special knowledge of skilled witnesses and scientific 
experts in the area of brain science (Hall, 2004). Since 2005, the use 
of neuroscientific evidence in American courts has been tripled, and 
such evidence is used in 25% of all murder-cases. The situation in the 
U.S. is not unique. Research in England and Wales, Canada, the 
Netherlands and Singapore shows that defense lawyers in all 
jurisdictions make use of neuroscientific evidence to defend their 
clients. Typically, if neuroscientific techniques are introduced in the 
courtroom, it is often in cases in which the charges are serious and 
severe punishment is possible. For example, neuroscientific evidence 
has been critical in overturning convictions for murder and reducing 
convictions from murder to manslaughter (Catley, 2016).  
It can be argued that a legal system that incorporates scientific facts 
into its practices is more reliable compared to a system that does not. 
Think of lies: if we could depict what happens in the brain when 
someone is lying (compare to when she is sincere, or mistaken) it 
would be easy to find out who is lying and who is not by making use 
of a brain scan.4  
Meanwhile, it can also be pointed out that (neuro)science often 
fails to provide the clear answers that are sought after in a legal 
context. For example, even though a brain scan may reveal certain 
facts about someone’s brain functions, it is not clear to what extent 
such facts can provide any additional explanatory power beyond what 
we already know from behavioral evidence such as descriptions of the 
defendant’s actions, or first or third person reports about her mental 
states. One highly influential voice who cautions against the use of 
neuroscience in the legal context is the legal scholar Stephen Morse. 
He maintains that those who put too much faith in the explanatory 
power of neuroscience suffer from “the brain overclaim syndrome” 
(Morse, 2006). Neuroscience cannot, at least not in the vast majority 
                                    
3 See e.g., Catley & Claydon (2015), Farahany (2015), Chandler (2015) and de Kogel 
& Westgeest (2015).  
4 See e.g., Farah et al (2014) for discussion. 
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of cases, deliver what we need to answer the relevant legal questions, 
he argues. One reason for this shortcoming, Morse points out, is 
methodological: the neuroscientific studies at hand are often made on 
a small number of people, why we must be careful drawing general 
conclusions from them. And even if we can draw certain conclusions 
from such studies at group level, this data still does not provide us 
with conclusive evidence about specific individuals. For example, 
even if we can identify certain correlations between EEG patterns 
and e.g. levels of consciousness on a group level, these correlations 
does not necessarily maintain in the individual case (Morse, 2006, pp. 
403-405). However, Morse acknowledges that there are some 
contexts in which neuroscience can contribute to legal controversies, 
such as, for example, in cases when the defendant has received a blow 
to the head, and it is unclear if he acted consciously (Morse, 2006, p. 
401).  
Hence, on the one hand, it can be argued that neuroscientific 
evidence is a potentially valuable resource for the legal system, and 
the system should, therefore, use neuroscientific evidence in order to 
improve its methods – e.g., for identifying defendants that deserve to 
be punished and defendants that should be excused. Or, as it is argued 
in the Revision Argument, to find out that some of our beliefs about 
human behavior are false. On the other hand, it can be argued that, 
at present, neuroscientific evidence is too unreliable to be used in 
court cases, and even that neuroscience has, in general, a very limited 
relevance for the understanding of human action in the legal context. 
Neurolaw is not a homogenous research field, and the possibilities 
and problems that are associated with questions of how neuroscience 
can be useful for the legal system vary within different areas of 
neurolaw. In the next section I will briefly describe some different 
areas of neurolaw, and specify what will be focused on this thesis.  
1.2.1 Different areas in the neurolaw debate 
The neurolaw debate is concerned with a wide array of questions, 
stretching from technical issues regarding the practical use of 
neuroscientific data in the courtroom, to moral and legal concerns 
about the foundations of our legal system – the latter being the topic 
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of this thesis. Adrian Petoft (2015) provides a useful two-part 
distinction between practical and theoretical neurolaw discussions. 
Practical discussions are, in Petoft’s view, those that focus on civil 
and criminal responsibility in legal processes, such as how 
neuroscientific data is used in the court room and the implications of 
this use. Theoretical research focuses on how neuroscientific research 
contributes to our general understanding and knowledge of the mind, 
and how it applies to philosophical questions concerning mental 
states and free will which are relevant for the question of criminal 
responsibility.  
Gerben Meynen (2016) distinguishes between three different areas 
within the neurolaw debate: Assessment, Intervention and Revision. 
These areas are described briefly below.  
 
Assessment 
In criminal law, lawyers have to answer a wide range of questions. 
Common examples are: does the defendant have a mental disorder? 
Is she competent to stand trial, is she legally insane? What is the risk 
for recidivism for this particular offender? What does the witness 
remember exactly – is she lying? Is the prospective juror biased 
against certain groups of people? (Meynen, 2016, p. 3). Part of 
neurolaw research focuses on how neuroscientific techniques can 
assist in answering such questions which concern the evaluation or 
assessment of an individual. In the task of assessing the presence of 
mental disorders, neuroscientific techniques such as for example 
brain scans could contribute with valuable information about e.g., 
deviant brain structures that may have implications for a person’s 
cognitive capacities (Meynen, 2016, pp. 134-138).  
A worry often mentioned in the assessment domain, which was 
mentioned above, is the problem of generalization. Even if we find 
statistically significant correlations between certain brain functions 
and certain mental states on a group level, conclusions concerning a 
particular individual cannot easily be drawn (see e.g., Pardo & 
Patterson 2013, p. 145 and Morse, 2006, pp. 403-406). However, one 
could argue that the assessment of e.g. mental health and the degree 
of control over one’s actions have reliability-limitations no matter 
what methods are being used. When a defendant’s mental capacity is 
CHAPTER ONE 
 11 
evaluated through forensic psychiatric or psychological examination, 
these methods are also based on empirically based tests, and the 
validations of such tests are also ultimately based on general statistics 
that are applied to individual cases.  
Besides the potential usefulness of assessing legally relevant mental 
health problems, neuroscientific methods have been used in order to 
develop techniques for lie detection.5 The legal utility for a reliable lie 
detector is obvious, but this area of research is perhaps suffused by 
even more controversy than the area of mental health assessment. 
Questions of e.g., under what conditions these techniques should be 
used and the reliability of lie detection techniques raise fundamental 
issues of how neuroscientific techniques can be relevant in legal 
contexts. For example, it is hard to develop experimental settings that 
are sufficiently similar to the contexts in which lie detection would be 
most helpful (see Pardo & Patterson, 2013). For example, it is 
plausible to think that the difference between what is at stake in the 
cases of lying in order to avoid a prison sentence and lying in an 
experimental setting, is reflected at the neural, cognitive and 
emotional level as well (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 109).6 
A third task for which we can see a potential use of neuroscience 
is to assess whether people are inclined to be affected by implicit bias 
in their judgements. This factor is relevant for jury selection and for 
assessing reliability in testimonies (Greely, 2011, p. 1225).  
 
Intervention  
The intervention domain covers questions about both practical and 
theoretical possibilities of using neuroscientific techniques in order to 
affect people’s thinking and action, but also discussions of the ethical 
implication of using such interventions in a legal context.  
Interventions can be of different sorts, and a common division 
between forms of interventions is treatment, enhancement and 
manipulation (Meynen, 2014, p. 820). Treatment concerns the question 
                                    
5 See e.g., Farah et al (2014).  
6 See Pardo & Patterson 2013, pp.79-120 for a detailed discussion of the difficulties 
for the prospect of brain states replacing behavior as the criteria for lies or 
deception. This will be further discussed in chapter five.  
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about current and future possibilities regarding treatments that can, 
for instance, help reduce the risk of recidivism. In this domain, the 
aim is ultimately to change brain functions in order to reduce criminal 
behavior. The enhancement area also involves discussions about 
possible consequences (ethical and otherwise) that different 
enhancement methods may have both within and outside of the legal 
sphere.  
Discussions about manipulation are related to cases in which the 
behavior is controlled, in some sense, by external sources. For 
example, if a deep brain stimulation device is implanted in order to 
control obsessive-compulsive disorders, is the result of the workings 
of such a device within the agent’s responsibility? If such a device 
turns out to have a negative effect on a person’s behavior, but perhaps 
also on her preferences, beliefs, desires and so on, in a way that have 
legal consequences - who is responsible for her actions? Or, how 
should the law deal with a scenario in which a deep-brain stimulation 
device is hacked by someone who manages to manipulate the user of 
the device to develop certain preferences in order to make her 
perform criminal actions? In legal cases, manipulative circumstances 
could play a mitigating role, but usually the history of people’s 
preferences are not exculpatory factors as such (Bublitz & Merkel, 
2013, p. 340).  
With regard to the domain of enhancement, if safe, reliable and 
effective techniques to enhance mental performance are developed, 
are there some groups that should be obliged to enhance their 
cognitive performance in order to maximize the likelihood of good 
outcomes, such as, for example, surgeons, or pilots? 7 If so, what are 
the consequences for responsibility attribution if someone who is 
obliged to take it refuses? Another aspect of the enhancement 
discussion is the question of whether cognitively enhanced people 
should be held responsible for their actions to a higher degree since 
mental capacities often are taken to co-vary with responsibility 
attribution. The idea behind this scenario is that if responsibility is 
diminished when mental capacities are reduced, and restored when 
the mental capacities are regained, then it seems as if we assess people 
                                    
7 C.f. Vincent, 2013, p. 326.  
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differently when it comes to responsibility, depending on what mental 
capacities they have. But then again, if the mental capacities are going 
beyond what is “normal” – should we expect this person to shoulder 
more responsibility than the “normal” person? This kind of argument 
is disputed and there are many counter-arguments against the 
plausibility of such views. For example, Nicole Vincent suggests that 
responsibility is a “threshold” concept, at least insofar as the law is 
concerned: the law imposes an objective rather than a subjective 
standard of care onto everyone, and as long as you reach that standard 
(or threshold) you cannot be blamed for if things goes wrong even if 
you would have the capacity to do more than just reach that minimum 
standard (Vincent, 2013a, p.188). Similar ethical considerations are 
figuring in the treatment domain. For example, to what extent should 
a defendant with addictive problems be coerced to follow treatment? 
(see e.g., Meynen, 2014, p. 821). 
 
Revision 
In the revision domain, research focuses on whether neuroscientific 
findings should lead to revisions in the law or legal practices. In this 
domain, Petoft’s division between practical and theoretical questions 
becomes particularly relevant. A central part of this discussion 
revolves around the question of what neuroscientific findings means 
for our responsibility practices, both in law but also with regard to 
moral responsibility. Some argue that neuroscientific explanations of 
human behavior support the hypothesis that free will is an illusion, 
and that this lack of free will, in turn, comes in conflict with some 
fundamental elements in moral thinking as well as in our legal system. 
This hypothesis is based on the intuition that the moral basis of 
blaming and praising people is built on the assumption that they have 
a genuinely free choice. Contestants of this argument claims that this 
interpretation is a misunderstanding of what matters to our 
responsibility practices: they may argue that free will is compatible 
with neuroscientific explanations, since we have free will in virtue of 
possessing certain capacities and abilities, which is consistent with a 
naturalistic understanding of behavior.  
This theoretical discussion concerns the theoretical underpinnings 
of the legal system, i.e., assumptions and beliefs that are not 
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necessarily are part of the written law and regulations but are 
fundamental in the sense that many aspects of the legal system make 
sense only in light of these assumptions. For example, if we did not 
assume that people can adapt their behavior to legal standards, then 
most parts of the legal system seem unmotivated (Morse, 2007).  
This discussion can be compared to what Petoft calls “practical 
discussions”, which focus on how procedures within the legal system 
can be revised in light of neuroscience. One such example was 
mentioned in the previous section, concerning how neuroscientific 
methods could be used in coerced treatment of offenders with 
addictive behavior. Another example of such a practical discussion is 
the one concerned with how to treat juvenile offenders. Drawing on 
research about how the brain develops, it can be argued that a young 
person cannot be expected to have the same cognitive capacities as 
an adult, and consequently, young people do not deserve the same 
kind of legal treatment as adults (see on this topic Meynen (2016 and 
Steinberg (2013)). Another example considers how a better 
understanding of for example addictive behavior can lead to revisions 
in how addicts are treated with regard to responsibility and 
punishment, or more knowledge about certain mental disorders 
might revise the way we blame and punish mentally disordered 
offenders.  
In this thesis, the discussion is restricted to what according to 
Petoft’s distinction belongs to the theoretical part of the neurolaw 
discussion, and more specifically, to the theoretical part of the 
revision domain. The point of departure will be what I will call the 
Revision Argument, in which the central claim is that neuroscience 
gives us reasons to revise some fundamental assumptions in our legal 
system. The discussion surrounding this argument is directly related 
to the traditional free will and responsibility discussion, in the sense 
that it focuses on the question of how to combine a physicalist 
understanding of human behavior with the view that people are 
responsible because they have a genuine free will. The aim in this 
thesis is not to defend any particular idea of what it takes to act freely. 
Rather, I want to scrutinize whether compatibilism can provide what 




Free will compatibilism can be contrasted to free will 
incompatibilism. The disagreement between these two views 
concerns the possibility of having a genuinely free will in a 
deterministic world. Compatibilists argue that we have a genuinely 
free will also in a deterministic world, while the incompatibilist refutes 
this claim. Determinism and physicalism play central roles in the free 
will discussion, and will do so throughout this book. In the following 
sections, I will give a brief introduction to relevant metaphysical 
doctrines, and explain how I will interpret them in the discussions to 
come. Next, I provide a brief overview of some major positions in 
the free will discussion.  
1.3 Physicalism 
Physicalism is a central notion in the discussions to follow, but it is a 
complex notion surrounded by disagreements of what it amounts to. 
For example, what is the basic claim of physicalism? Is it that 
everything is physical, or is it that everything must fit into a physicalist 
description of the world? For our discussion, it will suffice to 
understand physicalism in a manner suggested by e.g., Frank Jackson: 
Physicalism […] claims that a complete account of what our world is 
like, its nature, (or, on some versions, a complete account of everything 
contingent about our world), can in principle be told in terms of a 
relatively small set of favored particles, properties, and relations, the 
‘physical’ ones. (Jackson, 1998, p. 6) 
According to this description of physicalism, it is not ruled out that 
there are no non-physical phenomena. A number of theorists, as e.g., 
David Lewis (1986), David Chalmers (1996) as well as Jackson 
himself (1998) have suggested that we need a contingent global 
supervenience thesis that says something of the actual world and 
various worlds that are similar to the actual world, in order to illustrate 
how physicalism restricts the variation of phenomena that supervene 
on the physical. Jackson’s version of such a supervenience thesis goes 
as follows:  
Any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate 
simpliciter of our world. (Jackson, 1998, p. 12)  
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This basically means that even though there are phenomena in the 
world that are not physical, these phenomena supervene on the 
physical properties in the world. Henceforth, if there is a world exactly 
like ours with respect to physical properties, then this world will be 
exactly like ours with respect to all the non-physical phenomena we 
admit in our ontology.  
One problem for the supervenience view is, according to some 
theorists, that it allows for non-reducible, non-physical properties. 
Since the supervenience thesis only restricts the world in the way that 
non-physical properties necessarily co-vary with the physical 
properties, it does not restrict what non-physical properties there are 
or the nature of these properties. In other words, the supervenience 
view is consistent with property dualism.  
 J.J.C Smart describes the property dualism argument as concerned 
with the following issue: 
Suppose we identify the Morning Star with the Evening Star. Then 
there must be some properties which logically imply that of being the 
Morning Star, and quite distinct properties which entail that of being 
the Evening Star. (Smart, 1959, p. 148)  
If we apply this line of reasoning to the mind-body identity theory 
Smart concludes that there must be some mental properties that are 
logically distinct from physical properties: if we identify mental states 
and physical states by different criteria, then theses states seem to 
have distinct properties. The reasoning about identities resembles of 
Saul Kripke’s argument for dualism, according to which identities, if 
true, are necessarily true. Kripke argues, in relation to the mind-brain 
identity theory, that cases of minds without brains are possible, as well 
as brains without minds. Since minds can exist without brains, and 
vice versa, minds and brains are not identical (Kripke, 1972, 1980, pp. 
153-154). Henceforth, there are non-reducible, mental properties in 
the world.8 
Kim (2002), argues that if we accept that mental properties are 
irreducible to physical properties, the physicalist thesis will 
nonetheless be different from the substance dualist thesis in the sense 
                                    




that insofar as non-reductive properties are causally effective, their 
causal relevance is due to physical properties. This view of causality is 
also defended by David Papineau: 
Mental occurrences have physical effects. For example, Eric Bristow’s 
desire to score thirty-two at darts causes him to hit double sixteen. But 
such physical effects are also attributable to physical causes. The 
trajectory of Eric Bristow’s dart is also caused by the arrangement of 
neurons in his brain and his consequent bodily movements. So, unless 
we want to say that such physical effects are overdetermined by two 
separate causes, which we clearly don’t, we need somehow to view the 
mental cause and the physical cause as the same cause. (Papineau, 1990, 
p. 66) 
Papineau’s reasoning is based on the idea of “causal closure” which 
he formulates as the thesis “all physical effects have sufficient physical 
causes” (Papineau, 1998, p. 375).  
There are objections to the principle of causal closure: for example, 
E.J Lowe (2000) argues that various forms of naturalistic dualism are 
consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that 
can plausibly be advocated. However, I take the principle of physical 
closure to be sufficiently well-established – even if not 
uncontroversial – for being used as a basic assumption about 
causation within a physicalist framework in the discussions to come. 
Yet, that mental causation either is identical with physical causation 
or implies overdetermination is not an obvious consequence of the 
acceptance of the causal closure of the physical realm. I will return to 
questions of physicalism, supervenience, and mental causation in 
chapters three, four and five, where they will be connected to 
questions of how moral properties supervene on natural properties.  
1.4 Determinism 
Determinism is a perennial topic in philosophy, and it is no 
exaggeration to say that it has played an absolutely central role in the 
free will discussion. However, exactly how to understand what 
determinism is, and what theoretical implications it has, is far from 
clear. As John Earman expresses it:  
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[…]some take the message of determinism to be clear and 
straightforward while others find it hopelessly vague and obscure; some 
take determinism to be intimately tied to predictability while others 
profess to see no such bond; some take determinism to embody an a 
priori truth, others take it to express a falsehood, and still others take it 
to be lacking in truth value; some take determinism to undermine 
human freedom and dignity, others see no conflict, and yet others think 
that determinism is necessary for free will; and on and on. Here we 
have, the cynic will say, a philosophy topic par excellence! (Earman, 1986, 
p. 1) 
As Earman nicely illustrates, determinism is the subject of immense 
disagreement among philosophers, both with regard to its content, 
but also with regard to its truth-value, and its implications for human 
freedom. Part of the problem is that the philosophical relevance of 
the deterministic thesis is closely connected to theories in physics. 
And even though philosophers may speculate about what physical 
determinism really means, we often (quite naturally) lack insight in the 
complex details of how different physical theories work, and what 
role determinism plays in these theories. Earman continues: 
Classical physics is supposed by philosophers to be a largely 
deterministic affair and to provide the paradigm examples of how 
determinism works. Relativity theory, in either its special or general 
form, is thought merely to update classical determinism by providing 
for Newtonian mechanisms relativistic counterparts that are no less and 
no more deterministic. And it is only with the advent of the quantum 
theory that a serious challenge to determinism is supposed to emerge; 
the challenge is simply not that quantum mechanics is prima facie non-
deterministic but that “no hidden variable” theorems show that, under 
plausible constraints, no deterministic completion of the quantum 
theory is possible. This picture is badly out of focus. Newtonian 
physics, I will argue, is not a paradise for determinism; in fact, 
Newtonian worlds provide environments that are quite hostile to 
determinism [...] The special theory of relativity rescues determinism 
from the main threat it faces in Newtonian worlds, and in special 
relativistic worlds pure and clean examples of determinism, free of 
artificial props, can be constructed [...] The quantum theory, of course, 
poses challenges of its own; but the first and foremost challenge is not 
to the truth of the doctrine of determinism but to its meaning in 
quantum worlds where the ontology may be nothing like that 
presupposed in the Newtonian and relativistic formulations of the 
doctrine. (Earman, 1986, p. 2)  
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However, as Henric Walter (2001) points out, how to exactly 
understand the quantum world is far from clear even among the most 
renowned physicists: “It does not help much to appeal to quantum 
theory’s founding father Niels Bohr, nor to genius Einstein, nor to 
the acclaimed physicist Penrose to defend the ‘true’ or ‘really correct’ 
interpretation of it” (2001, p. 25). 
Given this picture, it might seem as if the use of the notion of 
determinism may cause more troubles than solutions in a 
philosophical discussion of free will. But if we accept that the 
meaning of determinism in physics is obscure, and that even the most 
renowned experts are not united in how to understand determinism 
in relation to different explanatory frameworks of the physical world 
(such as quantum mechanics, Newtonian physics, and relativistic 
formulations) we can still make use of determinism as a metaphysical 
doctrine, similar to other metaphysical doctrines philosophers use in 
order to build theoretical frameworks. For example, in ethics some 
people may postulate that there are moral facts, and in metaphysics, 
some may postulate that there is a reality independent of us. Given 
that determinism is not an empirically established thesis, I think it is 
plausible to view the use of determinism in philosophical discussions 
in a similar vein: as a metaphysical doctrine that may or may not be 
true. When determinism is referred to in the following discussions, it 
is such a metaphysical hypothesis that I have in mind. Still, that does 
not mean that using the term “determinism” is without 
complications, but that at least (some of) the issues related to physics 
theories can be circumvented in this way. 
In philosophy, a common characterization of determinism states 
that every event is causally necessitated by antecedent events. It can 
be summarized as the thesis that the facts of the past, in conjunction 
with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future (see, e.g., 
McKenna & Coates 2015, O’Connor, 2005). Another way to put it is 
like Randolph Clarke does:  
[…] determinism is the thesis that our world is such that any possible 
world that has the exactly same laws of nature and that is exactly like 
our world at any one point in time is exactly like it in every point in 
time […] I shall take determinism to conjoin this claim with the thesis 
that for every even E (except those beginning at the very first time, if 
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there is a first time), at every time t prior to the occurrence of E there 
is some event (or some plurality of events) that occurs at t that 
deterministically causes E. One event is taken to deterministically cause 
another just in case, in every possible world in which the actual laws of 
nature obtain and in which the first event occurs, it causes the second. 
(Clarke, 2003, p. 4) 
This thesis means that for every person, the facts of the past, in 
conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the 
person’s future acts. Does free will have any place in such a 
framework? At face value, the above description of determinism 
seems to imply that people’s actions are completely governed by 
factors beyond their own control. However, what it means to have 
control, and hence what it takes to exercise free will in a deterministic 
world is a topic of discussion. According to compatibilists, there is a 
sense of control that can be maintained in a deterministic world, and 
in this sense, we can have free will. The incompatibilist refutes this 
contention: according to her, free will is not compatible with us being 
completely determined. A brief description of these two positions is 
provided below.  
1.5 Free will 
In B.F Skinner’s (1948) utopian novel Walden Two, the citizens live 
rich lives. They pursue arts, sciences, crafts and music. They enjoy 
what seems to be a pleasant existence with plenty of leisure. In a way, 
Walden Two is the freest place on earth, since the people living there 
have maximal freedom of choice and action. They can do anything 
they want to do. There is no coercion, and no punishment. No one 
has to be forced to do anything against his or her will. However, 
behavioral engineers covertly control people’s wishes and desires. 
They can do anything they want since they have been conditioned not 
to want anything they cannot have.  
Are the people in Walden Two free? In the novel, a philosopher 
visiting Walden Two argues that they are not, since all they have is 
surface freedom, whereas real freedom must also consist of deep 
freedom of will. Frazier, the fictional founder of the society, answers 
that there is no real loss. Frazier thinks there is no such deep freedom 
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of will: it is an illusion in the first place. We do not, and cannot, have 
deep freedom of will, neither inside nor outside Walden Two.  
Skinner’s novel illustrates the essence of the free will discussion. 
What is it to exercise one’s free will? Do we have free will even if our 
wishes and desires are determined by factors beyond our control? The 
possible determining factors may include fate, God, the laws of 
nature, heredity, psychological or social conditioning, hidden 
controllers, and so on. But they all lead to the question whether we 
really are free. Many people appreciate that there is at least an 
apparent conflict between free will and determinism, but there is an 
immense disagreement whether they are truly incompatible, or that 
the apparent conflict disappears if we do some philosophical 
footwork. Many philosophers and scientists have argued that despite 
appearances to the contrary, determinism poses no real threat to free 
will, at least not the relevant kind of freedom or free will. This view 
that determinism is not a threat to the relevant kind of freedom or 
free will, is called “free will compatibilism”. The opposite view that 
free will is not possible in a determined world is called “free will 
incompatibilism.”  
1.5.1 Compatibilism 
Compatibilism about free will seeks to explicate an account of free 
will that is not threatened by the possibility that all actions are causally 
determined. Michael McKenna (2015) suggest that compatibilism’s 
place in contemporary philosophy can be understood as a 
development with at least three stages. The first stage entails classical 
compatibilist theories with roots in historical writing by for example 
Thomas Hobbes in the 16th century, and David Hume in the 18th 
century. In the modern discussion such classical compatibilism was 
defended by e.g. A.J Ayer (1954) and J.J.C Smart (1961). The core in 
classical compatibilist theory is that freedom of the will only requires 
the absence of compulsion and coercion. When an act is caused by or 
carried out in line with an agent’s desires and/or wills, then it is an act 
out of free will. The second stage departures the classical 
compatibilist view in the 1960’s: one incompatibilist argument put 
forward by Carl Ginet (1966) to the effect that if one has not the 
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possibility to do otherwise, one has no free will (Ginet’s argument is 
similar to what is known as “the consequence argument” put forward 
by van Inwagen, 1983); Harry Frankfurt’s thought experiment against 
the intuition that responsibility presupposes the possibility of doing 
otherwise (Frankfurt, 1969); and P.F Strawson’s descriptive account 
of responsibility practices and reactive attitudes in his seminal paper 
“Freedom and Resentment” (Strawson, 1962a). The third stage 
involves different kinds of contemporary forms of compatibilism that 
have been developed through the discussions and insights that 
characterized the second “transitional” stage, as for example, debates 
about the plausibility and implications of Frankfurt-style examples 
(see Kane, 2002, p. 17). I will discuss some compatibilist theories 
more thoroughly in chapter four.  
1.5.2 Incompatibilism 
Free will incompatibilism states that any free action must be an 
undetermined event: we can act freely only if determinism is false. It 
is worth pointing out that incompatibilism does not entail that there 
is no free will – it simply points out that free will and determinism are 
incompatible. One can be incompatibilist without taking a stance on 
the question about whether we have a free will or not – the 
incompatibilist claim is only that if determinism is true then there is no 
free will. Or, one can be an incompatibilist and take determinism to 
be true and, thereby, dismiss the possibility of free will. A third 
alternative is to be incompatibilist and embrace libertarianism. 
Libertarianism about free will is the position that people sometimes 
act freely in the sense that is incompatible with determinism: people 
sometimes act without being causally determined to do so. As was 
noted above, determinism, as it is interpreted in this thesis, is a 
metaphysical hypothesis, and there are those who argue that we have 
more evidence supporting the hypothesis that the world is not 
determined than we have for the hypothesis that it is. When accepting 
such a claim, libertarianism about free will seems more plausible than 
alternative theories of free will. However, libertarianism about free 
will is not a homogenous theory: there are at least three major 
categories of libertarians: event-causation libertarians, agent-
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causation libertarians and non-causal libertarians (O'Connor & 
Franklin, 2019). I will provide a brief description of the basic ideas in 
each of these views below.  
 
Event-causal libertarianism 
Event-causal libertarians hold that some of a person’s actions are self-
determined and that self-determination requires nondeterministic 
causation.  
One of the most prominent contemporary defenders of this type 
of libertarianism is Robert Kane (see e.g., 1985, 1989,1996, 2000). In 
Kane’s libertarian theory, free will and moral responsibility have close 
connections, and he thinks that people can be morally responsible for 
actions that are causally determined by their character. But he insists 
that in order to be morally responsible, at least some of the prior 
actions that have contributed to that character have not been causally 
determined. Kane calls these actions “self-forming actions” – or SFAs 
– since it is, at least partly, because of these actions that our character 
is like it is (Palmer, 2104, p. 4). In one of Kane’s examples of such a 
self-forming action, we are to imagine a business woman on her way 
to an important meeting when she comes across a person in need of 
help. The woman is torn by doing the moral thing (to stop and help) 
and doing the self-interested thing (carrying on to her meeting). She 
recognizes the reasons to do both and regard neither of the sets of 
reasons as weighing more than the other. Kane argues that in light of 
these conflicting motivations, the woman must make a mental effort 
to get her ends or purposes sorted out or to “set” her will in one way 
or another, that may initiate action in one way or another (Kane, 1996, 
p. 126). And it is the event of her making this effort, in combination 
with the event of her having reasons to perform it that non-
deterministically cause her action (Palmer, 2104, p. 6). At his point, in 
his work, Robert Kane also refers to a situation of “chaos” and 
“quantum events” in the person's brain. “Non-determinism” in this 
context should be understood as that the reasons one has for 
performing an action cause the action in a non-determined way: 
according to the event-libertarian, given the past and the laws, it could 
have been the case that other reasons could have non-
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deterministically (and nondeviantly) caused a different action 
(O'Connor & Franklin, 2019).  
 
Non-causal accounts of free will 
Non-causal libertarians contend that the power of self-determination 
need not be causally structured. Instead, an intentional action begins 
with a basic mental action, such as a decision or a choice. An action 
as e.g., raising one’s arm is held to be a non-basic, complex action that 
is constituted by a basic action that brings about a certain bodily 
movement (Clarke & Capes, 2017). An influential defender of non-
causal libertarianism is Carl Ginet (e.g., 1989, 1990, 2008). According 
to Ginet, we must understand the relation between intentions and 
actions when we are interested in explaining actions, and this relation 
has nothing to do with laws of nature (Ginet, 1989, p. 34) Instead, we 
control our basic actions, as e.g., choices, simply by having them, and 
by the fact that they are ours. Given that the event which is your 
choice is not determined by anything else, it is only you that ensure that 
what you do actually occur: “If an event is S’s action the S (but, of 
course, no one else) can ensure its occurrence, determine that it occurs 
and thus whether or not it occurs, just by performing it” (Ginet, 1998, 
p.22). 
 
Agent-causal accounts of free will  
According to agent-causal views, the agent herself must play a causal 
role in self-determined actions. Some agent-causal libertarians 
integrate both the agent herself but also her reasons for action in what 
causes actions (e.g., Clarke, 2003) whereas others deny that an agent’s 
reasons play a causal role in self-determined actions (e.g., O’Connor 
2000). In O’Connor’s view, a free decision must be caused by the 
agent, and it must not be the case that what the agent causes must be 
causally determined by prior events. Agent causation is another form 
of causation compared to mechanistic causation, according to 
O’Connor, which involves “the characteristic activity of purposive 
free agents” (O’Connor, 2000, p. 113) As with mechanistic causation, 
agent causation is, in O’Connor’s view, also grounded in a property 
or a set of properties. This means that any agent having the relevant 
internal properties have it “directly within his power to cause any of 
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a range of states of intention delimited by internal and external 
circumstances” (O’Connor, 2000, p. 113). If we think of properties 
that ground mechanistic causation, there is a direct causal function in 
such circumstances where these properties produce certain effects. In 
contrast, properties that ground agent causation are not direct in that 
sense: instead, they are “choice-enabling” which means that they, in 
suitable circumstances, are properties that ground the agent’s power 
to freely bring about, or freely cause, a certain intentional state 
(O’Connor, 2000, p. 113).  
Clarke (2003) argues that agent-causation views as the one 
defended by O’Connor, that excludes reasons as causes, appear 
unable to account for why reasons explain actions. In order to avoid 
this problem, Clarke defends an “integrated” agent- causal view, 
according to which non-deterministic event causation is part of 
directly free actions. With such a combination, Clarke argues, we gain 
both the origination of action that is provided by traditional agent-
causal accounts, but also what is needed for reasons-explanations 
(Clarke, 2003, pp. 135-136). 
1.5.3 A disclaimer about how free will is to be 
discussed in this thesis 
One of the premises in the Revision Argument is that according to 
folk psychology, we have a libertarian free will. However, what kind 
of libertarian free will that is required according to folk psychology is 
not specified, so in order to assess it, it could be argued that we must 
know more about what libertarian theory of free will that is intended. 
However, the objections towards the Revision Argument that are 
discussed in this thesis are not concerned with this particular issue. 
Instead, these objections reject the general claim that folk psychology 
requires libertarian free will and argue that a compatibilist view of free 
will is sufficient both for the folk psychological understanding of 
responsibility and desert as well as for the law. Hence, according to 
these objections, free will compatibilism can do the job that the 
Revision Argument claims has to be done by libertarian free will. This 
view, in turn, means that the ideas concerning free will and 
responsibility that will be discussed are compatibilist ideas, i.e., ideas 
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that accept the determinist hypothesis. Given the scope of this thesis, 
I will hence not go further into the specifics of each of the types of 
libertarianism. 
1.6 Some theories of mental states 
1.6.1 Introduction 
In any theory of free will, a person’s mental capacities play a 
fundamental role in explaining why and when a person exercises her 
free will. In order to make sense of this claim, we must have an idea 
of what mental states and mental capacities are.  
In contemporary discussions of the nature of mental states, a 
central theme is to find a place for the mind in a world that is 
fundamentally physical (Kim, 2000, p. 2). As was noted in section 1.3, 
physicalism entails that mental states are, or are derivative from, 
physical states. 
 In the discussions to follow in this thesis, physicalism will be a 
constraint for what theories of mental states that are possible 
candidates in a theory of free will. In the following subsections, I will 
introduce some theories about mental states that are physicalist in the 
relevant sense.  
1.6.2 The identity theory of mind 
According to Jaegwon Kim (2000), the current debates on the mind-
body problem can be traced back to Herbert Feigl’s paper “The 
‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’ “ (1958) and J.J.C Smart’s “Sensations and 
Brain Processes” (1959).9 Both these papers defend, independently of 
each other, an approach to the nature of the mind that has come to 
be known as the identity theory.  
                                    
9 Kim acknowledges that U.T. Place (1956) developed a similar idea some years 
before Smart and Feigl. According to Kim, Place’s paper has not been as influential 
as Smart’s and Feigl’s. However, Smart’s paper was a “refined and elaborated” 
version of Place’s ideas (Chalmers, 2002, p. 4), and he is often mentioned as one of 




The core idea of the identity theory is that mental states and 
processes are identical to states and processes of the brain. It does 
not entail that the brain is the mind in the sense that whatever one’s 
brain weighs this mass is the weight of one’s mind. Rather, the identity 
statement of the identity theory is to the effect that mental states are 
brain processes, as contrasted to being merely correlated with brain 
processes (Smart, 2017).  
According to the identity theory, the meaning of two sentences 
must not be identical in order for the sentences to have the same 
reference. U.T Place discusses this relation as follows: 
Those who contend that the statement “consciousness is a brain 
process” is logically untenable base their claim, I suspect, on the 
mistaken assumption that if the meanings of two statements or 
expressions are quite unconnected, they cannot both provide an 
adequate characterization of the same object or state of affairs: if 
something is a state of consciousness, it cannot be a brain process, since 
there is nothing self-contradictory in supposing that someone feels a 
pain when there is nothing happening inside his skull. By the same 
token we might be led to conclude that a table cannot be an old packing 
case, since there is nothing self-contradictory in supposing that a table 
cannot be an old packing case, since there is nothing self-contradictory 
in supposing that someone has a table but is not in possession of an 
old packing case. (Place, 1956, pp. 45-46)  
The trick is, according to Place, to keep distinct the “is” of 
composition and the “is” of definition. The claim “sensations are 
brain processes” makes use of “is” of composition, and hence it is an 
empirical matter whether this claim is true or false.  
Smart and Feigl focus instead on the distinction between meaning 
and reference: “very bright planet seen in the morning” and “very 
bright planet seen in the evening” both refer to the same entity, 
Venus. It is a contingent matter if the references are identical. In a 
similar vein, “sensations are brain processes” is a contingent claim 
(Smart, 2017).  
Paul Feyerabend (1963) argues that the identity thesis formulated 
as an identity relation between mental processes and brain states is 
problematic since it implies a version of dualism: “It not only implies, 
as it is intended to imply, that mental events have physical features; it 
also seems to imply (if read from the right to the left) that some 
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physical events […] have nonphysical features. It thereby replaces a 
dualism of events by a dualism of features” (Feyerabend, 1963, p. 
295). Feyerabend’s diagnosis is that this way of stating the identity is 
not sufficient for deciding the issue between monism and dualism. If 
we want to defend a monistic thesis, we must approach the matter 
differently: the identity theory should not only point to the fact that 
mental events are physical events, it also favors a redefinition of 
mental terms (Feyeraben, 1963, p. 296).  
W.V.O Quine also endorses the idea that mental event terms 
appear superfluous in the light of the identity thesis, and that terms 
denoting the physical states that are identified with the mental states 
would be useful. In his view, the mental states do not exist anyway, 
but the physical states do: “[t]he bodily states exist anyway; why add 
others?” (Quine, 1960, p. 264).  
One of the most powerful arguments against the identity theory is 
the multiple realizability argument, originally put forth by Hilary 
Putnam (1967). Putnam argues that in order for an identity theory to 
be true, a mental state, such as pain, must have some common 
physical/chemical basis in all kinds of creatures that can experience 
pain. But arguably, we want to be able to ascribe pain also to creatures 
that do not share our physical constitution. This criticism targets what 
is known as “type-type physicalism,” according to which a certain 
type of mental state is identical with a certain type of brain state. A 
less demanding version of physicalism is “type-token” physicalism, 
according to which a specific type of mental events can be realized by 
different tokens of brain states. However, a type-token kind of 
physicalism is a much weaker thesis than type-type physicalism: it 
does not specify what kind of physical properties that are identical 
with mental kinds, and that seems to be problematic from an 
explanatory point of view: how can we form scientific laws that 
include mental states, if they are identical with a perhaps infinite set 
of physical properties?  
David Lewis approaches the identity theory from this perspective, 
and changes focus from identity with a specific neural kind to the role 
of causality in the identification of mental states:  
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The definitive characteristics of any (sort of) experience as such is its 
causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we 
materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic 
necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since 
those physical states possess the definitive characteristics of experience, 
they must be the experiences. (Lewis, 1966, p. 17) 
This view allows for the same kind of mental event to be instantiated 
in different physical systems, as long as it has the “most typical” 
causes and effects that are associated with this mental kind.  
1.6.3 Eliminative materialism 
Eliminative materialism, or eliminativism, is a radical position about 
the nature of mental states and the meaning of mental state terms, 
rooted in the views defended by Quine (1960) and Feyerabend (1963). 
According to eliminativism our common-sense view of the mind is 
fundamentally mistaken, and some or all of the mental states as they 
are understood by people in general, do not exist.10  
Paul Churchland argues that an adequate and accurate theory of 
thinking and action should have considerable explanatory power, but 
folk psychology does not meet this requirement since it, for example, 
cannot explain why certain mental phenomena occur (P. M. 
Churchland, 1981, pp. 69-73). Another line of argument proceeds 
from the fact that folk theories change over time since they are 
commonly mistaken about all sorts of things. For example, the folk 
psychological understanding of certain mental disorders has 
undergone a radical ontological change in light of scientific 
discoveries about these disorders. Historically, some kinds of bizarre 
behavior were explained with reference to demons or other 
supernatural powers. In (most) contemporary accounts of behavior 
related to mental disorder, there are no references to supernatural 
powers: such explanations turned out to be empty since they referred 
to things that are not real (Ramsey, 2019).  
                                    
10 Ideas such as those defended by Quine and Feyeraben were preceded by C.D 
Broad in The Mind and its Place in Nature (Broad, 1925) and Wilfred Sellar’s article  
“Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (Sellars, 1956).  
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Eliminative materialism has been criticized from different 
perspectives. One is that the eliminative materialists ignore the 
explanatory power that folk psychology has when it comes to 
explaining and predicting behavior (see, e.g., Fodor, 1987). Other 
critics claim that folk psychology as an explanatory framework is 
committed to less than eliminativists typically assume. Instead, folk 
psychological explanations are not very ontologically demanding and 
are compatible with a wide range of ontological claims about the 
nature of the human mind (see e.g., Jackson and Pettit, 1990).  
1.6.4 Property dualism 
Property dualism holds that mental phenomena are non-physical 
properties of physical substances. Mental states are, hence, irreducible 
to physical states. One of the fundamental motivations for this 
approach is that reductive physicalism is an “unreasonably strong 
claim” (Hellman & Thompson, 1975, p. 551) More specifically, what 
is unreasonably strong is the claim that all scientific terms (in this case, 
mental terms that figure in scientific explanations) can be given 
explicit definitions in physical terms. Ernest LePore and Barry 
Loewer express their view on this subject as follows:  
It is practically received wisdom among philosophers of mind that 
psychological properties (including content properties) are not identical 
to neuropsychological or other physical properties. The relationship 
between psychological and neurophysiological properties is that the 
latter realize the former. Furthermore, a single psychological property 
might (in the sense of conceptual possibility) be realized by a large 
number, perhaps infinitely many, of different physical properties and 
even by non-physical properties. (Lepore & Loewer, 2011, p. 181) 
Lepore & Loewer argue that mental states are multiply realizable in a 
“perhaps infinitely many” of different physical properties. As 
mentioned above, it was Hilary Putnam (1967) who first introduced 
the concept of multiple realizability in the mind-body discussion. As 
later writers have stressed, the multiple realizability of the mental is a 
conceptual point: it is an a priori conceptual fact about mental 
properties that their specification does not include constraints on the 
physical properties that realize them (Kim, 2002, p. 137). Since the 
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irreducibility of mental states is conceptual irreducibility, it concerns 
irreducibility of mental types, not mental tokens. In other words, it is 
impossible to reduce the mental type of e.g., pain, to certain physical 
properties, since pain can be realized by a perhaps infinitely many 
different physical properties. A response to the contention that 
mental properties are irreducible is to suggest that, e.g., pain is 
reducible to a disjunction of physical properties. This suggestion has 
been discarded by e.g., Jerry Fodor, who argues that the disjunction 
strategy makes mental states unable to figure in scientific laws. Since, 
Fodor argues, for a special science (like psychology) to be reducible 
to a physical theory, each kind in the special science must have a 
nomologically coextensive kind in the physical theory. In Fodor’s 
vocabulary, P is a kind in a science just in case the science contains a 
law with P as its antecedent or consequent (Fodor, 2002, pp. 131-
132). If mental properties are identified with a conjunction of physical 
properties, this conjunction of physical properties does not qualify as 
a kind, since a disjunction of heterogenous kinds is not a kind itself. 
And that would make mental states disqualified for being included in 
scientific theories, and hence, also disqualified from figuring in causal 
relations. If mental states lack causal power, it is, supposedly, 
connected to a number of problems in other domains. For example, 
it seems difficult to justify that we blame and punish people on the 
ground that certain mental states were involved in their bad actions. 
Kim argues that if we accept multiple realization of mental states, we 
must choose between either allowing disjunctive kinds, or 
acknowledge that our mental concepts do not pick out kinds and 
properties in the world (Kim, 2002, p. 147).  
The discussion about whether mental properties can figure in 
causal explanations depends heavily on one’s view of causation. Kim 
defends a “production view” of causation according to which an 
antecedent causes an effect if and only if it is both necessary and 
sufficient for the effect to come around, but many writers have 
objected that this view is problematic. As for example, Christian List 
& Peter Menzies (2017) discard the production view and argue that if 
we adopt a counterfactual approach to causation, it becomes obvious 
that mental causation cannot be reduced to physical causation. I will 
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return to questions of mental causation in chapter four and discuss 
List & Menzies’ view to some extent in chapter five.  
1.6.5 Functionalism 
According to functionalism, what makes something a mental state of 
a particular kind– a belief, a smell, a pain – is the functional relations the 
state bears to the subject’s other mental states and behavior (see, e.g., 
Block, 1994). If taking the mental state of pain as an example: even if 
the pain in you corresponds to a specific neural state n1, n1 is not 
included in the definition of what it means that you are in pain. n1 
realizes your pain but is not the pain. In another organism with a 
different neural system, the neural state n2a could realize a mental 
state with the same function. But since the mental state realized by n2 
occupies the same functional role in this system as pain does in you 
(let us say that pain makes you try to avoid the cause of the pain) we 
can conclude that this different organism can have the mental state 
of pain as well, even if this mental state is realized by radically 
different physical processes.  
Functionalism is not a homogenous theory of mind. Different 
functionalist theories have been developed in relation to different 
aims. An early version of functionalism, developed as a response to 
the difficulties behaviorism faced, was machine state functionalism, 
perhaps most closely associated with Putnam (1975a, 1975c). 
According to this approach, the mind should be viewed as a 
probabilistic automaton. The theory aims to specify the probability 
with which the system, i.e., the mind, would enter a certain state, i.e., 
mental state, given a certain input, and then produce a certain output. 
Mental states are, in this framework, “machine table states” which are 
specified in terms of not only their relations to inputs and outputs but 
also to other states in the system at the time being (Levin, 2018). 
Another functionalist approach is “psycho-functionalism” which 
is closely related to cognitive science. According to psycho-
functionalism, associated with, e.g., Jerry Fodor and Ned Block 
(1972), psychology is an irreducibly complex science employing 
purposive explanations. Such explanations are also employed in 
biological sciences: as for example, in order to understand what a 
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heart is, we describe it as something that pumps blood, and as such it 
occupies a special role in the overall system of which it is a part. 
Analogously, mental states such as beliefs and desires are determined 
by the functional or causal role they have according to our best 
scientific psychological theory.  
As mentioned above, Lewis (1966) defends a type-token kind of 
identity theory, in which mental states are identified by their causal 
roles, and the causal roles are most plausibly filled by neural states. 
Lewis’ functionalism is called “analytic functionalism” and is 
specifically concerned with the meaning of mental state terms, and 
how they can be “translated” into functional descriptions that 
preserve the meanings of these terms. If this is a successful approach, 
Lewis’ view escapes an objection to the original identity theory that 
charges it of implying property dualism, and hence, he succeeds in 
escaping the threat of epiphenomenalism facing the property 
dualists.11 I will return to the Lewisian approach to causation in 
chapters four and five.  
1.7 Summary  
In this chapter the main themes underlying the argumentation of this 
thesis have been introduced and briefly discussed: neurolaw, free will 
and some different physicalist theories of mental states. Neurolaw 
was briefly described as a heterogenous, interdisciplinary research 
field that can be divided into the areas of assessment, intervention 
and revision. The Revision Argument, which is the point of departure 
for the discussions in this thesis, is a contribution to the theoretical 
part of the revision area of neurolaw. Some central features in free 
will compatibilism and free will incompatibilism were described. In 
the final section of this chapter I provided a brief description of a few 
theories of mental states that are relevant for the discussions in this 
thesis. In the next chapter, I will present and discuss the details of the 
Revision Argument.  
                                    
11 An objection that Smart (1959) attributed to Max Black (Block, 2007, p. 249)  and 





2 The Revision Argument 
2.1  Introduction 
The Revision Argument plays a central role in the discussion in this 
thesis. In this chapter this argument will be described and discussed 
in detail.  
The Revision Argument is what I take to be the most plausible 
interpretation of an argument put forward by Joshua Greene and 
Jonathan Cohen in their seminal article “For the Law, Neuroscience 
Changes Nothing and Everything” published in 2004 and since then 
one of the most cited and discussed papers in the neurolaw debate.  
The main claim in the Revision Argument is that from a 
philosophical point of view, we have reasons to think that we do not 
have free will, at least not in the sense that is presupposed in our 
everyday understanding of human action, as well as in legal contexts. 
The rapid development of neuroscience has provided further 
evidence supporting this view. Greene and Cohen describe the role 
of neuroscience in the free will debate as follows:  
[C]ontrary to legal and philosophical orthodoxy, determinism really 
does threaten free will and responsibility, as we intuitively understand 
them. It is just that most of us, including most philosophers and legal 
theorists, have yet to appreciate it [...] Neuroscience has a special role 
in this process for the following reason. As long as the mind remains a 
black box, there will always be a donkey on which to pin dualist or 
libertarian intuitions. For a long time, philosophical arguments have 
persuaded people that human action has purely mechanical causes, but 
not everyone cares for philosophical arguments. Arguments are nice, 
but physical demonstrations are far more compelling. What 
neuroscience does, and will continue to do at an accelerated pace, is 
elucidate the ‘when’, ‘where’, and ‘how’ of the mechanical processes 
that cause behavior. It is one thing to deny that human decision-making 
is purely mechanical when your opponent only offers a general, 
philosophical argument. It is quite another to hold your ground when 
your opponent can make detailed predictions about these mechanical 
processes work, complete with images of the brain structures involved 
and equations that describe their function. Thus, neuroscience holds 
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the promise of turning the black box of the mind into a transparent 
bottleneck. (Greene & Cohen, 2004, pp. 1781-82) 
The main concern in the Revision Argument is that certain parts of 
our legal responsibility practice are founded on libertarian intuitions 
about people’s free will, while we have strong reasons to reject the 
belief in libertarian free will. Philosophical arguments against the view 
that people have a free will have been put forward many times 
throughout history, but now there are also physical demonstrations 
in support of the claim that human behavior is purely mechanical. We 
have, hence, both philosophical arguments and scientific evidence 
which urge us to revise the folk psychological understanding of 
human action. Since our current legal system(s) and the normative 
standards therein are grounded in a folk psychological understanding 
of behavior, they will be affected by such a revision, Greene and 
Cohen argue.  
In order to see what kind of folk psychological explanations that 
the Revision Argument focuses on, consider the following example:  
Cornelia, who is out on a walk, approaches a child who is about to 
drown in a pond. Cornelia considers if she should help the child or not 
but chooses not to since that would require her to go out in the water 
and she doesn’t like wet clothes. She continues her walk, and the child 
drowns.  
Given that there is nothing wrong with Cornelia, i.e., she has no 
cognitive or volitional deficits due to a mental disorder that could be 
used in an explanation of her behavior, it seems uncontroversial to 
say that Cornelia acted wrongly and deserves to be blamed for what 
she did. It seems that Cornelia easily could have made the choice of 
saving the child and that not doing so was a selfish choice which led 
to horrific consequences. The assumption that Cornelia had a choice 
plays a vital role here, because it is plausible to assume that we would 
perceive the situation differently if Cornelia was somehow coerced to 
leave the child behind for some reason that we acknowledge as 
legitimate. For example, it could have been the case that Cornelia 
wanted to save the child, but someone held her back so she was 
physically unable to go out in the pond, and then she would not 
deserve blame for not saving the child.  
CHAPTER TWO 
 37 
The above line of reasoning is a typical folk psychological 
description of an action and its moral implications. The possibility to 
choose how to act hinges on different things. One such thing is that 
we are aware of the nature of our actions. For example, if I 
intentionally grab and keep someone else’s wallet when she drops it 
without noticing it, we normally think I could have chosen not to do 
so. But if I by mistake take someone else’s wallet because it looks 
exactly like my own, it seems like the choice to give the wallet back to 
the owner was not open to me, given what I believed in the situation 
at hand (that I was the owner). 
In the legal context, the difference between intentional and 
unintentional acts plays an important role. When assessing whether a 
crime has taken place, it is not only the objective circumstances that 
are considered, i.e., the circumstances that can be objectively 
established regarding the behavior on the crime scene. The mental 
characteristics of the agent are also of vital importance in the 
assessment of whether a crime has been committed, and whether the 
defendant is to be viewed as deserving blame or punishment for what 
has happened.12 
But if we assume that determinism is true, it seems that everything 
we do is equally determined to happen: regardless of whether we 
ourselves think that we can choose to act or not, the choice and the 
act are not “up to us.” If we imagine a mechanical event, as, for 
example, a bowling ball hitting some bowling pins, there is nothing in 
that event that is “up to” the bowling ball. According to the 
determinist hypothesis, our actions are not more “up to us” than the 
whereabouts of a bowling ball (and the pins) are “up to the ball.” We 
are of course more complex than bowling balls, but complexity does 
not play a distinguishing role according to this view: everything that 
happens do so out of necessity, and this fact holds for the simplest as 
well as the most complex systems in the universe.  
Even though there are obvious differences between people and 
non-living things with regard to how they interact with the world, i.e., 
                                    
12 In certain cases, people can be legally responsible and punished even if they didn’t 
commit a criminal action intentionally. For example, a parent can be legally 
responsible on the behalf of her child, and a manager can be responsible for what 
her employees do. Such cases will be discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5.  
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with regard to functional properties, one can ask if there is room for 
desert in a world where people’s choices and action are no less 
determined than is a bowling ball’s movements. According to the 
Revision Argument, the answer is no: there is no place for desert in 
such a world. Since retributive punishment requires desert in order to 
be justified, this view implies that retributive punishment lacks 
justification. And in so far as we demand justified legal punishment 
practices, we need to revise the legal system in the sense that we must 
remove the retributive principle from the system and replace it with 
a justification that does not rely on desert.  
In this section I have provided a brief background of the moral 
and legal context in which the Revision Argument was developed, and 
I pointed out the main target of the argument. In the next section, 
2.2, the argument is presented in the form of three premises and a 
conclusion, after which I will discuss the content of these premises in 
more detail in section 2.3. The Revision Argument holds that parts of 
our legal responsibility practice are unjustified. Responsibility, 
however, is not a clear-cut concept. In section 2.4, some different 
interpretations of this concept are presented. In section 2.5, I will 
make clear what notion of responsibility I use when I discuss the 
Revision Argument and the objections to it in this thesis. A summary 
of the chapter is provided in section 2.6. 
2.2 Outline of the Revision Argument 
The Revision Argument can be spelled out as follows: 
THE REVISION ARGUMENT 
(P1) Punishment needs to be justified 
One of the functions of the legal system is to punish those who engage 
in criminal behavior. Legal punishment should be based on a principle 
that makes the punishment morally justified.  
(P2) The current retributivist justification  
In the current legal system, the justification of punishment is at least 
partly retributivist. Legal punishment is legitimized by folk morality, 
and folk morality is based on a folk psychological understanding of 
behavior, according to which:  
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(a) people have, and their actions are explained partly in terms of, 
a libertarian free will. 
According to folk morality, the following principles hold for a justified 
retributive punishment: 
(b) it is only justified to punish those who deserve it, and 
(c) someone deserves punishment only if she is responsible for her 
actions, and 
(d) someone is responsible for her actions only if she can act freely, and 
(e) someone can act freely only if she has a libertarian free will. 
(P3) Undermining the retributivist justification 
If we accept determinism, no one can have a libertarian free will, since 
actions are determined by earlier events and the laws of nature. The 
view that human action works according to deterministic and 
mechanical principles is supported by neuroscience since people’s 
behavior can be accounted for in purely neuroscientific terms. In a 
neuroscientific explanation of action, free will is not required in order 
to make sense of why people act as they do. Hence, neuroscience 
supports the view that according to the best explanation, free will is not 
involved in human action. (‘Neuroscience turns the black box of the 
mind into a transparent bottleneck’(Greene & Cohen, 2004, p. 1781).) 
Conclusion 
We have strong reasons to reject the hypothesis that people have a 
libertarian free will. However, libertarian free will is required by folk 
psychology and folk morality in order for people to be responsible in 
the sense that they can deserve punishment. Consequently, if there is 
no libertarian free will, we are never justified in punishing people for 
their actions on the ground that they deserve it. This means that 
accepting the principle according to which it is only justified to punish 
people if they deserve it, implies that it is never justified to punish 
people. (P2-P3) 
Since retributivism is part of our current legal system, and it has turned 
out that retributivism cannot be a principle according to which we 
justifiably punish people, we need to revise the legal system in the sense 
that retributivism must be removed from the punishment practice, and 
replaced with another theory of punishment that is not based on the 
requirement that a person must have a libertarian free will on order to 
be justifiably punished. (P1) 
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2.3 Elaborating the argument 
The central aim of this section is to specify how to understand the 
most significant claims and concepts in the Revision Argument, 
which is, in short, an argument to revise the law – deleting the 
retributive element – based on neuroscientific findings. At some 
points, this elaboration will be done by providing additional 
information from the original article by Greene & Cohen. At other 
points, concepts and claims are underspecified and/or open for more 
than one reading, and in these cases, I will specify how I understand 
them in the discussions to come. Premise two will be given the most 
attention due to its complex structure. It is also premise two that gains 
most criticism in the objections that are discussed in the ensuing 
chapters of the book.  
2.3.1 First premise: Punishment needs to be justified 
A basic feature of the legal system is that when people commit 
criminal actions, they can be legally punished for them. Punishment 
is not exercised on an ad-hoc basis, but under principles that guide 
when, why and how the punishment practice is implemented.  
When I talk of “the legal system” in the discussions to come, I do 
not have a specific system in mind. Instead, it is best understood as a 
basic tenet of many legal systems; more specifically, I take my 
arguments to apply to any system that punishes at least partly with 
reference to retributive principles as justification, distinguishes 
between actions that are carried out freely and those that are not, and 
gains legitimacy from folk morality.  
A starting point in the discussions to come, then, is that the kind 
of legal system that we are concerned with is legitimate to the extent 
that it is, to a sufficient degree, in line with, and justified by, folk moral 
intuitions. What people in general think is morally right and wrong 
matters to the legitimacy of the legal system. For example, if people, 
in general, feel that capital punishment is wrong, and capital 
punishment is an element in the legal system, then this element lacks 
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legitimacy.13 However, premise one is concerned with moral 
justification, not legitimacy. There are different ways to understand 
what such justification consists in. In the discussions in this thesis, 
one of the questions is whether a certain theory of punishment 
(retributivism) provides a moral justification of punishment that is in 
line with folk morality. Or put in other words: is the retributivist 
justification of punishment consistent with folk moral intuitions? I 
interpret the claims of both the main proponents of the Revision 
Argument as well as the critics that I discuss in this book as follows: 
they agree that the moral justification of the legal system and 
punishment is to be sought in, or grounded in, folk morality. The 
moral justification question is intimately tied to legitimacy. The kind 
of legal systems that we are concerned with are legitimate to the extent 
that they are in line with folk morality.  
Plausibly, the claim that punishment needs to be morally justified 
is embraced by folk morality. This means that according to folk 
morality, legal punishment must rely on a principle that morally 
justifies punishment.  
An alternative way to conceive of the moral justification of the 
legal system would be to think of it as independent of folk morality. 
We could ask whether a certain moral justification of punishment is 
in line with the correct morality, rather than whether it is in line with the 
moral principles embraced by people in general. This question would 
presume that there are correct, or true, moral principles, but whether 
this is the case is not something that I will take a stand on here. 
Instead, as explained above, the assumption in the Revision 
Argument is that folk psychological and folk moral views are what 
make legal punishment legitimate, and the question is to what extent 
these folk moral and folk psychological assumptions are justified in 
                                    
13 The content of folk morality is complex, and to say that folk morality is what 
people in general think is morally right and wrong is a simplified way of 
characterizing it. There are different methods of assessing the content of folk 
morality and folk psychology, philosophers do often rely on their own intuitions in 
this regard, but there are also a number of experimental studies of these subjects. I 
will discuss such experimental studies in chapter three. In chapter six I will discuss a 
view of folk morality that allows for immediate responses to deviate from more 
well-reasoned moral beliefs, but where both the immediate response and the more 
well-reasoned belief can be called folk morality.  
MINDS, BRAINS, AND DESERT 
 42 
the light of other beliefs that people may be inclined to embrace, such 
as that the world is (sufficiently) determined.14 
What makes it the case that a principle justifies, or fails to justify, 
punishment? As will be clear in the discussions to come, the moral 
justification not only depends on whether the principle in question is 
part of folk morality. It also depends on certain factual beliefs people 
have, and to what extent these factual beliefs are epistemically justified. 
Different moral principles refer to different states of affairs or 
properties of actions as the states of affairs and properties that make 
the actions right or wrong (i.e., morally justified or not). 
Consequently, whether a principle will succeed in distinguishing 
actions that are right from actions that are wrong, depends on facts 
about the world, e.g., whether the relevant properties are instantiated. 
For example, if we are to apply the moral principle that we should 
maximize the total sum of well-being, this principle presupposes that 
we can make interpersonal comparisons of levels of well-being. 
Investigating this is not a moral inquiry but a factual one, concerned 
with what the world is like. Likewise, if we want to apply the moral 
principle of retributivism, this principle presupposes that we can 
distinguish between those who deserve to be punished from those 
who do not, which, according to the second premise of the Revision 
Argument, depends on whether people have libertarian free will or 
not. This inquiry is not a moral one but a factual one, concerned with 
what the world is like.  
To sum up: the first premise states that legal punishment needs to 
be morally justified, which here is to be interpreted as justified 
according to folk morality. This, in turn, means that legal punishment, 
to be justified, needs to conform to a moral principle or standard that 
is part of folk morality and that sets the criteria for why and when it 
is morally right to punish someone. Epistemic justification enters the 
picture in the assessment procedure of whether those criteria are met 
or not: we can be more or less epistemically justified in believing that 
                                    
14 This means that the methods used to explore what is part of folk morality, might 
be very similar to the methods of philosophers who describe their methods as ways 
to find the correct or most plausible moral principles. However, my interests are 
distinct from theirs.  
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the properties that according to folk morality are required for the 
justification of punishment are present or believing that they are not.  
2.3.2 Second premise: The current retributivist 
justification 
The second premise of the Revision Argument is concerned with the 
specification of how legal punishment is currently justified. The 
structure of this premise is complex, and in the following section I 




(P2) states that the justification of legal punishment rests, at least 
partly, on retributivist grounds. Retributivism is traditionally viewed 
as a backward-looking, merit-based theory of punishment. As such, it 
seeks justification of punishment in a past action, rather than 
justifying punishment on the grounds of certain goods that will be 
gained in the future if the punishment is executed. Alec Walen 
describes the central features of retributivism as follows:  
[Retributive justice] is best understood as that form of justice 
committed to the following three principles: (1) that those who commit 
certain kinds of wrongful acts, paradigmatically serious crimes, morally 
deserve to suffer a proportionate punishment; (2) that it is intrinsically 
morally good – good without reference to any other goods that might 
arise – if some legitimate punisher gives them the punishment they 
deserve; and (3) that it is morally impermissible intentionally to punish 
the innocent or to inflict disproportionately largely punishment in 
wrongdoers. (Walen, 2016)  
Retributivism captures a feature that might appear as intuitively 
morally plausible: that it is legitimate and intrinsically good to punish 
someone who has done wrong. Immanuel Kant provided an 
influential statement of the place of retribution in punishment in the 
18th century: 
Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for 
promoting any other Good, either with regard to the Criminal himself 
or to Civil Society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the 
individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime. For one man 
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ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the 
purpose of another [...] (Kant, 1887, p. 195) 
Duff & Hoskins (2018) label Kant’s form of retributivism as positive. 
According to positive retributivism, an offender’s wrongdoing 
provides a reason in favor of punishment. In contrast, according to 
negative retributivism, wrongdoing is rather a constraint for 
punishment, which means that punishment should be imposed only 
on those who have done wrong, and only in proportion to their 
wrongdoing – so, the punishment is thus constrained by the level of 
wrongdoing. One example of negative retributivism is, e.g., John 
Rawls’ view: “What retributionists have rightly insisted upon is that 
no man can be punished unless he is guilty, that is, unless he has 
broken the law” (Rawls, 1955, p. 7). 
Besides the difference between positive and negative accounts of 
retributivism, which concerns the issue of whether wrongdoing is a 
reason to punish or merely a constraint on who we may punish, there 
are several different ways to describe what a retributive theory is 
about, in a more specific way. According to John Cottingham, there 
are so many different definitions of “retributivism” that it is doubtful 
whether it is useful at all: 
Philosophers persist in talking of “retribution” and “retributive theory” 
as if these labels stood for something relatively simple and 
straightforward. The fact is that the term “retributive” as used in 
philosophy has become so imprecise and multivocal that it is doubtful 
whether it any longer serves a useful purpose. (Cottingham, 1979, p. 
238)  
A common way to describe retributivism as a “desert theory” 
according to which “punishment is meted out because it is deserved” 
(Golding, 1975, p. 89 cited in Cottingham p. 239). Cottingham’s point 
is that even though retributivism basically is the thesis that it is 
morally permitted to punish those who deserve it, as contrasted to 
e.g., a theory according to which it is permitted to punish those who 
act wrongly because it has desirable consequences, the retributivist 
thesis can be further elaborated in different directions. For example, 
Cottingham mentions retributivism as a “repayment theory” 
according to which punishment is inflicted in order to make the 
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offender “pay” for his offense and re-establish status quo between 
members of the society (p. 238). Alternatively, retributive punishment 
is based on the idea that justice demands that an individual who has 
committed a crime should be punished according to the principle “an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (a version of this idea was the view 
defended by Kant) (p. 239).  
Even if we might agree with Cottingham that the interpretation of 
the retributivist doctrine is far from uniform, it is at least clear that 
theories of retribution, regardless of what rationale is given as the 
reason for why punishment is justified, is a backward-looking kind of 
justification. Backward-looking theories of justification are 
traditionally contrasted to forward-looking theories of justification. 
The latter kind of theories are often called “consequentialist” or 
“instrumentalist” theories. Such consequences could, for example, be 
that punishment has a deterring effect on others, that we need to 
protect the members of society from criminals, or that punishment 
contributes to the stability of society.  
 
Desert-based retributivism & basic desert 
According to Berman (2011) the dominant classificatory framework 
of theories of punishment that had become orthodoxy by the latter 
decades of the 20th century is based on a distinction between 
consequentialist and retributivist justifications for punishment. In this 
framework, consequentialist theories justify punishment by the good 
that punishment produces, whereas retributive theories see 
punishment as justified by reference to the wrongdoers’ supposed ill-
desert: punishment is right if someone deserves it. Unfortunately, the 
definition of desert is not more straightforward than that of 
retributivism. Joel Feinberg (1970) analyzes desert as a triadic 
relationship between the agent who deserves something, that which 
is deserved and that which makes the agent deserve it. In the 
discussions to follow, the primary focus will be put on what it is that 
makes an agent deserve e.g., punishment. Feinberg calls this the 
“desert basis,” which is the term I will use when I discuss the issue of 
on what basis people may deserve something. The person who 
deserves something is called the “desert subject” and that which is 
deserved the “desert object” (Walen, 2016).  
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If we adopt this terminology, a natural question that comes up 
concerns the desert object: what, specifically, could occupy this role? 
In other words: what is it that people deserve when they deserve 
something? As Berman puts it, “[t]ime and time again, it is said that, 
for the retributivists, ‘punishment is justified because people deserve 
it’ “(Berman, 2011, p. 437). It thus may seem as the desert object is 
punishment itself. But several scholars have argued that punishment 
should not be viewed as the desert object according to retributivism. 
Rather, the desert object must be something that can be achieved by 
punishment, such as, e.g., suffering (see e.g., Bagaric & Amarasekara 
(2000) and Duff (1990)). In response to such a view, Berman suggests 
that what wrongdoers deserve is something in line with that “their 
lives go less well” (Berman, 2011, p. 87). But, Berman continues, then 
it seems as if retributivism is no longer about punishment being 
intrinsically good, but rather that punishment is a way to obtain 
another value that we think of as an intrinsically good. And this thesis 
is, in turn, not substantially different from the consequentialist theory 
of punishment, according to which punishment is a way of attaining 
certain other values. Retributivism that is motivated in this manner 
makes the distinction between retributivist and consequentialist 
justifications of punishment less clear-cut. As Berman puts it, if 
retributivism is motivated thus, it has “morphed into an account that 
rests upon a justificatory structure that is plainly consequentialist” (p. 
434). If this is correct, retributivism motivated by referring to certain 
kinds of desert-objects should be viewed as a subtype of 
consequentialist justifications for punishment: a “retributivist 
consequentialism” that can be meaningfully contrasted with varieties 
of “non- retributivist consequentialism.”  
The question of whether retributivism is, or could be, understood 
as a form of consequentialism will be discussed to some extent in 
chapter 7. However, for the main discussion in this thesis it will not 
be of any essential difference if we regard retributivism as a form of 
consequentialism in the sense Berman suggests, or as a deontological 
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theory of punishment, as long as desert is required for the justification 
of retributive punishment.15  
Michael Moore defines of the core meaning of retributivism like 
this: “what is distinctively retributivist is the view that the guilty 
receiving their just desert is an intrinsic good” (Moore, 1993, p. 15). 
As Moore puts it, it is “intrinsically good” that the guilty receive their 
just desert. If we do not want to define retributivism along the lines 
of a certain value, we can put it in deontological terms instead: it is 
morally right to give the guilty person her just desert. Regardless of 
whether we consider the thesis of retributivism to be a deontological 
or consequentialist thesis á la Berman, retributive punishment cannot 
be justified if people do not deserve anything in a relevant sense.  
When desert is discussed in the following chapters, it will be related 
to actions: someone can deserve something in virtue of performing 
an action with a certain moral status. This view of desert corresponds 
to what Derk Pereboom’s calls “basic desert”:  
The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would 
deserve to be blamed and praised just because she has performed the 
action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, 
merely in virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations. 
(Pereboom, 2014, p. 2) 
In a similar spirit, Saul Smilansky writes: 
My understanding of desert will in general reflect common usage. In its 
broadest sense, desert may imply a general idea of justice, roughly 
equivalent to that which is “due” to people. It is instructive for the 
importance of desert to note that desert in the broad sense can stand 
for all of justice in common speech. Here, however, we will be 
concerned with desert in a narrower sense. In this narrow sense, to say 
that A deserves X is to say that A is in certain respect due X (treatment 
or situation) on account of “intrinsic” features of himself or his acts. 
Desert in the narrow sense is intimately connected with the person. 
This is admittedly vague, but such vagueness seems to be part of the 
                                    
15 According to deontological theories, an action (as for example the action of 
punishing someone) is morally assessed not in relation to what desirable effects they 
bring about, but with regard to if the action conforms to a certain moral norm (see 
e.g., Alexander & Moore, 2016).  
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concept. Desert is typically backward-looking, it is concerned with what 
a person deserves to get for what she has done. When we enquire about 
desert we are not asking, like consequentialists, what it would be more 
useful to everyone, in the future, to give her, but focusing only on what 
she should get herself [...] given a narrow concept of desert, we can see 
that a person’s desert might differ from his entitlement, rights, or from 
what he ought to get from a consequentialist perspective. (Smilansky, 
2000, pp. 13-14) 
On the relevant concept of desert, then, to say that the agent deserves 
to be treated in a certain way (or deserves “to get X”) for having 
performed an action, is to say that she is due that treatment (or to get 
X) just because she has performed that action. It is “basic” desert in 
the sense that it depends on no further moral justification of treating 
her in the relevant way, such as a consequentialist justification in 
terms of that treating her (or people like her) in that way has good 
consequences, or that there are conventions or contractualist 
considerations that make her entitled to be treated in that way. Rather, 
she deserves the treatment just because she has performed the action. 
Basic desert seems, hence, to be the notion of desert that is relevant 
for retributivism since retributivism is the idea that punishment is to 
be justified on backward-looking considerations alone. I will assume 
that the kind of desert referred to in the Revision Argument as well 
as the objections to it, is basic desert. When I discuss desert in the 
following chapters, I will have basic desert in mind, if I do not 
explicitly indicate otherwise.16 
Smilansky further writes that a person’s desert in the relevant sense 
depends on “[…] ‘intrinsic’ features of himself or his acts. Desert in 
the narrow sense is intimately connected with the person”. As I 
interpret this claim, it concerns what it takes to be someone who can 
deserve punishment in the sense of basic desert. Some people – for 
                                    
16 In contrast, non-basic desert is ascribed to a person not only based on her actions 
(and their moral status), but on the basis of, e.g., consequentialist (or contractualist) 
considerations. Hence, non-basic desert attribution may be justified in cases where 
basic desert attribution is not. Such a view is, for example, defended by Henry 
Sidgwick, who suggests that desert claims can be justified with appeal to 
considerations about the values of consequences (Sidgwick 1907, p. 284). For more 
elaborated views on desert, see e.g., Feinberg (1970) and McLeod(2013). For an 
interesting exploration of different forms of desert, see Cupit (1996). 
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example small children and severely mentally disordered persons – 
plausibly do not deserve to be, for example, punished in the basic 
desert sense even if they have performed bad or illegal actions. 
Whether someone is a person who can deserve something in the basic 
desert sense depends, hence, on intrinsic properties of the person 
such as her mental states and capacities. This is where the relation 
between desert on the one hand and responsibility and/or free will 
on the other hand enters the scene.  
 
Responsibility and free will 
As formulated in (P2c), a person must be responsible for her actions 
in order to deserve punishment for what she has done. As mentioned 
above there are different notions of responsibility. In the Revision 
Argument, the two most obvious notions of responsibility are moral 
and legal responsibility. Even though legal responsibility in many 
aspects is different from moral responsibility, there are intimate 
connections between them. In the same way as the justification of 
legal punishment must correspond to the folk moral justification of 
punishment in order to be legitimate, legal responsibility practices are 
also legitimized by folk moral intuitions. If people in general think 
that the legal responsibility practice is morally unjustified, this legal 
responsibility practice lacks legitimacy among the people.17  
 (P2d) and (P2e) are both concerned with free will. To be 
responsible, it is required that one acts freely (P2d), and one can only 
act freely (in the relevant sense) if one has a libertarian free will (P2e). 
                                    
17 People’s moral intuitions are of course not the only thing that determines how 
legal practices are designed. The point I wish to make is that the general justificatory 
basis upon which people are held legally responsible must, in order to gain 
legitimacy, be supported by folk moral intuitions. This general justificatory basis 
may, for example, be that someone must have certain capacities in order for being 
responsible in the relevant sense. Details of what people can be held responsible for 
is another issue, and it is plausible to think that such details may be more or less 
supported by folk moral intuitions, and that lack of folk moral support in some 
cases are not of direct relevance for the legitimacy of that particular aspect of the 
legal system. Another way to put it is that it seems reasonable to think that folk 
morality allows for some unsynchronized aspects of the legal system and folk 
morality, as long as the fundamental moral values as well as the overall system is 
generally supported.  
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According to (P2a), it is a folk psychological assumption that people 
have a libertarian free will, and that this can be part of the explanation 
of their actions.  
As was shortly addressed in chapter one, there are different 
accounts of libertarian free will, and (P2) gives us no clear view of 
how the folk psychological account of libertarian free will should be 
interpreted. The point made in (P2), however, is that libertarian free 
will is incompatible with a determinist world view. When I mention 
libertarian free will in the discussions of this thesis, I am referring to 
an account of free will that holds that free will is not compatible with 
a fully deterministic universe.18 
As previously mentioned, retributive punishment means that 
punishment is only permitted if it is deserved. I will in the discussions 
to follow talk about desert as a moral property a person can have in 
virtue of her intrinsic properties and her actions. Admittedly, it may 
sound odd to talk about desert as a moral property, but as I think of 
it, this is a way of expressing that someone is, in virtue of her intrinsic 
properties, a person that has the moral property of deserving 
punishment just because she has performed an action with a certain 
moral status. Furthermore, desert is attributed based on backward-
looking, moral considerations, and as such, fundamentally different 
from consequentialist considerations.  
According to P2c, someone deserves punishment only if she is 
responsible for her actions. The notion of responsibility will be 
further elaborated upon in section 2.5, in order to specify what 
“responsibility” means in the discussions to come.  
 
                                    
18 I do not claim that libertarian free will is an untenable view, or that it is 
incompatible with a scientific explanation of human action. I remain neutral 
regarding the plausibility of libertarian free will in this book. The reason for why 
libertarian free will is left out of the discussion is of pragmatic reasons: in this book, 
I focus on discussions in which determinism is accepted. I discussed the content of 
the deterministic thesis and certain problems with this view in section 1.4.  
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2.3.3 Third premise: Undermining the retributivist 
justification  
According to premise two, libertarian free will is necessary for 
retributive punishment to be justified. But the very possibility of free 
will in the libertarian sense is contested in philosophy: it is argued that 
such free will is incompatible with our world. In premise three, we are 
faced with the claim that neuroscience provides further evidence to 
this position. 
According to Greene and Cohen, what neuroscience adds to the 
debate about the plausibility of libertarian free will is not any new, 
revolutionary facts about the mechanisms of the human brain and 
how it causes behavior. Rather, neuroscience provides more detailed 
descriptions of the “when,” “where,” and “how” of the mechanical 
processes that causes behavior, which makes it harder to hold on to 
the belief in libertarian free will for those who have not yet left it 
behind on the grounds of purely philosophical arguments: 
It is one thing to deny that human decision-making is purely mechanical 
when your opponent offers only a general, philosophical argument. It 
is quite another to hold your ground when your opponent can make 
detailed predictions about how these mechanical processes work, 
complete with images of the brain structures involved and equations 
that describe their function. (Greene & Cohen, 2004, p. 1781)  
In light of this quote, (P3) is best understood as holding that 
neuroscience contributes further evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that there is no libertarian free will. The evidence Greene & Cohen 
have in mind is that the increasingly detailed neuroscientific 
explanatory framework of human behavior will make it possible to 
give precise explanations and predictions of behavior and how it is 
connected to the brain. And since neuroscientific explanations 
describe behavior and its relation to the brain without including any 
references to libertarian free will, libertarian free will is not needed in 
order to understand why people act as they do. Although there are 
several established philosophical arguments for why there is no 
libertarian free will, philosophical arguments do not always bite. 
Greene & Cohen think that even though there are people who resist 
philosophical arguments to the effect that there is no libertarian free 
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will, it is more difficult to reject detailed scientific evidence that 
supports this view. All in all, neuroscience provides support to the 
philosophical argument against libertarian free will. 19 
The question of how neuroscientific evidence can and cannot be 
used in order to find out things about free will is widely discussed, as 
is the question of to what degree neuroscience can contribute to our 
understanding of why people act as they do. These issues are 
addressed in the remaining chapters of this book. But before that I 
will discuss the conclusion of the Revision Argument.  
2.3.4 The conclusion 
The Revision Argument claims that we are not justified in punishing 
people on retributivist grounds. If retributivism plays a central role in 
our punishment practice and restricts it in the sense that we are never 
justified in punishing offenders if they do not deserve it, this creates a 
problem with regard to premise 1: that legal punishment should be 
based on a principle that makes the punishment morally justified. If 
we accept premise one, our legal system must be revised in the sense 
that retributivism must be replaced with a principle that can justify 
punishment also in the absence of libertarian free will.  
This conclusion is contested. Most people agree that a legal system 
is needed for a functioning society, but if we accept the Revision 
Argument, we cannot practice one that legitimizes punishment 
according to retributivist principles. The main aim of this thesis is to 
analyze some serious objections to this conclusion.  
Before that, however, it is worth saying a bit more about 
responsibility. The claim that we cannot build our legal system upon 
a retributive justification of punishment might steer up worries about 
responsibility: is the conclusion of the Revision Argument also that 
no one is ever really responsible? Responsibility is a central notion in 
the Revision Argument, but its meaning is not clearly defined. In the 
                                    
19 Another perspective to the comparison of folk psychological and neuroscientific 
explanations of behavior is that neuroscientific explanations of behavior is superior 
to folk psychological explanations in virtue of Ockham’s razor: if we have two 
explanatory frameworks that explains the same phenomena and are equally 
successful, we ought to choose the framework that needs to postulate fewer 
ontological entities.  
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following section, I will discuss some different notions of 
responsibility that illustrates how the moral significance of 
responsibility can vary depending on which notion of “responsibility” 
one has in mind.  
2.4 Different notions of responsibility 
A worry that might arise in relation to the conclusion of the Revision 
Argument is that no one is ever responsible for his or her actions. As 
will become clear when we distinguish between different notions of 
responsibility, although responsibility is often central in discussions 
of free will and desert, which are in focus in this thesis, there are 
notions of responsibility that remain unaffected by such discussions. 
Therefore, to reject free will and desert must not imply a rejection of 
us ever being responsible.  
There are many suggestions on how to distinguish between 
different notions of responsibility. Recent work has been done by e.g., 
Nicole Vincent (2011), and Ibo van de Poel (2011). Many of the 
contemporary taxonomies of notions of responsibility are influenced 
by the division made by H.L.A Hart, who in the following quote 
illustrates how we can talk about responsibility can be used in a 
number of different ways:  
As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of his 
passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night 
and was responsible for the loss of the ship with all aboard. It was 
rumored that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was 
responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved quite 
irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that he was 
not a responsible person. He always maintained that the exceptional 
winter storms were responsible for the loss of the ship, but in the legal 
proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible 
for his negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was held 
legally responsible for the loss of life and property. He is still alive and 
he is morally responsible for the deaths of many women and children. 
(Hart, 1968, p. 212) 
Hart distinguishes between four different notions of responsibility: 
role-responsibility, causal-responsibility, liability-responsibility and 
capacity-responsibility. Below I will provide a short presentation of 
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each of these notions. Then, I will go on to discuss some connections, 
overlaps and contradictions that can arise between them. This list is 
not meant to be an exhaustive examination of all kinds of 
responsibility notions we can think of, nor is it the only taxonomy of 
different notions of responsibility in the literature. However, Hart’s 
distinction will be sufficient for the purposes of this section, which is 
to illustrate some different notions of responsibility and discuss to 
what extent they are morally significant, and also to determine which 
notion of responsibility that is in focus in the Revision Argument. 
2.4.1 Role responsibility 
The captain is responsible for his ship, parents are responsible for the 
upbringing of their children, a doctor is responsible for the treatment 
of her patient, a bus driver is responsible for driving the bus to the 
right destination. All these examples connect a person X to a certain 
duty Y. This kind of responsibility seems to be closely connected to 
social organization and normative to its nature in one sense: according 
to a certain normative structure, X is expected to act in such a way as 
to fulfil the goals associated with Y. Hart thinks, even though he 
confesses not being sure about it, that what distinguishes duties 
viewed as included in the role-responsibility of a person from short-
lived duties of a simple kind is that role-responsibility duties require 
care and attention over a protracted period (Hart, 1968, p. 213). 
However, in the present context, we need not care about the sharp 
distinction between duties that persist over time and more short-lived 
duties. Role-responsibility duties seem to be part of a more or less 
abstract bundle of duties with varying significance in relation to 
fulfilling the overall responsibility task. To be a “responsible person” 
in a role-responsible sense is something like being a person who cares 
about her duties, and make an effort to fulfill them.  
2.4.2 Causal responsibility 
In some contexts, “X is responsible for Y” means that X is (or, a 
significant part of ) the cause of Y, as in “the fire was responsible for 
the animals panicking,” or “the stormy weather was responsible for 
many car crashes.” When “responsible” is used in this way, in relation 
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to someone’s action, it is used to point out that a person’s action was 
particularly significant in the production of the outcome in question; 
but there is no particular moral judgment connected to the action. 
Hart notes that there is a difference between the claims “is responsible 
for” and “was responsible for” about a past action: to say that 
someone was responsible for a car-crash indicates that it is causal 
responsibility one has in mind, as compared to saying that someone 
is responsible for a car crash, in which it is not merely that causal 
relation to the car-crash is indicated. However, to say that someone 
no longer living was responsible for a car-crash can indicate both 
causal responsibility and liability (Hart 1968, p. 215).  
2.4.3 Liability 
As already mentioned, “liability” is perhaps a more familiar term than 
“responsibility” in the legal domain. Even if we might view liability as 
a form of responsibility, Hart points out that there is a notion of legal 
responsibility that should not be viewed as synonymous with legal 
liability (1968, p. 217). According to Hart, to say that someone is liable 
is not necessarily to pick out anything else than the fact that someone 
“has to pay” in some sense (by paying in an ordinary sense, or be 
legally punished in some other way) for a damage that has been done 
and that can be traced to that person in some way – not necessarily 
morally. A person may be liable to pay compensation for harm caused 
by others, e.g., by her employees, even if she was unaware of her 
employees’ whereabouts. To say that e.g., a company is legally liable 
for its products means (again roughly) that the company has to 
compensate the customer if it turns out that the product was defect 
or dangerous in some way. All these uses of “liability” focus on what 
has to be done in order to “restore the balance” without taking into 
consideration someone’s actual blameworthiness.  
In order to determine whether someone is legally liable or not for 
a certain action, one of the most basic questions is whether the action 
is considered criminal according to the law. If it is not, it is not 
possible to be legally liable for it, even though the action might appear 
as morally wrong. If the action is considered unlawful, a person is 
liable only insofar as she fulfills certain criteria at the time of action. 
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The assessment of whether someone does or does not fulfill these 
criteria is concerned with a more specialized range of topics, mainly 
with psychological conditions in the agent.  
Hart asks: “How far can the account given above of legal liability-
responsibility be applied mutatis mutandis to moral responsibility?” 
(Hart 1968, p. 225). As he thinks of it, in the moral domain “deserving 
blame” or “being blameworthy” will have to be substituted for “liable 
to punishment,” and “morally bound to make amends or pay 
compensation” be substituted for “liable to be made to pay 
compensation.” The assessment of whether someone is blameworthy 
or morally bound to pay compensation is made in basically the same 
manner as in cases with legal liability: it has to do with “a man’s 
control over his own conduct, or to the causal or other connection 
between his action and harmful occurrences, or to his relationship 
with the person who actually did the harm” (Hart, 1968, p. 226). The 
important difference between legal and moral responsibility is not due 
to the meaning of the terms themselves but is rather due to different 
content of moral and legal rules and principles. In both legal and 
moral cases, the criteria of responsibility are restricted to “the 
psychological elements involved in the control of conduct, to causal 
or other connexions between acts and harm, and to the relationships 
with the actual doer of misdeeds” (Hart, 1968, p. 227). But there is a 
difference in what kinds of specific criteria that fall under these 
general ones. A legal system can hold people responsible in ways we 
condemn as deeply unjust, but, as Hart notes, “there are no 
conceptual barriers to be overcome in speaking of such a system as a 
legal system” (p. 227). In the moral case, there are such conceptual 
barriers:  
The hypothesis that we might hold individuals morally blameworthy 
for doing things which they could not have avoided doing, or for things 
done by others over whom they had no control, conflicts with too 
many of the central features of the idea of morality to be treated merely 
as speculation about a rare or inferior kind of moral system. It may be 
an exaggeration to say that there could not logically be such a morality 
or that blame administered according to principles of strict or vicarious 
responsibility, even in a minority of cases, could not logically be moral 
blame; none the less, admission of such a system as amorality would 
require a profound modification of our present concept of morality, 
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and there is no similar requirement in the case of law. (Hart, 1968, p. 
226)  
Hart’s description of the difference between legal and moral 
responsibility is instructive. Legal and moral responsibility have 
different criteria, and are attributed of different reasons. But equally 
important as it is to recognize them as separate from each other, is to 
recognize the relation between them. This point will be discussed in 
chapter four and more elaborated on in chapter six.  
2.4.4 Capacity responsibility 
We do not only talk about responsibility for specific actions, but 
sometimes we also distinguish between people who are responsible 
for their actions in a general sense, from people who are not. Such 
general claims – that someone is a person who is responsible for her 
actions – often refer to the fact that the person has certain 
psychological capacities that are viewed as necessary for being 
included in the group of people who are responsible for their actions, 
morally or legally (Hart 1968, p. 228). Children under a certain age are 
usually thought of as not being responsible for what they do, neither 
morally nor legally, and people with severe psychological disabilities 
are in most legal systems viewed as having at least an impaired 
capacity to take responsibility for their actions. 
One reason to have a legal system that takes such capacities into 
account is that the efficacy of a legal system depends on that a 
sufficient number of those whom it concerns understand what the 
law requires of them (Hart 1968, p. 230). A legal system with strict 
responsibility, i.e., in which everyone could be held responsible for 
everything, including small children and people with mental 
disabilities, would be very demanding for those trying to secure that 
the rules within the system are followed, and would be costly due to 
the number of people that would be targets of punishment. It is 
probably a fairly uncontroversial idea that a legal system is (at least 
partly) a way of regulating human conduct through communication. 
If people cannot understand the laws, and therefore cannot adapt 
their behavior in order to avoid being punished, this criterion of 
communication has failed. 
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Another reason why a legal system restricts liability to people with 
certain capacities is the idea that one should only punish those who 
are actually morally responsible – in a sense that entails 
blameworthiness – for their actions. Having a legal system that 
restricts liability to people with certain capacities, is thus a way of 
trying to ensure that only those who have the capacities necessary for 
being morally responsible for their actions (in this sense) are punished 
by the legal system.  
It is important, however, for the discussion to come in this thesis, 
that we keep two things apart. As was pointed out in the previous 
section, we can distinguish between legal liability on the one hand, 
and the corresponding moral notion – i.e., moral responsibility that 
entails blameworthiness – on the other hand. In the same way, we 
should keep distinguished two forms of capacity responsibility apart: 
the capacities required for legal liability, on the one hand, and the 
capacities required for moral blameworthiness, on the other hand. A 
central assumption in this thesis is that the capacities required for legal 
responsibility are at least roughly corresponding to the capacities that 
are required for moral responsibility. Hence, when we discuss the 
criteria for legal capacity responsibility (i.e., what capacities and 
properties are required for legal responsibility) these criteria will to a 
large extent coincide with the criteria for moral capacity responsibility.  
2.5 The notion of responsibility in the Revision 
Argument 
In the foregoing section I presented four different notions of 
responsibility: causal responsibility, liability, role responsibility and 
capacity responsibility. In this section I will discuss how these notions 
relate to the kind of responsibility that is the target of the Revision 
Argument. 
In the Revision Argument, responsibility is a crucial part of 
premise two (P2). According to P2, a person must be responsible in 
order to deserve punishment, and she is responsible only if she acts 
freely, which in turn requires libertarian free will. Hence, according to 
the Revision Argument, libertarian free will is a necessary requirement 
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for being responsible in the sense that someone must be in order to 
deserve e.g., punishment.  
As causal responsibility was characterized in the previous section, 
it does not require free will of any sort and must not be connected to 
desert. Someone may cause an event as a complete accident. 
Moreover, it sounds perfectly sensible to say that someone was 
causally responsible for an accident but is neither morally nor legally 
responsible for it (as for example, someone can be causally 
responsible for an accident, but it was not her fault, but due to a 
construction failure of the car.) To be liable, in the sense discussed 
above, is to be a person who, according to the law, should pay, or 
otherwise compensate, for something that has happened. But liability 
need not be connected to a freedom-condition (i.e., that the agent 
acted freely): people can be legally liable without being personally 
involved in the action or state of affairs for which they are held liable. 
This can, in turn, be explained with reference to their role 
responsibility: a parent may be legally liable for the whereabouts of 
her child in virtue of her being the parent of the child. Likewise, a 
manager can be legally liable for the wrongdoings of her employees 
in virtue of her role as a manager. The question of whether the parent, 
or the manager, have libertarian free will is not directly relevant to 
whether they have the relevant role-responsibilities for their children 
or employees. If the parent, or the manager, deserve punishment, they 
do not deserve it because of their own actions but because of the role 
they occupy.  
Hence, role-responsibility, causal responsibility, and legal liability 
are not the relevant sorts of responsibility in the Revision Argument: 
we can use these notions of responsibility without assuming anything 
about free will. I will argue that the notion that is implied in the 
Revision Argument is that of capacity responsibility.  
An illustration of why it is reasonable to understand responsibility 
as it is used in the Revision Argument as capacity responsibility is that, 
as noted above, in most legislations, a necessary condition for being 
held criminally responsible for one’s actions is that one has the right 
psychological capacities. For example, children under a certain age are 
usually thought of as not being responsible for what they do (neither 
morally nor legally) and people with severe psychological disabilities 
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are in most legal systems viewed as having at least an impaired 
capacity to take responsibility for their actions. In the Revision 
Argument, there is no explicit mentioning of the requirement of 
certain capacities in order to be responsible. However, premise two 
states that responsibility requires libertarian free will, and libertarian 
free will can be understood as a capacity that one can have, or lack, in 
the sense that one can have the capacity to act out of one’s free will, 
or lack that capacity.20 
As will be clear in the discussions to follow, the claim that the 
capacity to act out of one’s libertarian free will is a necessary 
requirement for legal retributive punishment is contested. In most 
legislations, certain cognitive capacities are specified as necessary for 
being liable, but it is doubtful whether any legislation specifies 
libertarian free will as a criterion for legal responsibility. Instead, it 
may be argued that other cognitive capacities are required for 
someone to be “capacity responsible”, as for example, the capacity of 
being reasons-responsive.  
Whatever one think is the required capacity for being capacity 
responsible, a further question is: when someone is capacity 
responsible and performs an action for which she is held responsible, 
what does this mean? Since the Revision Argument is about 
retributive punishment, this discussion concerns what capacity that is 
required in order for retributive punishment to be justified. As was discussed in 
section 2.3.2, retributive punishment requires desert, and more 
specifically, what Pereboom (2014) calls “basic desert”. As previously 
noted, I will talk about basic desert as a moral property a person can 
have. Consequently, what is in focus in this thesis is what capacity a 
person must have in order to be someone who can acquire the moral 
property of basic desert. This moral property is, in turn, required in 
order for retributive punishment to be justified.  
Hence, when we say that retributive punishment requires 
responsibility, this means that if someone is to be punished on 
retributive grounds, she must have the mental capacity that is required 
                                    
20 As was noted in section 1.5.2, libertarian free will is not a homogenous theory of 
free will but can be characterized in many different ways. Common for all of them is 
that they are not compatible with determinism. 
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for acquiring basic desert if she performs an action with a certain 
moral status. If someone performs such an action, and has the 
required capacity, she is morally responsible for the action in the sense 
required for being the proper target of retributive punishment. In 
other words, retributive punishment requires, in order to be justified, 
that the person who is punished is responsible in the basic desert 
sense.  
Gregg Caruso & Stephen Morris label this specific kind of 
responsibility “retributive desert moral responsibility”. (Caruso & 
Morris, 2017, pp. 840-841). When I discuss moral responsibility in 
this thesis, it is this notion that I have in mind, if I do not explicitly 
state something different.  
Having made this point, I do not dismiss claims to the effect that 
there are other notions of moral responsibility: to me, it seems 
plausible that there are notions of moral responsibility that are not 
essentially connected to desert, and that these notions can serve as 
justification for non-retributivist punishment. The view that moral 
responsibility and justified (non-retributive) punishment can be had 
without accepting that people deserve anything in the sense of basic 
desert has been embraced by several philosophers, as for example 
J.J.C Smart (1961), Daniel Dennett (1984b), Saul Smilansky (2000) 
and Derk Pereboom (2014). David Hume can also be interpreted as 
defending this view (Russell, 1990, p. 560). In such a responsibility 
practice, what makes moral responsibility attribution justified, as well 
as the subsequent response (blame, praise, punishment, reward, etc.) 
is that this practice has consequences we consider as valuable. This 
kind of moral responsibility, its relation to folk morality and its 
applicability in the legal system, will be briefly discussed in chapter 7.  
2.6 Summary 
The Revision Argument holds that we should discard retributivism as 
a principle of punishment according to which we punish people in 
the legal system. The central feature of retributivism, as it is 
understood in this analysis, is that it is morally permitted to punish 
someone only if she deserves it.  
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When desert is discussed in this thesis, it is basic desert I have in 
mind. I will talk about basic desert as a moral property someone can 
have, and this means that she has the property of being such a person 
that deserves punishment in the basic desert sense. Basic desert can 
be contrasted to a notion of desert according to which someone has 
the property of deserving punishment because of consequentialist or 
contractualist considerations.  
As I understand the Revision Argument, it is basic desert that is 
required for the kind of responsibility necessary for retributivism. 
Following Caruso & Morris, the kind of moral responsibility that I 
take to be the relevant in the Revision Argument is what they call 
“retributive desert moral responsibility.” This notion is also the one 
that I will have in mind when discussing responsibility in the 
following discussions, if I do not state otherwise.  
The crucial claim of the Revision Argument, then, is that we are 
not morally responsible in the sense of retributive desert moral 
responsibility, because in order to be morally responsible in that sense 
it is required that we have a libertarian free will – which we, most 
probably, do not have. If this is correct, the justification of legal 
retributive punishment is lacking.  
This line of reasoning is much contested for various reasons. A 
common objection is that the conclusion that no one can deserve 
anything if she lacks libertarian free will is a misconstruction about 
what kind of free will is required for desert. With regard to legal 
retributive punishment, free will compatibilism provides a notion of 
free will that justifies retributive punishment. This argument is the 
topic of the next chapter.  
  
3 First objection: Legal retributive 
punishment does not require free 
will  
3.1 Introduction 
According to Stephen Morse, criminal law “is a thoroughly folk 
psychological enterprise that is completely consistent with the truth 
of determinism or universal causation […] to be sure, criminal law 
doctrine and practice are also fully consistent with metaphysical 
libertarianism” (Morse, 2013a, pp. 27-28). In several different 
publications (e.g., 2004, 2006, 2007, 2013a, 2013b) Morse argues for 
the view that neuroscience has much more limited relevance for the 
law than “neuro-enthusiasts” think. “Neuro-enthusiasts” hold, 
according to Morse, that neuroscience shows that what the law 
presupposes about human behavior is flawed: they claim that the law 
is built on assumptions of the existence of a libertarian free will and a 
genuine choice, and that neuroscience strongly suggests that there is 
no such freedom since brains work in accordance with the same 
physical processes as any other mechanism in the world, which most 
often is assumed to be either deterministic or probabilistic. Neither 
of them leaving any space for libertarian free will. The neuro-
enthusiasts do, hence, reason along the lines of the Revision 
Argument. In Morse’s view, this criticism is due to a 
misunderstanding of what the legal system is about. 21 What the law 
requires in order to hold people responsible is nothing like a 
libertarian free will. Rather, Morse claims, what the law is concerned 
                                    
21 As was explained in section 2.3.1, when I talk of “the legal system” in this thesis, I 
do not have a specific system in mind. Many people in this discussion, for example 
Morse and Pardo & Patterson, are primarily discussing the U.S. legal system. When I 
talk about “the legal system”, I think of a legal system that punishes at least partly 
with reference to retributive principles, that distinguishes between actions that are 
carried out freely and actions that are not, and also gains legitimacy from folk 
morality and folk psychology, as they are discussed in this thesis. 
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with when it comes to who deserves punishment is a conception of 
“rational personhood.” The law assumes that people have mental 
states like intentions, beliefs, desires, and plans, and that they act in 
certain ways given these mental states. This view presumes that 
“people are practical reasoners, the sort of creatures that can act for and 
respond to reason” (Morse 2013, p. 31, my italics). Given this picture, 
the law is an action-guiding enterprise which provides rules and 
standards that guide people in their reasoning of how they should 
behave (Morse, 2013, p. 31). Morse continues: “Virtually all criminals 
are rational, responsible agents, and in such cases, punishment is 
premised on the basis of desert. No agent should be punished without 
desert for wrongdoing […] we cannot detain them unless they deserve 
it, and desert requires culpable wrongdoing” (Morse 2013, p. 29). 
Nothing in this picture requires the existence of a libertarian free 
will or is incompatible with determinism, according to Morse. To 
believe in metaphysical libertarianism is, in Morse’s view, “extremely 
implausible in the modern, scientific age:”  
Human beings, as complex as they are, are still part of the physical 
universe and subject to the same laws that govern all phenomena. In 
short, I believe that libertarianism does not furnish a justifiable 
foundation for an institution that is essentially about blaming and 
punishing culpable agents. If determinism or something quite like it is 
true, as I assume it is, then only compatibilism provides a secure basis 
for criminal responsibility. (Morse 2013, p. 28)  
Law is, according to Morse, based on the folk psychological notion 
of rational personhood. This claim entails that the law’s underlying 
understanding of the human mind is, in its essence, a folk 
psychological theory. Furthermore, according to Morse, but in 
contrast to what is maintained in the Revisionist Argument, the folk 
psychological view of free will is not libertarian:  
[O]n the most natural reading of what ordinary people mean by 
claiming that free will is foundational, [libertarianism] is not necessary 
even for them, and determinism is not inconsistent with current 
responsibility doctrines and practices […] I believe that most confuse 
libertarian free will with freedom of action, the ability to do what one 
wants. I recognize that one interpretation of hard determinism is that 
agents cannot do what they want because there is no alternative 
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possibility other than the action that was performed. But this position 
is contested, and it is entirely consistent with determinism that people 
can act freely in the sense of doing what they choose to do based on 
their reasons for action and doing so without compulsion. (Morse 2013, 
p. 39)  
Morse holds that libertarianism is an untenable view of free will from 
a philosophical perspective, and he also maintains that “ordinary 
people” do not think that a libertarian free will is needed in order to 
justify current (everyday and legal) responsibility practices and 
doctrines. What people do think is required for attributing 
responsibility to others is that they can act freely and also have the 
ability to do what they want. But these requirements, Morse argues, 
can be satisfied without a libertarian free will. As was already 
mentioned in section 1.5, there are different forms of libertarianism 
and some of them are compatible with a physical world view. 
However, common for all libertarian theories is that they are not 
compatible with determinism, and Morse assumes that determinism, 
“or something quite like it” is true. Therefore, no form of libertarian 
free will has a place in Morse’s view of responsibility.  
In Morse’s view, then, the justification of the current legal system, 
including its retributive practices, differs drastically from the view 
presented in the Revision Argument. Even though Morse agrees with 
the revisionists (i.e., those who defend the Revision Argument) that 
the law is built on a folk psychological view of human action, he 
claims in contrast to the revisionists that the folk psychological view 
is not libertarian about free will. Morse holds, further, that the current 
legal system, including its retributive practices, is consistent with 
determinism and can be justified on compatibilist grounds. That is, 
he questions premises (2a) and (2e) in the Revision Argument. Morse 
points to the fact that it is entirely consistent with determinism that 
people can act freely in the sense of doing what they choose to do 
based on their reasons for action and doing so without coercion. He 
holds that this is the relevant form of free will and that it is sufficient 
for the justification of retributivist punishment.22  
                                    
22 Morse is far from alone in defending such a compatibilist approach to free will 
and retributivism.  Among others, for example Nicole Vincent (2009a, 2013) Alva 
Noë (2010) and Michael Gazzaniga (2006) have argued in a similar manner. 
MINDS, BRAINS, AND DESERT 
 66 
In the following sections, I will discuss Morse’s argument as 
divided into three inter-related, but distinct claims:  
(1) Legal responsibility is consistent with both compatibilism and 
libertarianism about free will, meaning that there is nothing in the 
law, on an explicit level, that requires libertarian free will in order 
for a defendant to be held legally responsible, but neither is there 
anything in the law that is incoherent with a libertarian free will. 
(2) The law’s view of a person is a folk psychological view. Libertarian 
free will is not required for the folk psychological notion of 
responsibility. What people in general have in mind when talking 
about free will as a requirement for responsibility is that a person, 
in order to be responsible, must be able to act freely in the sense 
that she has the ability to choose how to act on the basis of her 
reasons.  
(3) The kind of free will that a compatibilist view of free will provides 
can justify legal retributive punishment.  
In section 3.2, I discuss the claim Morse provides to the effect that, 
as the law is stated, legal responsibility is completely consistent with 
both compatibilism and libertarianism about free will, and some 
objections that have been put forward against this claim. I argue that 
even though these objections do not provide conclusive arguments 
against Morse’s view that the law is neutral with regard to 
compatibilism and incompatibilism, it is clear that Morse’s account 
about the law requires can be contested.  
In section 3.3, I discuss two different understandings of what 
Morse might have in mind when he maintains that the law reflects a 
folk psychological view of people and their behavior. I will conclude 
that if Morse’s position provides a substantial objection to the 
Revision Argument, it is most reasonable to understand his use of 
folk psychology as having the same explanatory role as it is taken to 
have in the Revision Argument, i.e., that it picks out the ordinary 
person’s common sense view of e.g., action explanations. After this 
discussion, some experimental studies regarding people’s view of free 
will are considered. These experimental studies come to different 
conclusions concerning the question of whether people are 
libertarians or compatibilists about free will and responsibility. I 
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conclude that there are no univocal answers to the questions whether 
folk psychology and folk morality are compatibilist or libertarian 
regarding free will and responsibility, and no clear answers to what is 
required for desert according to folk psychology and folk morality, 
either. Hence, we cannot draw any straightforward conclusions as to 
whether it is true or not that folk psychology is compatibilist regarding 
free will. (However, in chapter 6, I will return to this question and 
argue that, at least on one construal of folk psychology and folk 
morality, it is probably not compatibilist.) 
In section 3.4, some challenges to Morse’s claim that free will 
compatibilism can provide a secure basis for retributive punishment 
is spelled out. I will argue that if moral responsibility (in the sense of 
retributive desert moral responsibility) is based on a certain mental 
capacity (in other words, if a certain mental capacity is what makes 
someone morally responsible), this capacity must be relevantly 
different from capacities that do not make someone morally 
responsible. This argument departs from what will be called “the 
Principle of Relevant Difference” which is spelled out in 3.4.1.23  
What can be picked out as a relevant difference is, I argue, 
restricted by one’s metaphysical commitments. In the current context, 
the two most significant constraints for what can be referred to as a 
relevant difference are physicalism and determinism.24 In short, for 
any natural property (as for example, a mental capacity) that is claimed 
to be the relevant difference between a person who is morally 
responsible and a person who is not, this natural property cannot 
involve features of indeterminism, and it must be possible to explain 
within a physicalist explanatory framework.  
                                    
23 The Principle of Relevant Difference is intended to be a general principle, and it 
does not only apply to compatibilism. For example, according to libertarianism 
about free will, the relevant difference with regard to moral responsibility is the 
presence or absence of libertarian free will. But since libertarian free will is not 
compatible with determinism, this is not an alternative for the discussions in this 
thesis. 
24 As I have already pointed out, physicalism in a liberal form (i.e., not reductive 
physicalism) is embraced by nearly all free will philosophers. Determinism is a more 
controversial metaphysical thesis. The reasons for why it is accepted as a premise in 
the discussions of this book are described in chapter 1, where I also shortly discuss 
some different accounts of libertarian free will.  
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3.2 Legal responsibility and compatibilism 
According to Morse, the law is consistent with both compatibilism and 
incompatibilism about free will, since there are no explicit references 
to any of these metaphysical positions in criminal law doctrine. The 
criteria for legal responsibility and culpability rely on neither 
compatibilism nor libertarianism, as a foundation for their 
justification.  
 […] it is crucial to recognize that libertarian free will is not an element 
of any crime or of any affirmative defense. To establish prima facie 
guilt, the prosecution never needs to prove that the defendant had free 
will. To establish an affirmative defense, the party with the burden if 
persuasion never needs to prove the presence or absence of free will…in 
short, free will or lack of it is not a criterion for criminal responsibility 
or non-responsibility. Once again, it is irrelevant to the actual practices 
of criminal law. (Morse, 2013, p.38)  
Morse states that what is crucial for criminal responsibility is not free 
will but instead several other elements:25 
There are five types of elements that define crimes: acts (sometimes 
referred to as ‘conduct’ elements), an accompanying mental state 
(termed mens rea), attendant circumstances, results, and causation (in 
cases in which there is a result element). (2013, p.35) 
Morse provides us with an example of a crime that involves all five 
elements: “the intentional killing of a police officer knowing that the 
victim is a police officer” (2013, p.35). The act element is required for 
someone to be held criminally responsible. In the example, the act is 
intentional killing. The accompanying mental state, mens rea, picks out 
the intention that the agent had at the time of action. In the example, 
the intention was to kill. If the agent would instead have had the 
intention to scare the victim, or perhaps had acted in self-defense, 
then the agent would have lacked the intention to kill. In Morse’s 
                                    
25 The claim that free will is not included as an element that defines criminal actions, 
and that free will is not needed in order to establish prima facie guilt and an 
affermative defense is probably embraced by most legal theorists. In this regard, 
Morse’s position does not challenge the common view of these cases. However, as 
we will see, not everyone agree that this fact implies that free will is irrelevant to the 
assessment of legal responsibility.  
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example, the agent did not only have the intention to kill, but also 
knew that the victim was a police officer, which makes it a more 
specific crime. The result element is the death of the victim – if the 
victim would not have died, the defendant could not be guilty of more 
than an attempt to kill. Finally, the victim’s death must be the 
consequence of the defendant’s action. If the victim dies for any other 
reason, the “so-called causal chain between the defendant’s conduct 
and the victim’s death might be ‘cut’” (2013, p. 37).  
As Morse describes it, what matters when assessing if someone 
deserves legal punishment is what was going on in the defendant’s 
mind at the time of action, but also several external circumstances 
such as what actually took place at the time of the act regardless of 
the defendant’s intentions. However, none of these criteria, neither 
the “subjective” nor “objective” ones, are incompatible with a 
deterministic world-view. The same holds for the excuses. A person 
who has done something wrong can be excused if she e.g., has a 
general incapacity of acting rationally, or were temporarily incapable 
of rational behavior at the time of action. These facts, according to 
Morse, “explains why young children and some people with mental 
disorders are not held responsible” (2015, p. 257). Furthermore, 
compulsions and coercion can also be excusing conditions under 
certain circumstances, since these conditions defeat the requirement 
of a voluntary act. It can be that someone suffers from a disease that 
results in uncontrolled bodily movements, or that someone is coerced 
(by an external agent) to do something unlawful. But there are also 
excusing conditions linked to internal compulsive states that are 
defined as mental disorders, which often involves loss of action-
control, as e.g., auditory hallucinations that command a psychotic 
patient to commit a crime. The reason for why the presence of certain 
mental states may provide an excuse has nothing to do with 
determinism, but is connected to the agent’s ability to make rational 
choices: “All of the distinctions that criminal responsibility criteria 
draw are consistent with retributive and consequential theories of just 
blame and punishment that we endorse and with the truth of 
determinism” (2015, p. 258).  
Morse does not only claim that free will is irrelevant to law in the 
sense described above, i.e., that the criteria for legal responsibility can 
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be accounted for in a manner that is consistent with the truth of 
determinism. He also recommends forensic psychiatrists and 
psychologists to avoid thinking and talking about free will in their 
work, since free will is not an issue in forensic assessments:  
Forensic psychiatrists and psychologists should void all mention of free 
will in their reports, testimony and scholarship. They should not even 
think about free will as an issue in forensic work. Using the concept of 
free will can only confuse oneself and the legal agents to whom our 
work is addressed. It can never properly be a premise or conclusion in 
any forensic argument. It can never clarify any legal issue or help 
resolve any legal case. If one has a taste for deep philosophical 
problems, free will is of course worth thinking about. The issue is an 
endlessly interesting evergreen that will never be solved to everyone’s 
satisfaction. But if one thinks about the problem in this sense, one is 
doing philosophy, not forensic work. Some people think philosophy is 
a disease, however, so be forewarned. (Morse, 2007, p. 220)  
However, there are scholars from various fields that disagree with 
Morse on this account. Meynen writes:  
Morse’s argument is made within the context of the U.S. legal system. 
At least in principle, other systems may mention freedom of will in their 
legal doctrines, documents, or other relevant legal sources regarding 
insanity. For instance, in the Netherlands, “free will” is mentioned in 
some verdicts where the court explains why the defendant is not 
criminally responsible. (Meynen, 2016, p. 68) 
Moreover, Meynen maintains that even if Morse were right about the 
fact that free will is not mentioned in legal doctrine, this does not 
necessarily entail that free will is irrelevant to the law. As was 
discussed in section 2.5, responsibility and free will are regularly 
assumed to be closely connected, and according to many scholars, 
acting out of free will is just to satisfy the requirements for being 
responsible for one’s actions (O'Connor & Franklin, 2019). 
According to a view where free will and responsibility are closely 
connected, we do not need to explicitly refer to free will when 
attributing responsibility, since what we mean by saying that someone 
is responsible is, partly, to say that she has acted out of free will.  
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Other thinkers have argued that the U.S. legal system itself is not 
as neutral regarding free will as Morse claims it to be. Philosopher and 
neuroscientist Sam Harris writes: 
The U.S. Supreme Court has called free will a “universal and persistent” 
foundation for our system of law, distinct from “a deterministic view 
of human conduct that is inconsistent with the underlying precepts of 
our criminal justice system (United States v. Grayson 1978). Any 
intellectual developments that threatened free will would seem to put 
the ethics of punishing people for their bad behavior in question. 
(Harris, 2012, p. 48) 
In a similar vein, Michael Moore argues that hard determinism 
provides a challenge to our moral and legal practices, in the sense that 
we must be able to answer to the questions posed by determinism – 
as for example, how to make sense of the idea that agents control 
their own actions – in order for the system of responsibility 
attribution to make sense. Moore writes that we implicitly presuppose 
rather than explicitly defend answers to why certain elements are 
relevant when distinguishing the excused from the responsible 
(Moore, 2016, p. 48). These presuppositions about how we 
distinguish between the culpable and the excused are crucial to the 
whole system of responsibility attribution since this system only 
makes sense in light of such presuppositions: 
[T]he internal, work-week job of distinguishing the excused from the 
responsible can only be done if one has ready-to-hand certain answers, 
but not others, to the big, external questions posed by hard 
determinism. It may be that we who make daily judgements of 
responsibility and excuse can implicitly presuppose rather than 
explicitly defend those answers to hard determinism; but we cannot do 
our internal work without relying on such answers. It is not just that 
the whole system of responsibility attribution makes sense only if such 
answers can be defended. This is true enough, but also true is the fact 
that internal judgements about particular excuses will take their discrete 
shape in light of such general answers to hard determinism. We 
“internal” moralists and criminal lawyers have to go external to do our 
jobs. (Moore, 2016, p. 48)  
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Moore’s view stands in sharp contrast to that of Morse’s, who claims 
that what Moore calls “external” questions are generally irrelevant for 
legal responsibility assessment. 
In sum, Morse’s statement that questions about free will and 
determinism are not an issue when it comes to legal responsibility, 
and that the law is “silent” when it comes to questions about 
compatibilism and incompatibilism has been questioned by scholars 
in the field. As both Meynen and Harris point out, it is not obvious 
that the legal practice is as silent when it comes to free will as Morse 
claims it to be, and Moore argues that forensic psychiatrists and 
lawyers have to go “external” to be able to answer fundamental 
questions concerning their “internal” everyday practice. But as a 
matter of fact, Morse do discuss external questions in a sense, since 
he claims that the folk psychological conception of free will is fully 
compatible with determinism, and it is folk psychology that 
legitimizes the law. So even though the law as such is “silent” about 
free will, legal practices must still be compatible with the intuitions 
regarding free will, responsibility and punishment that are present in 
folk psychology (and folk morality). This means that if we accept 
Morse’s claim that the law is “silent” about free will, this is not a 
definite defense against the claim made in the Revision Argument: 
that legal retributive punishment presupposes libertarian free will. 
Since what the Revision Argument is ultimately concerned with is the 
justification of the “internal” practices of the law, not what is 
explicitly stated in the law. It seems that Morse agrees with the claim 
made in the Revision Argument: that the internal practices are 
justified by folk psychology and folk morality.  
So, if legal retributive punishment, according to folk psychology, 
requires that people have a libertarian free will in order to be justified, 
then the Revision Argument stands and it does not really matter if the 
law in itself is “silent” or not about free will. But if legal retributive 
punishment does not, according to folk psychology, require 
libertarian free will, then the Revision Argument is built upon a faulty 
premise.  
Morse, meanwhile, argues that folk psychology is compatibilist 
about free will and responsibility, i.e., that legal retributive 
punishment does not require libertarian free will for its justification. 
CHAPTER THREE 
 73 
In the following sections, this claim is scrutinized. First, I will say a 
few words about what folk psychology is, since the meaning of this 
concept is not straightforward. Second, I will discuss some results 
from experimental philosophy carried out by different research 
groups to try to highlight how “ordinary people” actually do think 
about free will, responsibility and punishment.  
3.3 Folk psychology, folk morality and the 
justification of retributive punishment 
3.3.1 Folk psychology  
Folk psychology remains a vague concept. In the present context, folk 
psychology is used to describe a common and pre-theoretical way of 
thinking of, predicting, and explaining human behavior. In other 
words, when “we” are thinking of, predicting, and explaining human 
behavior in terms of what people have in mind, e.g., in terms of 
mental states, we normally do this within the folk psychological 
framework.  
According to eliminative materialism, folk psychological notions 
characterizing e.g., mental states can be replaced with neuroscientific 
descriptions of what is going on in the brain when someone has, for 
example, a belief. Two of the most well-known proponents of 
eliminative reductionism are P.M Churchland (1981, 1989) and P.S 
Churchland (1986) who both argue that folk psychology is an 
inaccurate way to understand human thinking and behavior. Within 
folk psychology, human behavior is described and explained as it 
appears to us in an everyday context. But, the Churchlands argue, as 
we in the last decades have gained a lot of knowledge about how our 
brain works, folk psychology appears like an outdated way to explain 
behavior and we should replace folk psychological concepts and 
explanations with neuroscientific concepts and explanations. The 
latter will provide us with a more accurate understanding of why 
people behave as they do.  
As previously mentioned, (in section 1.6), physicalism does not 
necessarily entail that all kinds of phenomena can be reduced to 
physical phenomena. Non-reductionism about mental states can, for 
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example, be defended on the grounds that mental concepts are such 
that they cannot be “translated” into, or fully analyzed in terms of, 
concepts that refer to the brain. Certain predicates are essential for a 
full description of the world, and they are not reducible to physicalist 
predicates. Mental predicates cannot, according to this view, be 
reduced to physical predicates, because mental states are classified in 
functional terms rather than natural kind terms (Robinson, 2017). (I 
will return to this view of mental terms and the implication it may 
have for our responsibility practice in chapter 5.)  
Let us return to Morse: he agrees with the claim made in the 
Revision Argument to the effect that the current legal system is based 
on a folk psychological understanding of human behavior. According 
to eliminative reductionists, like the Churchlands, this is potentially 
problematic since folk psychology is an inaccurate way to describe 
human behavior, in so far as we do not want our legal system to rely 
on inaccurate descriptions and explanations. If we take the non-
reductionist perspective, it need not be a problem that the legal 
system is based on a folk psychological view of behavior, since folk 
psychology may be an equally good (or better) way of explaining 
behavior as any other way, as for example a more scientifically minded 
approach.  
Greene & Cohen (2004) suggest there may be a middle ground 
between eliminative reductionism and non-reductionism when it 
comes to folk psychology and the law. It may not be needed to 
eliminate the folk psychological terminology from our language, just 
because it is inaccurate. We should, however, recognize that it has 
certain problematic features, and therefore use a better perspective– 
the scientific one – when constructing legal standards. The reason 
why we should make a difference between our day-to-day judgments 
and judgments that guide how our laws should be constructed is that 
the law must live up to higher standards with regard to moral 
justification, than our everyday moral judgments need to. For 
example; if criminal law is justified in sentencing certain people to 
prison for a long time for their crimes, this moral practice must be 
robustly justified, both morally and epistemically (for instance, with 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.) Even if we legitimately ignore 
certain counter-intuitive truths about human behavior in our everyday 
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life, we cannot legitimately ignore it in legal contexts where the stakes 
and thus standards for moral and epistemic justification need to be 
much higher (Greene & Cohen, 2004, p. 1784).  
Greene & Cohen note that there is a fair amount of evidence 
suggesting that humans have a set of specialized cognitive subsystems 
both for processing information about intentional agents, but also for 
how ordinary matter behaves. A central feature in how we understand 
intentional agents is, they claim, that agents are uncaused causers: we 
need thus to understand why agents move around not in terms of 
apparent physical causes, but rather because of features of mind such 
as beliefs, desires and intentions. It is in relation to these features that 
ideas of free will, praise and blame come into the picture. Referring 
to Daniel Wegner (2002), Greene and Cohen argue that since we 
experience ourselves as being uncaused causers, and consequently feel 
as if we, in contrast to physical objects, cause our own actions, we 
“imagine that we are metaphysically special, that we are non-physical 
causes of physical events” (p. 1781).26 And since we place ourselves 
in the category of “intentional agents”, it is natural for us to explain 
other people’s behavior as free as well. So far, Greene & Cohen’s 
account is compatible with eliminative reductionism. However, they 
do not argue that we should replace the folk psychological account of 
human action – because they doubt that it is a possibility open to us:  
After thousands of years of our thinking of one another as uncaused 
causers, science comes along and tells us that there is no such thing, 
that all causes, with the possible exception of Big Bang, are caused 
causes (determinism). This creates a problem. When we look at people 
as physical systems, we cannot see them as any more blameworthy or 
praiseworthy than bricks. But when we perceive people using our 
intuitive, folk psychology we cannot avoid attributing moral praise and 
blame... The problem of free will and determinism will never find an 
intuitively satisfying solution because it arises out of a conflict between 
two distinct cognitive subsystems that speak different cognitive 
‘languages’ and that may ultimately be incapable of negotiation. 
(Greene & Cohen, 2004, pp. 1782-83.) 
                                    
26 Smilansky (2000) argues for the same conclusion in Free Will and Illusion, p. 26, as 
well as Strawson (1986) in Freedom and Belief, pp. 281-84.  
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Greene & Cohen suggest that it may be psychologically impossible to 
view ourselves and others from any other perspective than the 
intuitive, folk psychological one which comes together with 
assumptions about free will, blame- and praiseworthiness, etcetera. 
But when we decide the legal requisites and procedures for when it is 
morally permitted to punish people, we should apply a scientific 
perspective. Even though it is practically impossible for us to live by 
the fact that we have no free will, free will is still an illusion. Evolution 
has made us experience ourselves in this illusionary way, but we 
should not mistake this illusion for being real. Science makes us 
realize that. Our folk psychological view of behavior will take us 
astray when it comes to metaphysical questions of why people behave 
as they do, and we need to have a correct – evidence-based – view of 
these matters when we form our legal system. For example, we should 
not form our legal system based on the idea that people have a 
libertarian free will, and that they can deserve punishment because of 
that. Instead, legal practices should be based on e.g., consequentialist 
considerations.  
As the above section shows, Greene & Cohen make some 
substantial claims about the folk psychological view: they move from 
an explanation of why we feel as if we are free, uncaused causers, to 
explanations of how we transfer these experiences into metaphysical 
beliefs, and further to the argument for why this metaphysical view 
should not be relied on when constructing legal standards. It is this 
account of folk psychology that they refer to when they claim that the 
law’s view of the person is folk psychological, and it is this substantial 
account of folk psychology they argue we need to abandon when it 
comes to discussions of justified legal punishment.  
Compared to Greene & Cohen, Morse seems to apply a much 
more open (in the sense of less detailed) conception of folk 
psychology in his argument:  
Folk psychology does not presuppose the truth of free will, it is 
perfectly consistent with the truth of determinism, it does not hold that 
we have minds that are independent of our bodies (although it, in 
ordinary speech, sound that way), and it presupposes no particular 
moral or political view... the definition of folk psychology being used 
here does not depend on any particular bit of folk wisdom about how 
CHAPTER THREE 
 77 
people are motivated, feel, or act [...] The definition of folk psychology 
presupposes and insists only that human action can at least be partially 
explained by mental state explanations or that it will be responsive to 
reasons, including incentives, under the right conditions. (Morse, 2013, 
p. 31) 
The conception of folk psychology that Morse has in mind “does not 
depend on any particular bit of folk wisdom about how people are 
motivated, feel, or act.” What our “folk wisdom” comes down to 
remains a bit unclear in Morse’s writings. Folk psychology does not 
entail any special metaphysical view of mental states, beside the idea 
that mental states are central in explanations of action and that people 
are, in general, responsive to reasons: “the definition of folk 
psychology presupposes only that human action can at least partially 
be explained by mental state explanations or that it will be responsive 
to reason, including incentives, under the right conditions”. 
Apparently, Morse has a different conception of folk psychology in 
mind when he claims that the law’s view of the person is a folk 
psychological view, compared to what Greene and Cohen have in 
mind when they make similar claims.  
If we for a moment return to the Revision Argument, we need to 
remind ourselves of why folk psychology features in the discussion in 
the first place. In the Revision Argument, it is claimed that the law’s 
justification of retributive punishment is grounded in a folk 
psychological (and folk moral) view of behavior, and more specifically 
the folk psychological assumption that people have libertarian free 
will (2a), and that this is required in order to deserve punishment (2e). 
According to Morse’s counterargument, even though the law is 
indeed founded in a folk psychological view of behavior, folk 
psychology is not necessarily libertarian. Still, it presupposes that 
actions can be explained with reference to mental states, and also that 
people are reason responsive.  
It is reasonable to think, as Morse does, that folk psychological 
explanations of behavior do not always have to include allusions to 
free will. We can often explain behavior with reference to mental 
states without making any statements, or having any specific beliefs, 
about whether a person acted out of free will or not. For example, a 
natural explanation to why I just went to the lunch room would be 
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that I was hungry, and believed that there was an apple left in the fruit 
basket. No references to free will (explicit or implicit) are necessary 
in order to understand how my mental states explain my behavior. 
However, the question at stake here is whether the Revision 
Argument is correct in that a libertarian free will, according to folk 
psychology and folk morality, is required for the justification of 
retributive punishment.  
 There are at least two interpretations of Morse’s claim about folk 
psychology: First, Morse uses a different concept of folk psychology 
than the one used in the Revision Argument. And according to his 
stipulated concept of folk psychology, libertarian free will is not 
included. Since the law’s view of a person is the folk psychological 
view, libertarian free will is not a question for the law, either. This 
claim would be true in virtue of the stipulated definition. The first 
interpretation is suggested by Morse’s talk of “the definition of folk 
psychology being used here,” as he puts it in the quote above. Second, 
Morse claims that “folk psychology” refers roughly to how people 
actually, regardless of stipulated definitions, think of and explain 
human behavior. In this sense, Morse’s claim, as well as the rivalling 
claim about folk psychology put forth in the Revision Argument, can 
be contested on empirical grounds: if we understand folk psychology 
as “the way people commonly think of and explain human action,” 
what is presupposed in a folk psychological explanation is an 
empirical question.  
Since the Revision Argument states that the legal system is 
construed upon folk psychological understanding of behavior and 
legitimized by folk morality, what Morse says about folk psychology 
is only an objection to the Revision Argument if Morse talks about it 
roughly in the same sense as it is used in the Revision Argument, 
namely, that “folk psychology” refers to ordinary people’s common 
sense intuitions of why people behave as they do, and what 
considerations that, according to them, can be brought into an 
explanation of actions. Moreover, folk psychology is the framework 
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within which folk morality operates, that means, moral judgments are 
connected to folk psychological explanations.27 
In the following sections, I will discuss Morse’s objection to the 
Revision Argument according to this interpretation: Morse disagrees 
with Greene & Cohen about the ordinary person’s common sense 
understanding of how actions are explained and what is required for 
deserving punishment.  
If the content of folk psychology is an empirical question, it is 
important – if not crucial – to enquire about the actual beliefs ordinary 
people have regarding the topics under investigation. The next 
section, therefore, is concerned with some experimental studies of 
people’s moral intuitions concerning free will, responsibility, 
determinism and desert. 
3.3.2 Folk morality & experimental philosophy  
What do “ordinary people” actually think about the compatibility of 
determinism and free will? According to Nichols (2015, p. 31) 
experimental results show that there is a cross-cultural tendency 
among people to be incompatibilists and indeterminists about their 
own choices when it comes to explaining their ability to do otherwise. 
Moreover, Knobe & Nichols (2007) suggest that when “ordinary 
people” appear to be compatibilists, this is often because of 
performance errors. They present evidence that 86% of the 
participants in their study judged that it is not possible for an agent to 
be “fully morally responsible” in an abstract, deterministic scenario 
that does not specify a particular agent or action. However, when the 
participants are presented with a concrete case that engages people’s 
emotions, 72% of the participants judged that Bill who coldheartedly 
                                    
27 Neither Morse nor Greene & Cohen explicitly discuss folk morality as 
distinguished from folk psychology. In their writings, it seems as they use “folk 
psychology” to cover what I mean with both “folk psychology” and “folk morality.” 
Folk morality and folk psychology are intertwined in these discussions, since folk 
morality is based on a folk psychological understanding of how people think and 
act, but I think it is useful to treat them as separate phenomena since folk 
psychological explanation must not include folk moral elements. As will be pointed 
out later on in this thesis, it is also conceivable that folk morality can be based on 
other explanations than folk psychological ones.  
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killed his wife and children was “fully morally responsible.” So, in the 
abstract scenario, the vast majority of ordinary people do not believe 
that full moral responsibility is possible in a deterministic world, while 
in the concrete scenario, the vast majority of ordinary people do feel 
that full responsibility is compatible with determinism. So, the 
experimental design (the type of cases that ordinary people have to 
make judgments about) may be very important for the type of 
experimental results one gets. Frank Jackson argues that we must be 
careful when assessing experimental results, and take into account 
how people respond to a variety of different cases in order to reveal 
what their real intuitions are:  
A person’s first-up response as to whether something counts as a K 
may well need to be discounted. One or more of the theoretical role 
they give K-hood, evidence concerning other cases they count as 
instances of K, signs of confused thinking on their part, cases where 
classification is, on examination, a derivative one (they say it’s a K 
because it is very obviously a J, and they think, defensibly, that any J is 
a K), their readiness to back off under questioning, and the like, can 
justify rejecting a subject’s first-up classification as revealing their 
concept of K-hood. (Jackson, 1998, p. 35)  
In line with Jackson’s advice, Nichols & Knobe suggest that the best 
explanation for the inconsistency in intuitions found in studies is that 
concrete examples engage people’s emotions in a way that abstract 
cases do not, and thereby leading people to offer apparent, or “first-
up” compatibilist judgments. But since people, when not biased by 
strong emotions regarding the case, report incompatibilist intuitions, 
we could also explain away these compatibilist results as performance 
errors and conclude that people’s underlying theory is incompatibilist 
(2007, p. 672). Other studies have confirmed that the intuitions 
regarding compatibilism and incompatibilism are sensitive to how 
abstract the test case appear. For example, Roskies and Nichols 
(2008) observed that, ceteris paribus, people are expressing more 
compatibilist intuitions towards scenarios taking place in our world 
rather than in an alternate universe.  
 However, Murray & Nahmias (2012) report, in line with Morse’s 
claim, that they found opposite results compared to the findings 
reported by Nichols & Knobe. Murray and Nahmias’ results suggest 
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that most people have compatibilist intuitions and that 
incompatibilist results can be explained away since they are grounded 
in a bad understanding of determinism. Nahmias, Coates, and Kvaran 
(2007) provide some evidence for the claim that people tend to report 
different intuitions depending on whether an agent is described as 
psychologically determined, as opposed to neurologically determined. 
Generally, cases described as neurologically determined tend to 
generate more incompatibilist intuitions compared to cases described 
as psychologically determined. Nahmias & Murray suggest that this 
result is explained by the fact that people (mistakenly) tend to think 
that neurological determinism “bypasses” mental causation – in the 
sense that the neurological deterministic explanations of actions entail 
that the agent’s mental states have no causal role for her actions – 
whereas psychological determinism does not elicit this intuition. But, 
they argue, to think that determinism bypasses mental causation is a 
misunderstanding of determinism. Nahmias and Murray constructed 
a test in order to test this hypothesis. In the test, Nahmias and Murry 
randomly assigned the participants with four different descriptions of 
determinism. The participants were then asked to indicate their level 
of agreement to a series of statements on a six-point scale, ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The questions 
concerned not only whether the agent in the described scenarios was 
fully morally responsible, can have free will, and deserved praise or 
blame for their actions, but also whether the agent’s desires, beliefs, 
and decisions have an effect on what the agent ends up doing, and 
whether the agent has control over what he or she does (pp. 445- 46). 
According to Nahmias & Murray, analyses of the data strongly 
confirmed the hypothesis that there is a correlation between beliefs 
that determinism bypasses mental causation on the one hand and 
incompatibilist intuitions on the other.  
According to Nahmias & Murray these results mean, in contrast to 
the conclusion from Nichols & Knobe, that it is the incompatibilist 
intuitions that are grounded in a performance error, an error due to a 
misunderstanding of the relation between determinism and mental 
causation. Moreover, they refer to a test constructed to control for 
this result, which shows that the incompatibilist intuitions indeed 
decrease when the case presented explicitly mentions that 
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determinism does not mean that people’s mental states (their beliefs, 
desires, and decisions) have no effect on that they end up doing, and 
it does not imply that people have no control over their actions.28 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the experimental research 
described above is that there is some evidence pointing in the 
direction that people in general have compatibilist intuitions when it 
comes to free will, responsibility and determinism, that supports 
Morse’s view, but there is also some evidence that points in the other 
direction, i.e., that people have incompatibilist intuitions. 
Experimental philosophy does not provide us with a straightforward 
answer to the question of whether ordinary people have compatibilist 
intuitions or not.29 The question of how to understand folk morality 
and its connection to folk psychology and science will be further 
discussed in chapter six.  
                                    
28 To my mind, the interpretation Nahmias & Murray provide for their test results is 
not obviously the most plausible one. Their test results can be understood in at least 
two different ways. Either, we can understand it, as Nahmias & Murray do, as that 
people who report incompatibilist intuitions conflate determinism with bypassing of 
mental causation. This means that people make the mistake of assuming that if 
determinism holds, mental states are not causally efficacious. This would, of course, 
be a mistake: determinism as such doesn’t make mental causation impossible. 
Accepting determinism only means that mental causation would work in accordance 
with determined laws, in contrast to mental causation as, e.g., an ‘uncaused 
causation’ phenomenon. But there is another possible interpretation that is 
compatible with the results that Nahmias & Murray present. According to this 
interpretation, what determinism bypasses is not mental causation in the 
metaphysical sense, but the significance, or explanatory power, of mental causation, 
with regard to free will, responsibility and desert. This line of thought relates to 
what Björnsson & Persson call the ‘Explanation Hypothesis’ (Björnsson & Persson, 
2011, p. 4) According to Björnsson & Persson, an agent is assessed as responsible 
for an event when the agent’s motivational structures are “a significant part of the 
explanation of such an event” (Björnsson & Persson, 2011, p. 3). However, for the 
purposes of the current discussion, it suffices to conclude that experimental 
philosophy provides us with unsatisfactory results regarding the question of whether 
‘common people’ are compatibilists or incompatibilists about free will and 
responsibility.  
29 There are interesting experiments suggesting that individual differences with 
regard to people’s character traits play a role in how prone they are to ascribe 
responsibility in a deterministic world. Feltz & Cokely (2009) found, for example, 
that people high in extraversion were more likely to judge an agent in a deterministic 
world as free and responsible compared to more introvert people.  
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This means that Morse’s claim that folk psychology is fully 
compatible with determinism cannot be verified on empirical grounds 
(neither can it be dismissed). However, Morse does not only rely on 
the claim that folk psychology is compatible with determinism for his 
conclusion that retributive legal punishment is not threatened by the 
Revision Argument. He also refers to the philosophical discussion 
concerning determinism, responsibility and free will, and argues that 
free will compatibilism “[...] provides the only secure basis for 
criminal responsibility” (Morse, 2013b, p. 27). He continues: “I do 
not aim to argue for the truth of compatibilism. It is sufficient that it 
is one of the two plausible positions in the metaphysical debate – the 
other being hard determinist incompatibilism – and, in one form or 
another, it is probably the position held by the vast majority of 
professional philosophers” (Morse, 2013b, p. 28) 
Morse is probably right about that compatibilism, in one form or 
another, is the most popular position among contemporary 
(analytical) philosophers when it comes to responsibility and free will. 
However, in the current discussion we are specifically concerned with 
the fact that basic desert is required in order for retributive 
punishment to be justified. And it is not necessarily the case that 
compatibilism about free will and responsibility entails compatibilism 
about basic desert. In other words, it is not obvious that philosophers 
that accept compatibilism about free will and responsibility also 
accepts that the kind of free will responsibility they advocate allows 
for basic desert attribution. As e.g., Caruso & Morris (2017) point out, 
it is not always clear that philosophers, when they discuss moral 
responsibility, have “retributive desert moral responsibility” in mind, 
they can very well think of a notion of moral responsibility that allows 
for punishment on other grounds than basic desert.  
But, as I understand Morse, he holds that basic desert 
compatibilism is more or less an entailment of free will compatibilism. 
I will point to some challenges for this view in the following section.  
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3.4  Challenges for compatibilist basic desert 
retributivism 
3.4.1 The Principle of Relevant Difference  
In order to scrutinize Morse’s claim that free will compatibilism can 
justify legal retributive punishment I will discuss some common 
compatibilist theories and whether they can provide what is required 
for basic desert. However, we must be aware of what we are searching 
for in this discussion – what is it, more specifically, that a compatibilist 
theory must provide in order to justify basic desert attribution? In this 
section I will introduce a principle that I will call “the Principle of 
Relevant Difference.” I will argue that if a compatibilist theory can 
account for moral responsibility, it must meet the demands of this 
principle. It goes like this:  
THE PRINCIPLE OF RELEVANT DIFFERENCE 
When two phenomena (actions, agents, events, capacities, abilities, etc.) 
differ with regard to moral properties, the difference in moral 
properties must be due to a relevant, non-moral difference between 
those two phenomena. For example, if one action is wrong and another 
is not, this difference in moral status must be due to a relevant, non-
moral difference between the two actions.  
This principle is related to (but not identical with) the idea that there 
cannot be an ethical difference between two states of affairs or actions 
without there being some natural difference between them. That 
there is a necessary connection between natural and moral properties, 
was labeled “supervenience theses” by R.M. Hare (1952), and the 
view that moral properties supervene on natural properties is widely 
acknowledged by moral philosophers. In Henry Sidgwick’s The 
Methods of Ethics, he writes: 
In the variety of coexistent physical facts we find an accidental or 
arbitrary element in which we have to acquiesce...But within the range 
of our cognitions of right and wrong, it will be generally agreed that we 
cannot admit a similar unexplained variation. (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 209) 
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In the contemporary meta-ethical discussion, Michael Smith (2004) 
expresses a similar idea:  
Virtually everyone writing in meta-ethics takes it for granted that 
evaluative facts supervene on natural facts [...] I trace the attraction of 
the supervenience thesis to a fact about ordinary moral discourse, 
namely, the fact that it is always appropriate to ask what makes a moral 
claim true and what we require by way of a response is an answer in 
terms of certain natural features. (Smith, 2004, p. 10) 
Ethical supervenience is, hence, a relatively uncontroversial idea. 
Tristram McPherson describes the basic content of this thesis as 
follows:  
Suppose that a bank manager wrongfully embezzles his client’s money. 
If we imagine holding fixed how much the bank manager stole, and 
how; the trust his customers placed in him; what he did with the money; 
all of the short- and long-term consequences of his actions; and so on, 
it seems that there could not be a second action that perfectly 
resembled this embezzlement, except that the second action was right 
rather than wrong. Cases like this one seem to show a necessary 
connection: they suggest that the ethical character of the bank 
manager’s act cannot vary without some other facts varying as well. 
(McPherson, 2015) 
McPherson writes that “the ethical character of the bank manager’s 
act cannot vary without some other facts co-varying as well.” 
McPherson then notes that the most common way to characterize 
ethical supervenience in the literature is in terms of moral properties 
supervening on natural properties, even though there are some 
difficulties with this idea. For example, the term “natural” lacks a 
precise and canonical definition. I will put such difficulties aside here, 
and in what follows, I will discuss ethical supervenience as a 
supervenience relation between ethical properties and natural 
properties.  
According to the supervenience thesis, two actions cannot have 
different moral properties (or, in other words, different ethical 
character) without a difference in natural properties. However, in my 
view, it is intuitively plausible to reinforce the ethical supervenience 
thesis without making it much more controversial: according to this 
reinforced supervenience thesis, the claim is that for every difference 
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in ethical character, this difference is due to a natural difference of a 
relevant sort. Not just any difference will do the job. The Principle of 
Relevant Difference captures this point. What a relevant difference 
consists in will be discussed further in the next subsection.  
There is another supervenience relation that will play a central part 
in the discussions about whether compatibilism can meet the demand 
from the Principle of Relevant Difference: that between mental states 
and brain states. Here I will basically follow Davidson’s 
characterization when I talk about how mental states supervene on 
physical (brain) states. Davidson characterizes the supervenience 
relation between the mental and the physical as follows:  
[M]ental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, 
on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean 
that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but 
differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some 
mental respect without altering in some physical respect. (Davidson, 
1970, p. 214). 
Supervenience claims are, in themselves, not particularly explanatory 
forceful. For example, the claim that mental property A supervenes 
on physical property B is just a claim about a certain pattern of 
property co-variation: it does not tell us why this pattern holds, or the 
nature of the dependency (Kim, 1993, p. 167). Even though these 
explanatory questions are pressing if we want to understand why 
mental states co-vary with physical states, this is not the primary 
concern in the following discussions. For the purposes of the 
discussion here, it suffices to say that when a specific property, or set 
of properties, as e.g., mental states, supervene on another property, 
or a set of properties, as e.g., physical states, this means that the 
property that supervenes (i.e., the supervenient property) co-varies 
with the property it supervenes upon (i.e., the base-property) and that 
this is not an accidental co-variation, because every instance of the 
supervenient property will co-vary with the supervenience-base and 
it cannot be otherwise.  
Kim suggests that there are two different concepts of 
supervenience, one with a stronger modal force than the other (Kim, 
1984, p. 157). Weak supervenience is, according to Kim, when the co-
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variation between supervenient properties (e.g., the mental 
properties) and base-properties (e.g., the physical properties) holds 
within possible worlds, but not between possible worlds. In other words, 
the fact that there is a specific co-variation between a set of base 
properties and a set of supervenient-properties in a world W1 does not 
entail that this co-variation must necessarily hold in world W2. In W2, 
the supervenient properties may co-vary with another set of base-
properties (pp. 159-169). Strong supervenience is, according to Kim, 
when the co-variation between the supervenient properties and the 
base-properties holds necessarily, i.e., that for every two possible worlds 
such that people are indiscernible with regard to the base-properties, 
they are also indiscernible with regard to the supervenient properties 
(p. 165).30 
If we return to moral supervenience, Kim notes that weak 
supervenience falls short of accounting for the intuitive sense in 
which moral properties supervene on natural properties, since this 
intuition is often taken to imply that any two worlds exactly alike in 
all natural respects must be alike in all moral respects. However, weak 
supervenience still meets the “consistency requirement,” which is 
based on a principle that Kim calls “the principle of universalizability” 
and which, in turn, is based on the intuition that ethical judgments 
should be generalizable, i.e., the idea that like cases should be treated 
alike (pp. 161-162). For the discussions in this thesis, weak 
supervenience will do the job, since what we are interested in is the 
similarities and differences between cases that are treated differently 
with regard to basic desert within the same world. Retributivist legal 
systems need to distinguish between people who deserve to be 
punished for their actions, and those who do not – in the actual world. 
And we are interested in the question of whether these (actual world) 
cases are sufficiently different with regard to natural properties in 
order to differ with regard to the moral property of basic desert. If 
this is not the case – i.e., if we cannot find a sufficient difference in 
                                    
30 “Necessarily” can be interpreted in different ways. For example, there can be 
logical, metaphysical and nomological necessity. According to Kim, how to specify 
“necessarily” depends on the particular supervenience thesis under consideration: 
“We should […] leave an exact interpretation of ’necessarily’ as a parameter to be 
fixed for particular cases of application” (Kim, 1984, p. 166).  
MINDS, BRAINS, AND DESERT 
 88 
the natural properties (i.e., the base properties) – then to ascribe 
different moral properties to them would arguably violate the 
consistency requirement.  
3.4.2 What is a relevant difference? 
A basic assumption behind the Principle of Relevant Difference is 
that moral properties supervene on natural properties. If two people 
have identical natural properties (i.e., identical base-properties) they 
will be identical with regard to moral properties (i.e., they will have 
identical supervenient properties). In this sense, the supervenience 
idea is the very plausible idea that we should “treat completely identical 
cases alike.” But it also seems plausible that we should “treat sufficiently 
similar cases alike.” For example, when two people share the moral 
property of “being a good person,” and this moral property 
supervenes on their natural properties of being caring and loving 
people, it does not have to be the case that they are exactly alike in 
these aspects in order for both being good. Even if one of these two 
persons is a bit more loving than the other this difference is not 
enough to make one of these two people good and the other not 
good. They are still sufficiently similar in order to be “treated alike.”31 
This point is what the relevant difference condition in the Principle 
of Relevant Difference is about. The principle holds that if two things 
are sufficiently and relevantly similar with regard to their natural 
properties, they will also be alike with respect to their moral 
properties. So, in order for two people to differ with regard to moral 
properties, this difference must be due to a difference in natural 
properties of a relevant kind. Just any difference between natural 
properties cannot do the job of explaining a difference in moral 
properties. If a person A has a certain natural property and person B 
lacks this natural property, this does not necessarily entail a difference 
between A and B with regard to a certain moral property.  
Even if the above reasoning says something over and above the 
supervenience thesis as it is spelled out by e.g. Hare, I take it to be a 
fairly unproblematic view. The idea can be illustrated if we consider 
                                    
31 The meaning of “sufficiently similar” cannot be given a detailed description, but is 
most plausibly assessed on a case-to-case basis.  
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McPherson’s example that was mentioned in section 3.4.1, in which 
a bank manager wrongfully embezzles his client’s money. Consider a 
situation in another world in which the situation is exactly like 
McPherson’s example: the bank managers in these two worlds are two 
exactly identical copies of one another, physically, psychologically, 
historically, and so on, and the worlds are also almost identical. The 
only difference between them is that one of the bank managers has 
green eyes and the other has brown eyes. But this difference in natural 
properties between the bank managers seems, intuitively, not relevant 
for making a moral difference between them with regard to the 
question if they deserve punishment for having embezzled money 
from their customers. With regard to the relevant natural properties that 
determine the ethical character of the actions and the bank managers 
themselves, there is no relevant difference. Obviously (and non-
surprisingly) it is intuitively implausible that the ethical character of 
an action supervenes on any kind of natural property. Instead, some 
natural properties are relevant to moral properties and others are not. 
In order to determine if two states of affairs, actions, or persons differ 
concerning moral properties, it does not suffice to identify that there 
is a natural difference of any kind between them. We must be able to 
identify whether the natural properties that differentiate between two 
states of affairs, actions, or persons can account for a difference in moral 
properties.  
A difference that intuitively is relevant, in contrast to eye color, is 
behavior. In an alternative world where none of the bank managers 
embezzled any money, but one of them always care for his colleagues 
and customers, whereas the other only cares about his own interests, 
there seem to be a difference between relevant natural properties with 
regard to the moral property of being a good person. Thus, this 
difference in natural properties may be able to account for why one 
of them has the moral property of being a good person while the 
other lacks this moral property. Their actions can be compared 
similarly: two actions differ with regard to their moral properties only 
if they differ in a relevant sense at the level of natural properties. Let us 
summarize: to say that having/lacking the natural property G is a 
relevant difference with regard to having/ lacking the moral property 
F (e.g., the moral wrongness of an act) is to say that the fact that one 
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act has property G and another act lacks property G can make it the 
case that one act has F and the other does not (e.g., that one act is 
wrong and the other is not). In other words, it is to say that G is 
plausibly a natural property that can make an action wrong.  
Morse view seems to entail that the natural properties that are 
relevant for moral and legal responsibility-attribution are related to an 
agent’s mental capacities. That an agent’s mental capacities are, ceteris 
paribus, what make a difference with regard to responsibility-
attribution is a fairly common view – probably the most common 
among compatibilists. Often, reasons-responsiveness is the mental 
capacity that is picked out as sufficient for responsibility-attribution. 
In the next section, I will argue that given that the metaphysical 
doctrines of determinism and physicalism are accepted in this 
discussion, they restrict us regarding what can plausibly be picked out 
as a relevant natural difference that can account for a moral 
difference.32, 33 Furthermore, I will suggest that determinism and 
physicalism provide two prima facie challenges to the view that 
reasons-responsiveness is sufficient for responsibility, in the basic 
desert sense.  
3.4.3 Metaphysical constraints on the relevant 
difference condition  
In the present discussion, the metaphysical doctrines of physicalism 
and determinism restrict what can be referred to as a relevant 
difference.34 For example, if we accept determinism, we cannot 
explain a moral difference between two people by saying that one of 
them has an indeterministic property, such as a libertarian free will, 
and the other has not.  
                                    
32 As has already been pointed out, physicalism in a liberal form (i.e., not reductive 
physicalism) is embraced by nearly all free will philosophers. Determinism is a more 
controversial metaphysical thesis. The reasons for why it is accepted as a premise in 
the discussions of this book are described in chapter 1, where I also shortly discuss 
some different accounts of libertarian free will.  
33 For a definition of basic desert, see section 2.3.2 (pp. 35-49.) 
34 For a brief discussion of how these metaphysical doctrines are interpreted in this 
thesis, see sections 1.3 and 1.4 (pp. 15-20.)  
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In the following two sections, I will attempt to spell out how the 
metaphysical doctrines of physicalism and determinism seem to 
provide two prima facie challenges for the prospect of justifying basic 
desert on compatibilist grounds.  
The challenges will then further be discussed in the next chapter, 
in the light of some compatibilist theories of free will and (or) 
responsibility in order to consider whether these theories can meet 
the prima facie challenges for the prospects of justifying basic desert 
retributivism on compatibilist grounds. 35  
3.4.4 The challenge from determinism 
According to Morse, criminal law, and hence legal retributivism, 
presuppose that behavior can be explained by mental states such as 
beliefs, desires, intentions, volitions, and plans. Moreover, he claims 
that “the law’s view is that people are capable of acting for reasons 
and are capable of minimal rationality” (2015, p. 255). What is 
required for its practice to be justified is that these presuppositions 
are also true: if it is true that people have beliefs, desires, intentions, 
volitions, and plans, and if it is true that people are capable of acting 
for reasons and are capable of minimal rationality, then legal practices 
are justified.  
The capacities to be able to act for reasons and to be minimally 
rational seems, in Morse’s view, to be necessary conditions for being 
responsible, and deserving of punishment. According to him, having 
these capacities entails than one can act freely: “it is entirely consistent 
with determinism that people can act freely in the sense of doing what 
they choose to do based on their reasons for action and doing so 
without compulsion” (2013, p. 39). Given that determinism is a 
                                    
35 As will become clear in this discussion, certain attempts to meet the challenge 
from determinism for the prospect of basic desert is via free will compatibilism, 
others are via responsibility compatibilism. These compatibilist accounts do not 
necessarily coincide. However, for the present discussion, it is not of central 
importance if basic desert is defended via responsibility compatibilism or via free 
will compatibilism. Regardless of which of these compatibilist position that is 
provided as the framework within which basic desert can be had, the Principle of 
Relevant Difference will require that there is a relevant difference with regard to the 
base property of basic desert and other natural properties.  
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metaphysical restriction that Morse accepts, what it means to act 
freely in the sense he has in mind has nothing to do with libertarian 
freedom. Rather, freely willed actions are distinguished from non-
freely willed actions by the mental capacities the agent has at the time 
of action.  
In short, the challenge from determinism is as follows: Assume 
that a certain mental capacity, as e.g., the capacity to act for reasons, 
has been suggested as the relevant difference between people who 
can deserve (in the sense of basic desert) to be punished and those 
that cannot. Assume also that two people (say, P & Q) perform 
similar acts, but that only one of them has this mental capacity. Given 
that determinism is true, P and Q were equally determined to act as they 
did, regardless of their different capacities. So how, then, can the 
mental capacity in question be a relevant difference between P & Q?36 
 
Elaborating on the challenge from determinism 
The capacity to act for reasons is central in Morse’s view, although he 
does not describe in detail what this capacity consists in, or what 
reasons really are. A commonly drawn distinction in the 
contemporary literature on reasons is between normative and 
motivating reasons (see, e.g., Alvarez, 2017). T. M Scanlon (1998) 
characterizes normative reasons as something that “counts in favor 
of” someone to act in a certain way. A motivating reason is a reason 
for which someone does something, and thus it is a reason that has a 
certain explanatory power with regard to the question “why did you 
do that?”. A common view is that normative and motivational reasons 
are of different kinds: normative reasons are facts, whereas 
motivational reasons are mental states (see e.g. Scanlon, 1998, Mele, 
2003, Audi, 1993). There are several intriguing questions connected 
to what reasons are, their relation to action and their role in action-
explanations, but for the discussions in this thesis, it suffices to think 
                                    
36 As a reminder, basic desert is not attributed because it has good consequences 
(see section 2.3.2). If consequences were part of why desert is attributed to people, 
what counts as a relevant difference would change. Then a relevant difference 
between two people may be that one of them is responsive to certain kinds of 
interventions, but the other is not, and therefore it makes sense to attribute desert to 
one who is sensitive to interventions but not to the other one.) 
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of reasons as something an agent thinks of (or can think of) as 
something that speaks in favor of an action, when she deliberates 
about how to act. The distinction between normative and 
motivational reasons is helpful, since both these kinds of reasons 
figure in, but play different roles, in the assessment of whether 
someone is reasons-responsive.  
Agents who act freely are, in Morse’s view, doing what they choose 
to do based on their reasons for action and doing so without 
compulsion or coercion. Agents who suffer from mental disorders 
that make them unable to respond appropriately to rational 
consideration cannot, according to this view, act out of free will and 
are hence not responsible for their actions. I take this general 
description to correspond to the characterization of reasons-
responsiveness as it is discussed by e.g., John Martin Fischer (1994) 
and Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998), whose account has played a 
central role in the discussions of reasons-responsiveness and moral 
responsibility. Fischer and Fischer & Ravizza provide a much more 
detailed description of reasons-responsiveness, but for our purposes 
this general description of what it means to be reasons-responsive will 
suffice.  
In discussions regarding responsibility and desert, reasons-
responsiveness is often assumed to play a central role for desert-
attribution, since to be reasons-responsive means that one has the 
mental capacity to take normative reasons into account when one 
rationally considers what to do. For example, even though someone 
thinks she needs to drive really fast because she is late for a meeting 
(a motivational reason) she knows that she drives on a road with a 
certain speed-limit and considers this normative reason as a reason to 
not drive as fast as she wants. In contrast, someone who is psychotic 
and thinks she is driving on an intergalactic highway with no speed 
limits seems to lack the capacity to adapt her speed to the speed-limit 
on the actual (real) road.  
Reasons-responsiveness in this sense is obviously relevant when 
motivating why we have legal rules in the first place. As Morse puts 
it, the law is an action-guiding enterprise, and it would not work as 
that if people are unable to use laws as reasons for their actions. If 
people are reasons-responsive in the sense that they, as a general 
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ability, can use laws as action-guiding, it makes sense to provide 
reasons in forms of laws to promote certain behavior and inhibit 
other kinds of behavior in society at large. However, the claim that 
reasons-responsiveness is relevant to the law in this consequentialist 
sense is distinct from the claim that reason-responsiveness is relevant 
for basic desert. And since basic desert is required for the justification 
of legal retributive punishment, reasons-responsiveness can not only 
be of consequentialist value for the legal system: it must also be a 
property that in some way can lead to, or be the base- property of, 
basic desert. Otherwise, reasons-responsiveness fails to account for a 
justification of retributive punishment.  
According to Morse, someone can deserve punishment (or praise, 
blame, reward) in virtue of what kind of mental capacities she had 
when she acted. If she had the mental capacity of reasons-
responsiveness she deserves punishment (or praise, blame, etc). If she 
was not reasons-responsive, she does not deserve it. When the moral 
property of basic desert is attributed to someone, the base-property 
is reasons-responsiveness. If someone commits a criminal action, in 
principle, she does not deserve punishment if she is not reasons-
responsive, and she does deserve punishment if she is reasons-
responsive.  
If reasons-responsiveness is the base-property of basic desert, this 
entails that reasons-responsiveness is the relevant difference between 
someone who has the moral property of basic desert and someone 
who lacks that property: reasons-responsiveness is the natural 
property that makes a difference with regard to if you have the moral 
property of basic desert or not, when you commit a criminal action. I 
will now explain how determinism is a challenge for this view.  
Consider a case in which a person P sticks to the speed limit for 
the road she is driving on since she takes it as a reason for not driving 
faster even though she is late for a meeting (i.e., even though she also 
has a motivational reason to drive much faster). The day after, P is 
late for another meeting. Still, she sees the speed limit as a reason not 
to drive too fast, but this time it does not override her motivation to 
drive faster than the speed limit allows for: the meeting is too 
important, and her boss was unhappy with her late arrival the day 
before. P consequently drives much too fast when she is observed by 
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a police officer who stops her. As it happens, another person, Q, also 
drives much too fast on the exact same road just behind P. Q believes 
she is late for a meeting with Darth Vader and believes she has good 
reason to hurry up since Mr. Vader is a busy person. Q is also stopped 
by the police officer.  
P and Q are – probably – assessed differently when it comes to the 
question of whether they deserve legal punishment or not for what 
they have done. Imagine that the following line of reasoning is offered 
to explain this difference: P deserves punishment and Q does not, 
since P was reasons-responsive in the relevant sense at the time of 
action (ta), which means that she is ascribed the moral property of 
basic desert which, in turn, makes it justified to punish her with 
reference to desert. Q, on the other hand, suffered from a psychosis 
at ta, which means that she was not reasons-responsive in the relevant 
sense at ta and since she was not reasons-responsive, she does not 
deserve punishment. The difference between P and Q can be spelled 
out as follows:  
 
P: Drives too fast at ta, reasons-responsive at ta® deserves 
punishment 
Q: Drives too fast at ta, ¬ reasons-responsive at ta ® ¬ deserves 
punishment 
 
Reasons-responsiveness is, in this situation, supposed to be the 
natural property that meets the requirement of the Principle of 
Relevant Difference: reasons-responsiveness is supposed to account 
for the moral difference between P and Q. What makes it the case 
that P was reasons-responsive is that she, at ta, had the ability to 
rationally consider the normative reason (i.e., the speed limit) and 
respond to it, even though she actually did not do so. Reasons-
responsiveness is, hence, a dispositional property (it is defined in 
counterfactual terms).  
In a determinist framework, all that happens do so out of necessity: 
given the history and the laws of nature, it could not be in any other 
way. In such a framework, to say that someone has a dispositional 
property at ta, is to say that the person has a property such that under 
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other conditions than those that actually obtain at ta (which means: had 
the history and/or the laws of nature been different or, alternatively 
put, in another possible world) then this dispositional property had 
been realized. In the case of P, in the actual world, she was determined 
to drive too fast, but if the world had been different with regard to 
the history and/or the laws of nature, i.e., in another possible world, 
then she would have adapted her speed in accordance with the speed 
limit.  
The challenge from determinism is that given that determinism is 
true, P and Q were equally determined to produce the same functional 
output at ta, regardless of their different functional outputs under 
other conditions. But it is difficult to make sense of why the fact that 
P has a dispositional property such that she would have adapted her 
speed under other conditions, would constitute a relevant natural 
difference with regard to natural properties between P and Q at ta 
.Why think that the dispositional nature of their mental abilities is a 
relevant natural difference between them – i.e., different such that P 
deserves to be punished and Q does not – when it is true of both P 
and Q that they were completely determined to act as they did (and 
to have their respective motivational reasons) in the actual situation?37  
                                    
37 Again, I want to remind the reader that it is important to keep in mind that I am 
discussing basic desert. We can talk of desert in other senses. For example, we may 
attribute desert because it has good consequences to do so. But then it is not basic 
desert we are talking about. As will be discussed to some extent in chapter 7, that 
kind of desert is not be based on intrinsic properties of an agent, in the same sense 
as basic desert, or responsibility in the basic desert sense, is. On a consequentialist 
view of desert, the difference between a person who deserves punishment and one 
who does not is a difference regarding the consequences of punishing them. 
Whether a person deserves to be punished depends on some non-intrinsic property 
of her, namely whether she is the kind of person that it has good consequences to 
treat in certain ways (or something similar). One might argue that there is such a 
difference between e.g., people like P and people like Q – and if there is, then this 
difference is there even if they are both determined to act as they do. But since my 
discussion concerns basic desert specifically, what counts as a relevant difference 
between people is different – there has to be an intrinsic difference between the two 
persons such that it becomes plausible to say that one is a person who can deserve – 
in the basic desert sense – and the other is not. The challenge from determinism 
then claims that the fact that two persons were equally determined to perform their 
acts makes them sufficiently similar, why it would violate the consistency 
requirement to attribute basic desert to one of them but not to the other. 
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The challenge from determinism is not intended to prove that 
reasons-responsiveness does not work as the relevant natural 
difference with regard to basic desert. Rather, it is a way to describe a 
common prima facie worry whether compatibilism can deliver an 
intuitively plausible account of basic desert and hence justify legal 
retributivism. I will discuss this worry in relation to specific 
compatibilist arguments in next chapter. Before that, I will describe a 
second challenge provided by our metaphysical commitments: the 
challenge from physicalism. 
3.4.5 The challenge from physicalism 
The second challenge for the prospect of justifying legal retributivism 
on the basis on free will compatibilism comes from the metaphysical 
constraints of physicalism, and more specifically, physicalism of the 
mental.  
It is uncontroversial that the difference between people who 
deserve to be punished for actions they have performed (in the basic 
desert sense) and those that do not, has to do with how their actions 
came about, e.g., whether they could control their acting in some 
relevant sense. Compatibilists who cannot refer to libertarian free will 
as the relevant difference in this regard must instead say that the 
relevant difference has to do with some mental capacity of the 
persons, a mental capacity involved in the production of the actions 
in question, such as reasons-responsibility.  
The challenge from physicalism builds on the following plausible 
extension of the Principle of Relevant Difference. Suppose that we 
are considering the suggestion that reasons-responsiveness is the 
relevant difference between someone who has basic desert and 
someone who does not: it is, as it were, the desert-base. We can then 
further ask about other mental capacities that we think do not 
plausibly qualify as desert-bases: what is the relevant difference 
between reasons-responsiveness and these other capacities? If we 
cannot find a relevant difference, a difference that makes it plausible 
to think of one but not the other as a desert-base, then this is a 
problem for the suggestion that reasons-responsiveness (and not the 
other capacities) is the desert-base.  
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In more general terms, it seems plausible to maintain that if a 
certain natural property G prima facie seems to be the base property 
for a moral property F, while another natural property G’ prima facie 
does not appear as a plausible base property, then there must be a 
relevant difference between G and G’ in order to make it intuitively 
plausible that G is a supervenience-base for F and G’ is not. If no 
such relevant difference is to be found, it seems as if the consistency 
requirement is violated. 
The challenge from physicalism is, in short, that given physicalism, 
there are no such relevant differences between, on the one hand, e.g., 
reasons-responsiveness (or other compatibilist suggestions), and, on 
the other hand, other mental capacities that, plausibly, are not desert-
bases.  
Let us assume that reasons-responsiveness is the base-property of 
basic desert (e.g., in a case where two persons perform similar actions 
and one of them deserves to be punished for the action and the other 
does not, reasons-responsiveness is the relevant difference between 
them.) Furthermore, assume that color-responsiveness is not relevant 
for basic desert. In order for these two capacities to differ with regard 
to basic desert, there must be a relevant difference between reasons-
responsiveness and color-responsiveness that makes it plausible that 
reasons-responsiveness, but not color-responsiveness, is the base-
property of basic desert. It might seem obvious that there are such 
differences. To start with, reasons-responsiveness makes a difference 
with regard to how actions come about in a way color-responsiveness 
does not. More specifically, it might be suggested that reasons-
responsiveness makes a difference with regard to how actions come 
about compared to how actions come about when someone is not 
reasons-responsive in the sense that a person can deliberate rationally 
about, and thereby choose how to act, instead of acting upon, e.g., 
irresistible impulses, delusional beliefs or something like that.  
Being a physicalist, one is not committed to the thesis that the 
capacity to deliberate rationally about reasons for action is reducible 
to brain functions. But one is most plausibly committed to the thesis 
that if two people differ in their capacity to deliberate rationally on 
reasons for actions, this difference must be reflected by, and depend 
on, differences in their brains. The point can be illustrated by an 
CHAPTER THREE 
 99 
example from legal practice. When assessing legal responsibility, 
offenders are at times screened for psychiatric disorders. Deviance in 
the brain structure may indicate that the offender lacks the ability to 
form her decisions for action in the way that is required for basic 
desert. Consequently, it seems that a person’s brain must have certain 
physical structures intact in order for reasons-responsiveness to be in 
place. This means further that certain brain structures are at least a 
necessary condition for the ability to be reasons-responsive (for the 
moment, I leave the discussion of multiple realizability aside).  
Given physicalism, then, the difference between a person who acts 
out of reasons-responsiveness and one who does not, is a difference 
between which brain-structures (or brain-processes) that were 
involved in producing their actions. The suggestion that reasons-
responsiveness (but not other capacities) is the basis for desert 
attribution, in effect entails that the involvement of certain brain 
structures (or brain processes) in producing action, but not the 
involvement of others, is the basis of desert.  
However, if we look at the level of brains, what could make it the 
case that a certain brain structure can be relevant for basic desert, 
whereas other brain structures are not? If we just look at these brain 
structures – regardless of their respective functions – it seems odd to 
say that a certain brain structure, but not another, is a base-property 
for a specific moral property just in virtue of its physical properties. 
Brain structures are just complex networks of neurons, that are wired 
in certain ways, and fire in certain ways. This goes for all structures in 
the brain. Thus, with regard to physical properties, it seems difficult 
to pick out a relevant difference that can account for such a moral 
difference.  
If we compare the physical structures in the brain that are involved 
in a deliberative, rational decision-making (i.e., the kind of decision-
making that reasons-responsive people are capable of) with the 
physical structures in the brain that are involved in the process that 
leads to action when reasons-responsiveness is lacking, it is difficult 
to see the relevant differences between these structures, at least with 
regard to basic desert. In other words: if reasons-responsiveness is the 
base-property of basic desert, there must be a relevant difference 
between reasons-responsiveness and other mental capacities that are 
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not base-properties of basic desert. But if we are looking at the brain 
structures that are involved in reasons-responsiveness, these 
structures are not relevantly different compared to other brain 
structures.  
Now, it might be argued that it is not brain structures as such, but 
rather brain processes, or brain events, that are relevant for reasons-
responsiveness, and hence for desert-attribution. However, the same 
reasoning that holds for brain structures holds for processes in the 
brain. If the physical events that lead to action in a reasons-responsive 
person are sufficiently similar to physical events that lead to action in 
someone who is not reasons-responsive, then, arguably, the 
consistency requirement implies that these processes should not 
differ with regard to moral properties (again, with regard to basic 
desert, so this means: either both, or none, have basic desert).  
The idea is, then, that it is hard to get a sense of a relevant 
difference for whether someone deserves or does not deserve to be 
punished for her actions, if we look just at the level of brain structures 
involved in her acting. But given physicalism, this level is the one we 
should focus on, since the relevant differences are differences in how 
different acts come about, and it is at the physical level of brain 
structures, processes, and events that our actions come about.  
 
Elaborating the challenge from physicalism 
In light of the above reasoning, we can ask whether it is still intuitively 
plausible that reasons-responsiveness is sufficient as base-property 
for basic desert given that reasons-responsiveness (which in this 
section is assumed to be the base-property of basic desert) is 
sufficiently similar to other mental capacities in terms of how they are 
realized on the level of brain processes. In this section, I will suggest 
that it is not. Instead, I will argue that the fact that brain processes 
that lead to action in someone who is reasons-responsive are 
sufficiently similar to brain processes that lead to action in someone 
who is not reasons-responsive provides a prima facie reason to doubt 
that reasons-responsiveness is sufficient as base-property of basic 
desert.  
When two people perform similar actions, but one of them fulfils 
the criteria for basic desert and the other does not, this moral 
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difference is due to a difference in the nature of the mental states (i.e., 
the natural properties) that are causally involved in the chain of events 
leading up to the respective action. If reasons-responsiveness is 
picked out as the relevant difference between someone who has basic 
desert and someone who has not, then reasons-responsiveness must, 
given the Principle of Relevant Difference, differ in a relevant sense 
from natural properties that are not base-properties of basic desert. 
But what is the intuitive difference between reasons-responsiveness 
and another property, let us say, for simplicity, the property of being 
non-reasons-responsive? A plausible answer is that the relevant kind 
of reasons-responsiveness is a capacity that consists in a 
responsiveness to normative reasons, and if one has that capacity, one 
can consider normative reasons when one chooses how to act. In 
other words, reasons-responsiveness makes a difference when one 
elaborates on different alternatives of action. If so, the relevant 
difference between someone who is reasons-responsive and someone 
who is not is described in terms of the functional role of reasons-
responsiveness. 
 In order to provide for a functional difference, reasons-
responsiveness must be a property that can be involved in mental 
events that cause actions. In other words, reasons-responsiveness 
must be causally relevant for actions.38 How to understand notions 
like “cause,” “causal relevance,” and “causal effect” in relation to 
philosophy of mind and philosophy of action is much discussed. If 
we embrace reductive physicalism, mental states are reducible to brain 
states, and hence the causal role played by mental states is identical 
with the causal role played by brain states. However, the fact that 
mental states seem to be multiply realizable is a reason to reject 
reductive physicalism: e.g., the mental state of fear is possibly shared 
also by creatures with different brains compared to the human brain, 
which means that “fear” cannot be reduced (at least not on type-level) 
to a certain brain state. The causal story of mental states becomes 
even more complex when mental states are regarded as non- reducible 
                                    
38 Not everyone agrees that mental causation is necessary in order for mental states 
to be relevant for action explanations. For example, Helen Beebee (2017) argues 
that epiphenomenalism about mental states must not obviously a crazy position. I 
return to her argument for why this is so in chapter 5.  
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to physical states. One central worry is to what extent the so-called 
“Exclusion Problem” is a threat for non-reductive physicalists (see, 
e.g., Beebee, Hitchcock & Price, 2017). This problem can be outlined 
as follows: if we take mental properties to be irreducible to physical 
properties, and actions can be fully explained in both mental and 
physical terms, it seems as that we have two complete, but different, 
explanations of the same phenomenon. The problem is that these two 
different explanations both are regarded as causally sufficient for 
accounting for the action in question. According to Kim, when we 
are faced with two causal explanations of a single event, we have some 
different alternatives of how to think of it: 
[…] (a) each is a sufficient cause and the effect is causally 
overdetermined, (b) they are each necessary and jointly help make up a 
sufficient cause (that is, each is only a “partial cause”), (c) one is part of 
the other, (d) the causes are in fact one and the same but given under 
different descriptions, (e) one (presumably the mental cause in the 
present case) is in some appropriate sense reducible to the other, and 
(f) one (again the mental cause) is a derivative cause with its causal 
status dependent in some sense on the neural causes, N. (Kim, 2000, p. 
65) 
In either case, Kim argues that “the presence of two causal stories, 
each claiming to offer a full causal account of a given event, creates 
an unstable situation requiring us to find an account of how the two 
purported causes are related to each other. This is the problem of 
‘causal/explanatory exclusion’” (Kim, 2000, p. 65).  
There are scholars who reject the claim that there is an exclusion 
problem, and I will discuss an objection to the exclusion problem put 
forward by List & Menzies (2017) in chapter 5 (see also e.g., Burge, 
1993, and Yablo, 1992, for critical discussions). However, in the main 
part of this thesis, I will proceed from the assumption that the 
exclusion problem is a challenge for non-reductive physicalism.39 
                                    
39 When discussing the exclusion problem, I have the metaphysical version of this 
problem in mind, that is, that it is problematic if effects can have two independent 
causes that both are sufficient causes of the effect. However, there are those who 
challenge this view, arguing that we should reverse the order of investigating causal 
relations: instead of asking wether we capture the real causal relations in our causal 
explanations, we should start with clear cases of causal explanations in order to 
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Moreover, I will assume, following Kim, that when we are faced with 
two causal explanations of a single event, alternatives (a), (b) and (c) 
are “nonstarters” (Kim, 2000, p. 65). Regarding the other alternatives, 
(d) – (f), all of them locates the causal relevance of reasons-
responsiveness on the physical level. More specifically, I will assume 
that the relevant physical events, in this case, are physical events in 
the brain.  
When compatibilists point to reasons-responsiveness as sufficient 
for moral responsibility, the intuition underlying this point is, 
arguably, that if a person can respond to the relevant reasons in a 
given situation, she has the ability to control her behavior. In contrast 
to someone who is not reasons-responsive, she is able to act 
appropriately based on the relevant reasons. If she, despite this ability, 
does not act appropriately, (i.e., does not respond to the appropriate 
reasons despite that she has the ability to do so) then it seems that she 
is responsible for her actions in a way that a non-reasons-responsive 
person is not, and thus there is relevant difference between them with 
regard to basic desert. The difference is that there is some element of 
control (i.e., the ability to choose based on reasons) involved when 
one of them acts, but not when the other acts. But when we look 
closer at this difference in light of physicalism, what previously 
appeared to be a relevant difference seems to disappear. Because in 
both cases, brain processes (and input to the brain processes) cause 
the actions – and neither of them involves an element of control in a 
relevant sense since both are just neural input-output mechanisms. 
Hence, when we zoom in on the physical processes involved in the 
actions, these processes are, in relevant aspects, not different from 
each other, and the relevant difference between the agents and their 
actions is lost.  
This argument does, of course, not preclude the possibility that 
neuroscientists may discover a difference between brain processes 
that lead to action when someone is reasons-responsive, on the one 
hand, and processes that lead to action in someone who lacks reasons-
                                    
understand how the concept of causality works (see e.g., (Burge, 1993; Wilson, 
1999). I will briefly discuss an objection to Kim’s characatization of the exclusion 
argument put forward by List & Menzies (2017) in chapter five.  
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responsiveness, on the other hand, that will appear as an intuitively 
relevant difference. However, it is hard to imagine what such 
difference would consist in, and it is still the case that the burden of 
proof lies on the compatibilist who defends basic desert. Moreover, 
current legal practices cannot be justified with reference to what we 
may come to know about brains and minds in the future, but have to 
be justified with reference to what we currently know.  
It is important to point out two things about this prima facie 
challenge: Firstly, this challenge is not meant to presuppose reductive 
physicalism. In only assumes that as far as we accept physicalism, 
physical effects have physical causes. I will return to this issue in 
chapter 5, where I will discuss a suggestion to the effect that 
compatibilism about desert can be saved if we accept a non-reductive 
physicalism. Secondly, this challenge is not a challenge for all kinds of 
moral property attribution. What intuitively is a relevant difference 
vary between different moral properties. The reason that physicalism 
about the mental raises a challenge for basic desert is that what might 
seem like intuitively relevant differences with regard to desert is found 
in the mental realm – it concerns how different acts are caused, and 
more precisely that some sort of control is involved in the causation 
of some acts but not others – and seems to disappear when we look 
at fundamental physical nature or basis of the mental processes 
involved. It is not at all obvious that physicalism threatens what 
intuitively appears to be the relevant differences when it comes to 
other moral properties, such as goodness, kindness, generosity, 
rightness and wrongness.  
One of the central concerns in the vast literature concerned with 
moral responsibility, regardless of whether we take reasons-
responsiveness, or some kind of practical rationality, or something 
else, to be the base-property of basic desert, is that these capacities 
are dispositional in nature (as all capacities are). The nature of 
capacities is often discussed in modal terms: it is described as 
something the agent having the capacity “could have done,” or ”can 
do,” given certain circumstances. But in a deterministic framework, 
this cannot be interpreted literally: given determinism, no one can act 
otherwise than she actually does, and no one can have another brain 
than she actually has. However, there are several intriguing 
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compatibilist responses to this worry. I will discuss some well-known 
approaches in the next chapter, and consider whether they can meet 
the challenges from determinism and physicalism.  
3.5 Summary & conclusions 
In this chapter, I have described Stephen Morse’s objection to the 
Revision Argument. Morse argues that the Revision Argument is 
mistaken about the role of libertarian free will in the legal system. 
Morse claims that legal responsibility has nothing to do with free will, 
but concerns the rational capacities in a person. To begin with, many 
people disagree with Morse that free will is not an issue in the legal 
context: for example, Meynen (2016) and Harris (2012) point out that 
there is evidence to the contrary: free will, and perhaps even 
libertarian free will, is an implicit assumption in legal doctrine. Moore 
(2016) argues that even if Morse is right about that the law from an 
internal aspect does not require free will, we cannot avoid addressing 
external questions, such as the question of determinism, free will and 
responsibility, in order for the internal practice of the law to make 
sense. Concerning such external questions, Morse claims that 
compatibilism can do the job of providing such an external basis to 
the internal practices of the law. Moreover, he claims that the law is a 
folk psychological enterprise, and the folk psychological account of 
free will and responsibility does not require libertarian free will. Thus, 
the Revision Argument seems to be mistaken on two points, 
according to Morse: (1) that the legal system presuppose libertarian 
free will for being legally responsible, and (2) that folk psychology is 
incompatibilist with regard to free will, responsibility and retributive 
punishment.  
However, when looking into some experimental philosophy cases 
concerning this issue, it turned out that it is not clear whether the folk 
psychological view of free will and responsibility actually is 
compatibilist or incompatibilist. Therefore, I turned to Morse’s claim 
that compatibilism is consistent with, and provides a secure 
metaphysical basis to, criminal responsibility and legal retributive 
punishment. I argued that in order for a compatibilist theory to 
account for basic desert, it must be able to meet the demands of a 
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moral principle that I call “the Principle of Relevant Difference.” 
According to this principle, in order to establish the moral property 
of basic desert, there must be a relevant natural difference (leaning 
here on the ethical supervenience thesis) between someone who is 
ascribed with basic desert and someone who is not. Furthermore, I 
argued that since physicalism and determinism are accepted in this 
discussion, they, in combination with the Principle of Relevant 
Difference, constitute two prima facie challenges for compatibilist 
basic desert retributivism: “the challenge from determinism” and “the 
challenge from physicalism.” I argued further that it seems difficult 
to pick out the relevant difference between someone who is ascribed 
with basic desert and someone who is not within a compatibilist 
framework of free will and responsibility, in light of these challenges. 
However, in order to assess whether they de facto provide problems 
for compatibilism with regard to basic desert, we must scrutinize 
some compatibilist theories in more detail.  
In the next chapter I will discuss a selection of compatibilist ideas 
that are frequently discussed in relation to moral responsibility, and 
scrutinize whether these ideas can meet the challenges from 
determinism and physicalism, given the Principle of Relevant 
Difference.  
  
4 Compatibilism, basic desert & the 
Principle of  Relevant Difference 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the Principle of Relevant 
Difference according to which a claim to the effect that there is a 
moral difference that does not supervene on a natural difference of a 
relevant kind violates what Kim calls “the consistency requirement,” 
which is grounded in the moral intuition that like cases should be 
treated alike (Kim, 1984, pp. 161-162). I also introduced the 
challenges from determinism and physicalism, which, I argue, provide 
metaphysical constraints of what can be referred to as a relevant 
difference.  
According to Morse, free will compatibilism provides us with the 
kind of freedom required for moral and legal responsibility, basic 
desert attribution and, hence, also for the justification of retributive 
punishment. In this chapter, I will scrutinize this claim.  
Morse does not specify in any detail which compatibilist account 
he has in mind but writes that it has to do with mental capacities 
rather than libertarian free will. In this chapter, I will examine some 
influential compatibilist theories and their suggestions of what mental 
capacities they claim have to be in place for someone to be morally 
responsible for her actions.  
As already pointed out, free will compatibilism and moral 
responsibility compatibilism do not necessarily coincide: one can 
argue for free will compatibilism without being a compatibilist about 
moral responsibility, and one can be a compatibilist about moral 
responsibility while rejecting free will compatibilism as a plausible 
theory. Or, as will be illustrated by the parts of this chapter concerned 
with the writings of Harry Frankfurt, one can argue for both free will 
compatibilism and moral responsibility compatibilism, without 
arguing that free will compatibilism is sufficient for compatibilism 
about moral responsibility. However, besides the parts concerned 
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with Frankfurt’s writings, I will not attend to this distinction in the 
following discussion. Even though free will plays a central role in the 
Revision Argument as well as in Morse’s objection to it, whether there 
are any plausible compatibilist theories of free will as such is not of 
vital importance here. Rather, what is at stake is whether legal 
retributivism is justified or not and for it to be justified, we need to 
be able to ascribe basic desert to the people we want to punish on 
retributive grounds. For the sake of justifying basic desert attribution 
via compatibilism, we may either look for a compatibilist account of 
free will that gives us the kind of moral responsibility that is required 
for basic desert or we can try to find a compatibilist account of moral 
responsibility that does not necessarily address the free will question, 
but provides for the justification of basic desert attribution by itself. 
It may be worth noticing that it is not always clear to what extent 
different compatibilist theories actually aim to justify basic desert 
attribution, but there are at least not any explicit claims to the 
contrary: They aim to defend non-basic desert moral responsibility.  
 As was pointed out in section 2.5, the kind of moral responsibility 
in focus in this thesis is labelled, following Caruso & Morris (2017), 
“retributive desert moral responsibility.” The notion “moral 
responsibility” refers to the kind of responsibility that can include, or 
lead to, basic desert. I will in the following discussions have this 
notion in mind when discussing moral responsibility, if not indicating 
otherwise.  
If there is a version of compatibilism regarding free will and /or 
moral responsibility that can meet the Principle of Relevant 
Difference, in light of the challenges from determinism and 
physicalism, then we are, arguably, justified in ascribing basic desert 
to people and, hence, also justified in punishing them on retributive 
grounds. Then, Morse’s claim that compatibilism can provide a secure 
basis of retributive punishment is accurate, and the Revision 
Argument can be rejected. However, if the compatibilist theories we 
will be concerned with in this chapter cannot meet the Principle of 
Relevant Difference, then Morse’s claim is not supported (at least not 
by the compatibilist theories discussed here), and the Revision 
Argument stands (at least for now).  
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This chapter will unfold as follows. In section 4.2, the discussion 
starts with Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) hierarchical model of free will, 
together with some critique of this view put forth by Gary Watson 
(1987). Section 4.3 is concerned with discussions about the principle 
of alternate possibilities (PAP). PAP is the principle that moral 
responsibility requires the possibility of doing otherwise than one 
actually did, and the question of whether this is a necessary 
requirement or not for moral responsibility is central to the moral 
responsibility debate. The section starts with Peter van Inwagen’s 
(1983) “Consequence Argument” according to which we cannot be 
morally responsible for our actions if they are the consequences of 
factors beyond our control. Van Inwagen’s argument is followed by 
another central contribution to the responsibility debate made by 
Frankfurt: his widely discussed argument that people can be morally 
responsible also when PAP is not satisfied. This line of thought has 
been developed more recently by e.g., John Martin Fischer, and 
compatibilist theories of this kind will be called “actual sequence 
compatibilism.”  
In section 4.4 I will discuss theories that I will call “counterfactual 
theories of alternative possibilities” according to which PAP does not 
require any metaphysical freedom, but can be satisfied if there is a 
counterfactual situation (i.e., a nearby possible world) in which the 
agent would have done otherwise. In section 4.5, the discussion 
moves to an alternative way of approaching the moral responsibility: 
Peter Strawson (1962) argues that responsibility and free will should 
be understood in terms of “reactive attitudes” and that the analytic 
disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends on 
a misconstruction of the nature of moral responsibility.  
In section 4.6, I summarize the conclusions drawn from the 
discussions in this chapter: that the compatibilist theories considered 
turn out to have problems with meeting the requirements from the 
Principle of Relevant Difference, in light of the challenges from 
determinism and physicalism. If this conclusion is correct, it means 
that Morse’s compatibilist objection fails to make a convincing case 
against the Revision Argument. But I will also introduce a possible 
problem for this conclusion, which will be discussed in chapter 5.  
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4.2 The hierarchical view of free will 
The question of whether people have free will, and if so, what kind 
of free will they have, is most often discussed in relation to topics 
such as agency, desert, and responsibility (see e.g., Timpe 2010, 
McKenna & Coates 2015). In these discussions, human action plays 
a central role. Richard Taylor once wrote that “the question whether 
men have ‘free will’ is really only the question whether men ever act 
freely. No special concept of the will is in any way needed to 
understand that question” (Taylor, 1960, p. 264).  
However, one reason not to restrict the discussion of free will to 
the possibility of free action is that our prospects of carrying out free 
actions are often restricted by environmental factors in the world, in 
a way free will in itself is not. For example, a prisoner may perhaps 
want to walk out of her prison, but she is not free to act in that way. 
Hence, we can be free to want something without having the 
possibility to carry out this will.  
In situations where there are no particular constraints on actions, 
a free action can be viewed as exercising one’s free will, and in such 
cases, the will and the action are closely connected. In the following 
sections, I will consider the question of whether actions that are 
carried out as consequences of someone’s free will is relevantly different 
compared to actions that are not the consequences of someone’s free 
will, in a way that matters to basic desert. Hence, the distinction 
between free will and free action will be present in the following 
discussion. However, in relation to the overall question – if it is 
reasonable to ascribe basic desert to people on the grounds that they 
acted freely, it is not necessary to view free will and free action as 
distinct categories. In order to make sense of the question about why 
people deserve punishment in the sense of basic desert, free will must 
be discussed in combination with actions that are carried out as a 
consequence of the free will, since basic desert is a (moral) property 
that people can have because of something they have done. 
In his article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” 
(1971), Harry Frankfurt presents his hierarchical model of how to 
understand free will and free action.  
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According to Frankfurt, the essential difference between human 
free will and the will in other creatures is to be found in their 
psychological structure. More specifically, Frankfurt thinks that 
human beings, in contrast to members of other species, are able to 
form what he calls “desires of the second order:” 
Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in 
making choices. They share these with the members of certain other 
species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to 
make decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly 
characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I 
shall call “second-order desires” or “desires of the second order.” 
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men 
may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. 
They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and 
purposes, from what they are. (Frankfurt, 1971, pp. 6-7)  
Frankfurt suggests that a central difference between human and 
animal behavior is the human capacity of reflecting on her beliefs and 
desires and form second-order beliefs, desires and judgements with her 
own will as the object. According to Frankfurt’s account, we act freely 
when the desire upon which we act is one that we also approve of, 
and want to act upon when reflecting over it.  
Frankfurt’s view accommodates the intuition that there is an 
important difference between acting out of compulsion, i.e. not being 
able to resist acting in accordance with one’s desires, preferences 
etcetera, and acting in accordance with them because one chooses to 
do so. Frankfurt illustrates his point by taking an unwilling addict as 
an example: this person hates his addiction and tries everything that 
he thinks might enable him to overcome his desires for the drug, but 
always fails. In such a case, there is a first-order desire to take the 
drug, but there is also a second-order desire not to have the desire to 
take the drug. That is, the addict wishes that he was not a person who 
wanted to take the drug. Even if this unwelcome desire to take the 
drug is impossible to resist, the unwilling addict who truly identifies 
with his second-order volition (that has his first order desires as 
object) may state– he does not identify himself with the desire that he 
acts upon: this desire is not really his and wish he could resist it. If this 
is the case, the unwilling addict does not act freely, even if he acts 
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upon a desire that belongs to him, in a sense. In contrast, an addict 
who acts out of free will has a second-order desire that approves of 
her first-order desire to take the drug. She takes the drugs since she 
has a desire for it, she chooses to act on this desire, and make no 
effort no to do so.  
Frankfurt’s hierarchical model is intended to describe and explain 
what must be in place in a person’s psychology for her to act out of 
free will. Even though all attitudes, desires, beliefs, and so on, strictly 
speaking, belong to the individual having them, only some of them 
can be the basis of freely willed actions. According to this model, if 
someone acts in accordance with her second order desires, the act is 
grounded in her as a person and her will is the source of the action, 
in contrast to when an agent acts upon a desire that she does not 
endorse as a desire she also wants to have.40 
Determinism is not a threat to this view – Frankfurt explicitly says 
that freedom of will may be causally determined: 
It seems conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person 
is free to want what he wants to want. If this is conceivable, then it 
might be causally determined that a person enjoys free will. There is no 
more than an innocuous appearance of a paradox in the proposition 
that it is determined, ineluctably and by forces beyond their control, 
that certain people have free wills and that others do not. (Frankfurt 
1971, p. 20) 
Frankfurt’s compatibilist theory of free will is intuitively plausible 
cases, such as, for example, we want to distinguish between people 
                                    
40 Even if Frankfurt does not mention it explicitly, his ideas relate to another 
common idea in free will debate, the one about sourcehood. A common intuition is 
that a freely willed action must have its source within the agent (see e.g. McKenna & 
Coates, 2015). Roderick Chisholm once defended the idea that human freedom 
entails an absence of causal determination, and a free agent has “a prerogative which 
some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover 
unmoved” (Chisholm, 2015, p. 352). The idea that someone must be ‘the prime 
mover unmoved’ is found in what is sometimes referred to as ‘the Source 
Incompatibilist Argument,’ according to which someone only acts out of her free 
will if she is the ultimate source of her action. But since no person is the ultimate 
source if determinism is true, no person has free will, or so the argument goes. (see 




who act upon desires that they fully embrace, and people who try to 
resist their desires but fail, as in the case with the unwilling addict. 
However, Frankfurt has received critique that suggests that his 
account of free will fails to satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference 
which, I argue, is a requirement for being able to account for basic 
desert. Gary Watson (1987) puts forth an objection to Frankfurt’s 
model that I take to be central for our purposes here. Watson 
criticizes Frankfurt’s free will compatibilism for being arbitrary with 
regard to which level we should choose as the one corresponding to 
free will:  
The problem […] is not that there is a regressive ascent up the 
hierarchy, or that people are not that complex, but simply that higher-
order volitions are just, after all, desires, and nothing about their level 
gives them any special authority […]. (Watson, 1987, p. 149) 
Watson points to the fact that the capacity to form second-order 
desires does not imply that there is anything special about these higher 
order desires compared to the first-order desires, with regard to their 
nature. The uniqueness of higher-order desires compared to first-
order desires is the content, or the object of the desire: whereas first 
order desires most often are directed towards the world, second-order 
desires are directed towards the subject’s first order desires. The 
fundamental nature of second-order desires is, however, similar to the 
nature of first order desires.  
Watson’s critique implies that Frankfurt’s free will compatibilism 
fails to satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference, since there seems 
to be no relevant difference in nature between the different levels of 
volitions that Frankfurt points out as central in order to understand 
what it means to be free, or, as Watson puts it, there is nothing about 
higher-order volitions that gives them “any special authority.” This 
point means that even though Frankfurt’s compatibilism is useful 
when trying to distinguish different psychological mechanisms from 
each other, it fails to provide a secure basis for moral responsibility 
and basic desert. To be fair, Frankfurt did not intend his free will 
compatibilism to be the basis of responsibility. Moral responsibility 
does not, he claims, require free will:  
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The most common recent approach to the problem of understanding 
the freedom of will has been, indeed, to inquire what is entailed by the 
assumption that someone is morally responsible for what she has done. 
In my view, however, the relation between moral responsibility and the 
freedom of the will has been widely misunderstood. It is not true that 
a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was 
free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it 
even though his will was not free at all. (1971, p. 18)  
However, Frankfurt has made a significant contribution also to the 
compatibilist camp of moral responsibility, in which he attacks one of 
the most fundamental assumptions in the moral responsibility debate: 
the assumption that in order to be morally responsible for one’s 
actions and the consequences thereof, one must have had the 
possibility to do otherwise than one actually did. The discussion 
surrounding the idea that alternative possibilities are required for 
moral responsibility is the topic of next section.  
4.3 The Principle of Alternate Possibilities  
Why is everyone so sure they could have acted otherwise? After all, 
nobody ever has. (R. Taylor, cited in Yablo, 2008, p. 154) 
Peter van Inwagen once argued that a necessary condition to be 
genuinely responsible for one’s actions is that one was able to refrain 
from doing what one did: 
Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition for holding an 
agent responsible for an act is believing that the agent could have 
refrained from performing that act. (van Inwagen, 1975, p. 188) 
This condition is often referred to as “the principle of alternate 
possibilities,” or “PAP”, in the literature. If PAP is accepted, 
determinism seems to pose a real threat against genuine moral 
responsibility. Peter van Inwagen’s most discussed contribution to 
this line of thought is known as “the Consequence Argument,” which 
goes as follows:  
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws 
of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went 
on before we were born, and neither it is up to us what the laws of 
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nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our 
present acts) are not up to us. (van Inwagen, 1983, p. 16) 
Van Inwagen’s claim that the consequences of our acts are not “up to 
us” is meant to point to the fact that we lack the necessary condition 
for being morally responsible for our actions, since everything that 
happens is the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the 
remote past and, hence, we have no possibility of doing otherwise 
than we actually do.  
4.3.1 Rejecting PAP 
But why think that moral responsibility depends on the possibility of 
doing otherwise in the first place? Prior to van Inwagen’s construction 
of the Consequence Argument, Frankfurt put forward an objection 
to the idea that PAP is necessary for moral responsibility. Frankfurt 
presented a thought experiment in which we intuitively (or so he 
argues) want to hold a person morally responsible even if she could 
not have done otherwise at the time of action. A version of this 
thought experiment goes as follows:  
Suppose that someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones to perform a 
certain action. Black is prepared to go considerable lengths to get his 
way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he 
waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does 
nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such 
things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he 
wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to decide 
something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides 
to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. Whatever Jones 
initial preferences and inclinations, Black will have his way. (Frankfurt 
1969, p. 835)  
What Frankfurt aims to show with this thought experiment is that 
Jones is responsible for his actions even if the PAP is violated. This 
move is made by postulating that Black actually does not have to do 
anything because Jones, for reasons of his own, decides to perform 
and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In that 
case, Frankfurt argues, “it seems clear Jones will bear precisely the 
same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have had if 
Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he does it. It 
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would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones for his action, or to 
withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the 
basis of the fact that he could not have done otherwise” (Frankfurt, 
1969, p. 836).  
Many contemporary philosophers endorse Frankfurt’s conclusion 
that moral responsibility does not require the possibility to do 
otherwise, and there are many more or less technical proposals of 
how to get around van Inwagen’s consequence argument by 
challenging the premises and/or the conclusion. John Martin Fischer 
thinks that the irrelevance of alternative possibilities is intuitively very 
plausible, even though difficult to prove:  
One is supposed to see the irrelevance of alternative possibilities simply 
by reflecting on examples. I do not know how to prove the irrelevance 
thesis, but I find it extremely plausible intuitively. When Louis 
Armstrong was asked for the definition of jazz, he allegedly said: ‘If you 
have to ask, you ain’t never gonna know’. I am inclined to say the same 
thing here: if you have to ask how the Frankfurt-type cases show the 
irrelevance of alternative possibilities to moral responsibility, ‘you ain’t 
never gonna know.’ (Fischer, 2002, p. 292) 
Frankfurt and Fischer refute the claim that moral responsibility 
requires alternative possibilities: they argue that our intuitions 
accommodate moral responsibility attribution also without the 
possibility to do otherwise. They argue that what we care about in 
responsibility-attribution is not metaphysical unavoidability of the 
event as such, but how the agent came to act as she did. As Fisher 
puts it, “moral responsibility is a matter of the history of an action (or 
behavior) – of how the actual sequence unfolds – rather than the 
genuine availability of alternative possibilities” (Fischer, 2012, p. 124). 
We can call such views “actual sequence compatibilism.” 
Arguments of the kind presented by Frankfurt and Fischer have 
been widely discussed. David Widerker (1995, 2000, 2006) criticizes 
Frankfurt’s argument for being incoherent. Frankfurt claims that his 
argument is supposed to show that moral responsibility is compatible 
with determinism, but according to Widerker, the argument in itself 
actually presupposes indeterminism. Because if Black really knew 
what Jones was going to do at a point before Jones actually did it, he 
would have had access to the facts about what Jones was going to do 
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before he did it. But how could he have access to such facts? In an 
indeterministic world, there are no such facts before Jones actually 
carries out his act. Then, it makes no sense that Black had to put in a 
device in Jones’ brain and wait until Jones made up his mind, before 
interfering. On the other hand, if we agree that the world is 
indeterminist, even if Black intervenes in this situation, it is still the 
case that Jones has the possibility to choose again (see e.g., Widerker 
2006, p. 165). Fischer (2002) and Robert Kane (1985, 1996) have 
objected along similar lines.  
Structural worries like the one Widerker points out have been 
followed by several improvements of Frankfurt’s original example. 
Here, I shall not discuss such improved examples, but proceed from 
the assumption that there are Frankfurt-style examples that avoid 
such criticism.41 
4.3.2 Actual sequence compatibilism & the Principle 
of Relevant Difference 
In relation to the questions which we are examining in this chapter – 
whether compatibilist theories of free will and/or moral responsibility 
can provide what we need in order to be justified in attributing basic 
desert in light of the Principle of Relevant Difference and the 
metaphysical restrictions of physicalism and determinism – actual 
sequence compatibilism seems problematic. The problem lies in the 
fact that according to actual sequence compatibilism the attribution 
of basic desert is based on a person’s natural properties. As Fischer 
writes, “moral responsibility is a matter of the history of an action (or 
behavior) – of how the actual sequence unfolds – rather than the 
genuine availability of alternative possibilities” (Fischer, 2012, p. 124). 
But according to the challenge from determinism, it is difficult to pick 
out the relevant difference between sequences that do not lead to 
moral responsibility and sequences that do since all sequences are 
equally determined to unfold as they do. If one wants to escape this 
challenge by arguing that the important thing with regard to moral 
responsibility has nothing to do with determinism but is rather about 
                                    
41 See e.g., Alfred Mele & David Robb (1998) and Widerker (2000) for a discussions 
and improved examples. 
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the “actual sequence” that is involved when actions come about, we 
are instead troubled by the challenge from physicalism. When looking 
at the physical level, all actions seem to be caused by processes that 
are, with regard to their basic nature, sufficiently similar: they are 
neural processes that work according to input-output principles, and 
the way they process incoming input is completely determined by the 
physical and functional properties of the neural networks involved.  
Besides the restrictions of determinism and physicalism, which 
exclude certain theories of mental states from our discussion, there 
are no obvious clues to how to interpret the nature of mental states 
in the current discussion. In section 1.6, I discussed some theories of 
mental states that are compatible with physicalism and determinism. 
If one embraces the identity theory of mind, i.e., reductive 
physicalism, or eliminativism, mental causation is completely 
explained in terms of brain states. It is more difficult to explain mental 
causation while subscribing to either property dualism or 
functionalism. The literature of mental causation is rich and complex, 
and I will not go into details of possible solutions for non-reductive 
physicalist theories with regard to mental causation here (I will discuss 
it to some extent in chapter five). The point that I want to make here, 
in relation to the challenge from physicalism and the Principle of 
Relevant Difference, is the following: assuming that there is mental 
causation, we must determine which properties in a mental event that 
are causally relevant.42 Being a physicalist, and following Kim (2000) 
regarding the exclusion problem, the causally relevant property of a 
mental event is either identical to, reducible to, or otherwise 
dependent on a neural cause. Plausibly, this neural cause is a neural 
event in the brain. But there seems to be no relevant difference 
between such neural events in the brain that cause the kind of actions 
for which we are morally responsible and neural events in the brain 
                                    
42 In discussions concerning mental causation, I follow Beebee (2017) and take 
properties to be the relata of general causal relations, as for example, “mental 
property M is the cause of physical property P.”  But at the token level, properties are 
not the relata of causation, but events are. The role of properties in event-causation 
is that certain properties of an event are causally relevant, whereas others are not 




that cause other kinds of actions for which we are not morally 
responsible – they seem to be the same kind of events. Hence, to 
ascribe basic desert to someone on the basis of how the actual 
sequence of action unfolds seems to violate the consistency 
requirement.  
4.3.3 Reinterpreting PAP 
In the previous section I argued that actual sequence compatibilism 
cannot account for the relevant difference that is required for basic 
desert. However, many compatibilists accept that alternative 
possibilities – that is, the ability to act otherwise than one actually 
does – is necessary for responsibility and that there are compatibilist-
friendly notions of abilities that give us that possibility. That is, there 
are compatibilist theories of moral responsibility according to which 
an agent who is morally responsible has alternate possibilities 
available at the time of action, in virtue of having certain abilities or 
capacities. In this section, I will discuss whether this kind of 
compatibilism fares better with regard to the challenges from 
determinism and physicalism, in satisfying the Principle of Relevant 
Difference for moral responsibility.  
Dana Nelkin (2011) argues that Frankfurt’s refusal of PAP as it is 
formulated in the case with the “Frankfurt controller” rests upon an 
invalid counterfactual scenario. Recall that in Frankfurt’s thought 
experiment, Black wants Jones to perform a certain action, but he will 
not interfere with Jones plans if he does not have to. If Jones decides 
to act in the way Black wants, Black will not do anything. But if Jones 
decides to act in any other way, Black takes effective steps to ensure 
that Jones decides to perform, and then performs, what Black wants 
him to perform. But this move seems to preclude the relevant sense 
of ability. Nelkin formulates it as follows:  
We saw earlier that one way of understanding the possession of an 
ability is that an agent has an ability to X if (i) the agent possesses the 
capacities, skills, talents, knowledge and so on that are necessary for 
X’ing, and (ii) nothing interferes with or prevents the exercise of the 
relevant capacities, skills, talents and so on. Since in the Frankfurt-style 
examples, Joe satisfies these conditions, there is a sense in which he has 
the ability to do otherwise. Now, of course, there is a sense of “ability 
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to do otherwise” in which Joe lacks such an ability. Joe will push the 
child off the pier, even if he wavers. In this sense, having an ability to 
do X is precluded when it is inevitable that the agent will not do X. 
(2011, p. 115). 
Nelkin’s critique consists in pointing out that there seems to be two 
different senses of “ability to do otherwise” invoked in Frankfurt’s 
original example. When we talk about a person’s ability to do 
otherwise, we are interested in whether the person can act differently 
given that the causal structures governing her choices and actions are fixed. But in 
the Frankfurt-controller case, what would have happened in the 
counterfactual case in which Black would have intervened, is that he 
would have changed Jones’ causal structures, and therefore the 
counterfactual case alters the relevant factors in the situation. Nelkin 
claims that this move makes the conclusion – that PAP is not 
necessary for moral responsibility – invalid. A similar objection is put 
forth by Michael Smith who argues that the relevant ability in 
Frankfurt’s examples are masked by other factors, but abilities should, 
when discussed in relation to moral responsibility, be analyzed as 
dispositional properties (more specifically, in Smith’s view, this 
dispositional property is a certain rational capacity.) In doing so, the 
ability to do otherwise is present in the Frankfurt-controller example 
(Smith, 2003, p. 25). 
Both Nelkin and Smith, then, argue that to be able to act otherwise 
is to have a certain psychological capacity. The general idea seems to 
be that this captures an intuitively relevant notion of “being able to 
do otherwise” which is compatible with determinism: Even if I was 
determined by the past and the laws of nature not to do A, there was 
nothing about my psychological capacities that stopped me from 
doing it – it was, as it were, within the range of options set by my 
psychological capacities to do so. In this way, these compatibilist 
views are descendants of more simple “conditional” variants of 
compatibilism. In David Hume’s version of compatibilism, for 
example, responsibility arises from freely willed actions, which are 
perfectly compatible with determinism:  
By liberty, then we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, 
according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to 
remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this 
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hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is 
not a prisoner in chains. (Hume, 2019, p. 617) 
The idea is that to say “I had the ability to do X” (which I did not do), 
is just to say that if I had tried or chosen to do X, I would have done 
it (see also Ayer: “It is not [...] causality that freedom is to be 
contrasted with, but constraint” (1954, p. 278)).  
Theories of this sort, then, promise to deliver a common sensical 
notion of “could have done.” For example, while jumping to the 
moon is excluded by my capacities, raising my arm is not. And indeed, 
intuitively I could have raised my arm ten minutes ago, but I could 
not have jumped to the moon (even though I actually performed 
neither of these actions).  
In this context we should also mention David Lewis, who, even 
though he did not explicitly suggest any specific understanding of 
“ability” or “could have done”, can be seen as defending such 
commonsense ideas of ability from one kind of objection having to 
do with determinism:  
I have just put my hand down on my desk. That, let me claim, was a 
free but determined act. I was able to do otherwise, for instance raise 
my hand. But there is a true historical proposition H about the intrinsic 
state of the world long ago, and there is a true proposition L specifying 
the laws of nature that govern our world, such that H and L jointly 
determine what I did. They jointly imply the proposition that I put my 
hand down. They jointly contradict the proposition that I raised my 
hand. Yet I was free: I was able to raise my hand. The way in which I 
was determined not to was not the sort of way that counts as inability. 
(Lewis 1981, p. 113).  
It seems correct, as Lewis points out, that in some intuitive sense we 
are able to raise our hands, even in situations where we are determined 
not to. And in this sense, we are not able to jump to the moon (even 
though we are equally determined not to do that). Perhaps the 
relevant sense of ability is captured by some theory of the sort 
mentioned above. The objection that Lewis aims to tackle is this: even 
if it might seem that (in some situation) we were able to raise our 
hands when we, in fact, did not, if we had that ability, then we must 
have been able to break the laws of nature (or change the past), and 
of course we can do neither (Lewis admits). 
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Lewis’ claims that we must distinguish between a person’s ability 
to, for example, raise his hand, and his ability to break the laws of 
nature. It may be perfectly true to say that someone was able to raise 
his hand (even if he did not), while it is not true that someone has the 
ability to break the laws of nature. “Soft determinism” – which in 
Lewis’ vocabulary refers to the position that one sometimes freely 
does what one is predetermined to do and in such a case one is able 
to act otherwise even though the past history and the laws of nature 
determine that one will not act otherwise – “[is] committed to the 
consequence that if I had done what I was able to do – raise my hand 
– then some law would have been broken” (Lewis 1981, p. 114). But, 
according to Lewis, this commitment can be spelled out as either a 
weak or as a strong thesis (p. 115): 
(Weak Thesis) I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law 
would have been broken.  
(Strong Thesis)  I am able to break a law.  
Lewis argues that to be able to raise one’s hand even though one is 
predetermined to put it down should be understood in accordance 
with the weak thesis: that if one would have raised one’s hand, a law 
would have been broken. It is not the case that the hand-raising would 
cause a law to be broken. Rather, if one had raised one’s hand, a law 
would have been broken beforehand (1981, p. 116). 
Whatever we think of the success of Lewis’ claim, his treatment of 
this kind of compatibilist friendly ability to act otherwise highlights 
the counterfactual nature of the ability.43 What makes it true that I 
was able to raise my hand (when I, in fact, did not) is that I did so in 
some non-actual nearby possible world (with different laws of 
nature). In this world, raising my arm was, after all, excluded by the 
past and the laws of nature in this world.  
I will call theories that make use of such a counterfactual 
understanding of capacities in order to save PAP for “counterfactual 
theories of alternative possibilities.”  
                                    
43 See Beebee (2003) for an argument to the effect that he does not succeed in 
distinguishing between the weak and strong thesis in a way that ensures that we are 
never able to act otherwise in the sense spelled out by the strong thesis. 
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4.3.4 Some worries concerning counterfactual theories 
of alternative possibilities  
Before going into the details of whether counterfactual theories of 
alternative possibilities satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference 
and hence justify basic desert attribution, I will mention van 
Inwagen’s worry about the expressions “could have done” and “is 
able to”. In “Some Thoughts on An Essay on Free Will” (2015), he 
discusses the ambiguous meaning of “could have”:  
 “Could have” is grammatically ambiguous, and this has caused a great 
deal of confusion in the discussions of the free-will problem in 
English[...] Sentences of the form “X could have done Y” can mean 
either “X might have done Y” (i.e., “This is how things might have 
turned out: that X did Y”) or “X was able to do Y” [...] One of the 
confusions that has resulted from the double meaning of “could have 
done otherwise” is that some critics of libertarianism have supposed 
that when libertarians say (for example), “She was not morally 
responsible for what she did because she could not have done 
otherwise” they mean “She was not morally responsible for what she 
did because her act was determined to occur”. Now libertarians do 
believe that “X was able to do Y” entails “X might not have done Y” 
(i.e, “The world as it was just before X did Y might have evolved in 
such a way that X did not do Y”), but they regard this as a substantive 
philosophical thesis. They do not regard “X was able to do Y” and “X 
might not have done Y” as two ways of saying the same thing [...] 
Suppose, for example, that Martha Argerich is stranded on a desert 
island (where, of course, there is no piano). Is she able to play Pictures 
at an Exhibition? In one sense of “able to play” she is (she knows it, as 
the idiom has it, forwards and backwards), and in another sense she is 
not. I would explain the relevant sense of “able” in terms of what is 
presupposed by making a promise: if a fellow castaway begs Argerich 
to play Pictures (then and there), she is not in a position to promise to 
do so, for (in the sense of “able” that is relevant to the problem of free 
will), she would not be able to keep that promise. (van Inwagen 2015, 
pp.17-18)44  
                                    
44 Van Inwagen (2015, p. 17) complains that the free will debate has, to a large 
extent, been captured by “verbal essentialism”. The disagreement in the debate is 
often centered around verbal disputes about how to interpret fundamental concepts 
and expressions. This problem would be interesting to discuss in light of some 
theories of disagreement, such as, for example, Plunkett & Sundell’s “Disagreement 
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Van Inwagen complains that if the compatibilist needs to understand 
“could have done” in a counterfactual fashion, this understanding 
does not capture what we intuitively have in mind when talking about 
free will and responsibility. In the Martha Argerich case, it is true that 
there is nothing about her psychological abilities that makes here 
unable to play the piano – she could have done so if she would have 
had a piano. But she does not have a piano, so this counterfactual 
truth does not mean that she has a real access to the possibility of 
playing the piano. Likewise, in some reasonable sense of ability, 
nothing about Lewis’ psychological abilities stopped him from raising 
his arm (if the laws of nature had just been a tiny bit different, he 
would have used that ability to do so). But still, he was determined by 
the past and the laws of nature not to do so – so the counterfactual 
truth that he would have done so if the laws of nature had been 
slightly different does not seem to mean that he has a real access to a 
possibility of raising his arm.  
However, even if one would, in the end, think that the 
counterfactual view captures some sense of free will, and perhaps 
even some sense responsibility, one can object to the idea that it is 
sufficient for basic desert. Nicole Vincent expresses this worry (but 
she puts in in terms of justification of blame rather than basic desert) 
as follows:  
 [...] when we remind ourselves that under determinism nobody would 
have capacities in the genuine access to alternative possibilities sense, 
the fact that in these other senses people might still have capacities 
seems to lose its ability to provide a normative justification for blame. 
After all, “blame” is a contrastive notion in the sense that it compares 
the way that a person actually behaved to a norm which specifies how 
they should have behaved – i.e. one is blameworthy when one’s actions 
do not accord with (when they infringe) how one ought to have acted. 
However, a consequence of the ought implies can maxim is that how a 
person ought to act depends at least in part on how they can act – i.e. 
what a person should do depends at least in part on their capacities. 
                                    
and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms” (2013) in which they 
discuss different levels of disagreement in moral matters, between participants who 
do not share the same metalinguistic intuitions. I lack the space in this thesis to 
examine how such a view could be applicable to the free will debate but I think it 
would be an interesting approach to the free will problem in future research.  
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Stated schematically, a person is blameworthy when they acted not in 
accordance with how they ought to have acted, and how they ought to 
have acted depends at least in part on how they had the capacity to act. 
However, the sense of “capacity” in which people must have a capacity 
to act in a given way in order for it to be legitimate to expect them to 
act in that manner – in order for it to be true that they ought to act in 
that way – is surely the genuine access to alternative possibilities sense. 
It must surely be such that someone really could have acted in a way 
that accorded with how it is claimed that they ought to have acted and 
not just that they “could” have acted in that way. If people only ever 
have capacities in these other senses but not in the genuine access to 
alternative possibilities sense – if nobody can ever do anything other 
than what they actually do – then how can it ever be morally legitimate 
to expect anyone to do something other than what they actually did, 
and thus to blame them when their actions depart from that 
expectation? A substantial sense of “capacity” seems to be needed to 
warrant blame, for otherwise what we will end up saying is that despite 
the fact that a particular behavioral option was never in fact available 
to someone – despite the fact that they only “could” have done it, but 
not that they could really have done it – they still nevertheless ought to 
have done it. (Vincent, 2013, pp. 183-184)  
Vincent is worried about how we can attribute blame on good 
grounds, if we accept that nobody can ever do anything else than they 
actually do. Her concern is based in the intuitive plausibility of the 
Kantian moral principle “ought implies can”, which basically is what 
grounds the intuition of why PAP is important for moral 
responsibility in the first place.  
 The content of Vincent’s worry about the justification of blame is 
similar to the worry about the justification of basic desert. Blame and 
desert are closely connected: if someone does not deserve blame, it 
seems unjust to blame her. Vincent is also, even if she does not 
express it in these terms, concerned with the question of how a mere 
dispositional capacity of being able to act differently can be the relevant 
difference that distinguishes a person who is blameworthy from 
someone who is not. Now, this is exactly what was pointed out as a 
prima facie problem for basic desert in relation to the challenge from 
determinism.  
As a reminder, the problem is this: given determinism, no capacity 
can be such that it in a specific point in time actually can produce 
another output (as e.g., another action) than it actually does. Given 
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the moral supervenience thesis, moral properties supervene on 
natural properties, and given the Principle of Relevant Difference, 
there must be a relevant difference between two natural properties in 
order for there to be a difference in moral properties. But how could 
a feature of a capacity, say, the dispositional feature of being able to 
produce another output, work as the relevant difference, when this 
feature, in fact, could not be realized under the circumstances at 
hand? When presented like this, the challenge from determinism and 
Vincent’s worry appear to be concerned with the same problem: is a 
dispositional capacity to act otherwise sufficient for basic desert and 
blame? However, as Vincent also discusses in her article, her worry, 
that ought implies can, can be answered by those who defend the 
dispositional interpretation of “can” by saying that as a matter of fact, 
a person who has the capacity to act differently in a counterfactually 
sense can act differently in the relevant sense. Neil Levy notes that it 
seems perfectly true to say about e.g., a vase that it has the property 
of fragility, and that this property is one the vase possesses at the time 
of the utterance in the actual world. This means that it is true to say 
that a vase can break, even though it for the moment being sits on the 
shelf:  
Fragility is a property the vase possesses right now, while it sits on the 
shelf [...] Fragility is [...]an actual sequence property, which the case has 
now, regardless of what might happen in nearby worlds [...] We test for 
fragility [...] by asking how [the vase] would behave in a world in which 
the vase was dropped [...] because doing so is the best way to 
understand the properties the vase has in this world. (Levy, 2008, pp. 
227-228) 
According to Levy, to understand dispositional properties in terms of 
possible worlds is the only way to understand the notion of capacities 
of mechanisms in deterministic settings (Levy, 2008, p. 228). 
However, Vincent objects to this claim, not primarily because it does 
not capture what we mean by dispositional properties, but because it 
cannot account for the normative role dispositional properties are 
assumed to play in a theory of responsibility. Vincent’ s worry is, 
basically, that a counterfactual analysis of capacities of the sort 
suggested by e.g., Levy cannot meet the challenge from determinism:  
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“Capacity” is ultimately a modal notion, and it is tricky business to 
figure out how to accommodate modality under determinism. Perhaps 
more importantly, however we decide to make sense of that notion – 
i.e., whatever analysis we propose – we must ensure that in the context 
of debates about responsibility someone stuck in a deterministic universe 
will have no legitimate grounds for complaints of the sort I aired above 
[that “ought implies can” and that one lacks the relevant sense of ‘can’ 
in an analysis of the sort suggested by e.g., Levy]. (Vincent, 2013, p. 
188) 
In order to solve the problem of how a notion of capacity can provide 
us with the normative force needed for responsibility and blame, 
Vincent provides an alternative, diachronic account of how to 
understand what it means to have a capacity, in contrast to e.g., 
Fischer & Ravizza’s synchronic account, (see Vincent, 2013, pp. 188-
191). In Vincent’s view, we should understand the modal nature of a 
capacity, as e.g., one’s capacity of being reasons-responsive, in terms 
of how one’s reasons-responsive mechanism behaves “in this world over 
a span of time” (Vincent, 2013, p.188). According to Vincent, this 
approach has several advantages, but for the current purposes, what 
is interesting is how such an approach can meet the challenge of 
determinism. It turns out that it does so by abandoning basic desert, 
and instead justifies the responsibility practice that connects to 
judgments of capacities with reference to consequentialist concerns: 
“ […] holding some people responsible for what they do but not 
others might be morally justified […] because doing so will be fair as 
long as over the course of a lifetime that person stands to benefit 
more than they stand to be burdened from such a practice” (Vincent, 
2013, p. 189). However, the purpose of this chapter is to scrutinize 
whether there is a compatibilist view of free will and /or responsibility 
that can save basic desert – and Vincent’s account does not save that.  
In my view, Vincent has an intuitively plausible point regarding the 
tricky business of making sense of capacities in a deterministic world. 
In the next section, I will scrutinize the counterfactual account of 
alternative possibilities, and see how it fares in light of the Principle 
of Relevant Difference and the challenges from determinism and 
physicalism.  
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4.3.5 Counterfactual theories & the Principle of 
Relevant Difference 
The Principle of Relevant Difference poses the following question to 
counterfactual theories of alternative possibilities: what is the relevant 
difference between a person who has the property of reasons-
responsiveness and a person who lacks this property, with regard to 
moral responsibility (in the sense of retributive desert moral 
responsibility)? As we have seen, the properties that account for the 
relevant difference between someone who is and someone who is not 
morally responsible are, in counterfactual theories of alternative 
possibilities, found in the dispositional properties of an agent. Such a 
dispositional property is, for example, that at a specific time t1, when 
you choose coffee instead of tea, it is true to say that the mechanism 
that was causally involved in the choice at t1, also had the disposition 
in t1 to be causally involved in another choice, had the circumstances been 
slightly different.  
Reasons-responsiveness is a dispositional property that is often 
discussed as being sufficient for basic desert. Imagine two people, A 
and B. A is reasons-responsive, whereas B is not. This difference can 
be illustrated as follows:  
 
	 t1’		 t1*	 t1@	
A:	 x y z 
B:		 z z z 
 
t1’- t1@ is the same point in time, in slightly different possible worlds. 
We approve of A’s x’ing and y’ing in t1’ and t1*. We do not, however, 
approve of her z’ing in t1@. B is z’ing in all cases (we disapprove of 
B’s behavior in all cases.) Further, A’s action in t1’ and t1* are due to 
her responding properly to reasons in the situations, and therefore 
she is described as reasons-responsive. Since B does not respond 
properly to reasons in any of the possible worlds, she is described as 
not reasons-responsive. 
t1@ is t1 in the actual world, t1’ and t1* are the same point in time 
in nearby possible worlds. Given determinism, A and B are equally 
determined to act as they do in all possible worlds, including their act 
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of z’ing in t1@. According to the counterfactual account of alternative 
possibilities, the fact that A, but not B, acquires basic desert in t1@ is 
explained by A’s, in t1@, dispositional property (that she has in t1@) 
to be x’ing in t1’ and y’ing in t1*, a dispositional property that B lacks. 
But regardless of this, both A and B have the disposition to perform 
z in t1@ and none of them, of course, has the disposition to act in any 
other way than they actually do in t1@.  
A’s and B’s dispositional properties seem to be different in terms 
of their functional nature: given identical circumstances, they will give 
different outputs. It is quite easy to get the intuition behind the 
thought that this functional difference is a relevant difference with 
regard to basic desert: A is the kind of person who, over a range of 
possible situations, responds to the relevant reasons in the situation, 
and thus, the idea is that A is the kind of person who can respond to 
the relevant reasons. And since A can (in the dispositional sense) 
respond to reasons also in t1@, but fails to do so, it makes sense to 
hold her morally responsible (in the relevant sense) for her failure to 
respond to the relevant reasons. Consequently, according to this line 
of thought, A’s dispositional property to respond to reasons is the 
base property of basic desert. However, given determinism, both A 
and B are equally disposed to do what they actually do in t1@, that is, 
they are equally determined not to respond to the relevant reasons in 
that situation. In this sense, for both of them, doing something other 
than z in t1@ was equally ruled out by the past and the laws of nature. 
At t1@, was equally impossible for A to do y or x, as it was for B to 
do y or z, and it is hard to see why the fact that A in other (non-actual) 
possible worlds is determined to do other things, such as x and y, 
would be relevant to whether A, but not B, is responsible in the basic 
desert sense when both of them do z. When their respective abilities 
to act otherwise are described like this, it is not obvious why A’s 
capacity to act otherwise under other circumstances is enough to 
establish that she is relevantly different from B at t1@. 
Hence, when looking at A and B doing z at t1@, the difference in 
dispositional properties seems not enough for establishing that there 
is a relevant difference between A and B such that this difference can 
be the basis of basic desert. Because at t1@ A and B are equally 
determined to act as they do, and they are equally unable to act 
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otherwise. Therefore, the relevant difference condition is not 
satisfied, and according to the consistency requirement, A and B 
should not have different moral properties.  
If one wants to escape the challenge from determinism by arguing 
that the important thing with regard to moral responsibility has 
nothing to do with determinism, but rather, how different mental 
states and actions come about, we instead face the challenge from 
physicalism. The problem is as follows: if we accept that the relevant 
difference between someone who has basic desert and someone who 
has not is located in some property involved in the sequence of events 
that leads to the action in question, there must be an intuitively 
plausible account of what it is that makes that property special in the 
sense that it is the base property of basic desert. Moreover, this 
intuitive account must not be based on consequentialist 
considerations, such as Vincent’s idea that a certain practice is more 
beneficial than burdensome for the individual person. Rather, in 
order to make sense of basic desert, it must be an account that makes 
it intuitively plausible to connect a certain natural property to the 
moral property of basic desert, without invoking instrumentalist 
concerns. In order to pin down the properties between which we 
must pick out this relevant difference, a plausible method could be to 
determine which properties in a mental event that is causally relevant 
with regard to an action.  
Since we accept physicalism, and follow Kim (2000) regarding the 
exclusion problem the causally relevant property of a mental event is 
either identical to, reducible to, or otherwise dependent on a neural 
cause. Plausibly, this neural cause is a neural state in the brain.45 
Hence, the relevant difference between two mental events, where one 
includes the base-property of basic desert and one does not, is to be 
found on the neural level. But on the level of brain states, the 
Principle of Relevant Difference is hard to satisfy: there seems to be 
no relevant difference between brain states that cause the kind of 
actions for which we are (supposedly) morally responsible and brain 
states that cause other kinds of actions for which we are (supposedly) 
not morally responsible – they seem to be processes of the very same 
                                    
45 For Kim’s view of the exclusion problem see p. 102. 
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kind. Hence, the challenge from physicalism makes it hard to satisfy 
the relevant difference condition, since the causal power of mental 
states are found at the level of brain states. It seems to violate the 
consistency requirement that one neural property, but not another, is 
the base-property of basic desert, if they are of the very same kind in 
the sense that they work in accordance with certain input-output 
mechanisms, and the way they process incoming input depends 
completely on their physical and functional properties.  
The worry that the dispositional, functional properties that are 
picked out as base-properties for basic desert do not meet the 
Principle of Relevant Difference resembles what Watson pointed at 
as problematic for Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory of free will. 
Watson’s critique was the following:  
The problem […] is not that there is a regressive ascent up the 
hierarchy, or that people are not that complex, but simply that higher-
order volitions are just, after all, desires, and nothing about their level 
gives them any special authority […] If they have that authority, they 
are given it by something else. (Watson, 1987, p. 149) 
Watson’s critique is, in a sense, concerned with the Principle of 
Relevant Difference: if higher-order volitions should play a special 
role with regard to free will, they must be relevantly different from 
first-level volitions. Otherwise, to give them a special normative 
authority violates the consistency requirement. If we apply a similar 
critique to counterfactual accounts of free will, we can ask: what is it 
with the dispositional properties of A that makes them special with 
regard to moral responsibility, when they are, in their more basic 
nature, not relevantly different from the dispositional properties of 
B? If the properties of A have that authority (with regard to moral 
responsibility) they are given it by something else. For example, we can 
give certain properties a certain authority with regard to desert, of e.g., 
consequentialist considerations, as Vincent does. But to give some 
natural properties such an authority does not provide us with basic 
desert, since basic desert is ascribed to a person solely based on an 
action that she has performed and certain intrinsic properties of her 
that make her into a person who can deserve things on the basis of 
what she has done. According to such a view, we do not ascribe basic 
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desert to people because it has desirable consequences, but because 
they actually deserve something, given their natural properties.  
In this section I have discussed the prospects of justifying basic 
desert based on what I call counterfactual accounts of alternative 
possibilities, and more specifically, compatibilist theories that 
characterize the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility in terms 
of dispositional capacities. I have concluded that this approach to 
moral responsibility cannot justify basic desert attribution, because it 
fails to satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference. In the next 
section, I shall discuss Peter Strawson’s account of moral 
responsibility as connected to reactive attitudes, and whether this kind 
of approach can ease the worry about the justification of basic desert.  
4.4 Wrong focus? Strawson’s diplomatic 
account 
The essay “Freedom and Resentment” (1962), P.F Strawson’s famous 
contribution to the free will and responsibility debate, is an attempt 
to bring incompatibilists and compatibilists closer to each other. 
Instead of focusing on the possible consequences of determinism for 
free will and responsibility (he explicitly claims that he does not know 
what the thesis of determinism is (Strawson, 1962a, p. 1)) he focuses 
on the nature of moral responsibility. According to him both 
compatibilists and incompatibilists have misconstrued the nature of 
moral responsibility, and hence arguments from both sides miss the 
target. His attempt to draw a distinction between different “modes of 
interpretation” is similar to what some more recent thinkers, e.g. 
Morse (2013b) and Ruth Ann Mackor (2013), argue is the way we 
must understand neuroscientific findings in the context of law: even 
if neuroscience gives us a much richer theoretical understanding of 
how human behavior is connected to brain functions, brain functions 
are not what we talk about when we discuss for example people’s 
desires, wishes, beliefs and so on.  
In Strawson’s view, responsibility judgements are connected to 
deep and innate features of the human psyche: it is about gratitude, 
resentment, forgiveness, love and hurt feelings: this emotional space 
is where responsibility judgements come from. We react to the 
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behavior of others, and care about how others react to our own 
behavior. Strawson makes a distinction between participant reactive 
attitudes and objective attitudes, where the first kind of attitudes “ […] 
are essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or 
indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and 
actions” (Strawson, 1962b, p. 67). That is, the attitudes we have when 
we participate in human relationships. Our practice of holding people 
morally responsible is part of this practice of having reactive attitudes 
when we interact with people. The second kind of attitudes, objective 
attitudes, are such that we can choose to apply them in some 
circumstances. For example, a teacher working with a child diagnosed 
with a neuropsychiatric disorder might try to set her participant 
reactive attitudes aside, and adopt the objective reactive attitudes 
towards the difficulties of this child to concentrate, follow 
instructions, etc. When the child displays her difficulties, the teacher 
tries to identify what in the situation that has triggered the behavior 
and adapt the circumstances in ways that serves the child’s learning 
process better.  
When adopting the objective attitude towards another person, we 
see her as an object rather than a social subject with which we interact. 
This means that the interactive part of the situation disappears. The 
objective perspective can be accompanied by emotions like, for 
example anger; fear; disgust; or love; but these emotions serve 
another purpose in the objective attitudes compared with the 
participant reactive attitudes. As in other situations when we have 
such emotions directed towards an object (as opposed to having the 
same emotions in an interactive situation) they are not there in order 
to fulfill any interactive purpose. 
Even if participant and objective attitudes are not mutually 
exclusive, they are opposed to each other (Strawson 1962b, p. 66). To 
take a fully objective perspective on a person seems then to exclude 
the possibility to have a fully participant perspective on the very same 
person. Strawson’s theory is construed around the question of what 
effect the acceptance of the truth of a general thesis of determinism 
has upon participant reactive attitudes. Should the acceptance of the 
truth of the thesis lead to the decay or the repudiation of all such 
attitudes? Should we stop feeling gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, 
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love, and hurt feelings? Well, it is conceivable, in Strawson’s view, that 
all these things may happen. But is it practically possible? Strawson 
believes not. The alternative to replace all participant reactive 
attitudes with objective reactive attitudes and start viewing each other 
as mere objects or automata with which we have no genuine 
interactive, social contact is perhaps possible in a theoretical 
discussion in which we discuss possible ways of treating each other 
from an intellectual point of view. But this move, Strawson points 
out, actually seems to take us away from what we actually are – 
interactive and social beings.  
Strawson’s aim was to turn the focus away from the metaphysical 
discussion of free will and responsibility, as, for example, the 
discussion of whether moral responsibility compatible with a 
determinist universe. But although his account of responsibility 
provides some intuitively plausible explanations to e.g., why 
responsibility is central in social interactions, the metaphysical 
questions remain. As was considered to some extent in chapter 3, it 
is hard to justify any internal practice (such as e.g., the legal 
proceedings) without referring to some external justification: even if 
we may accept that people’s reactive attitudes de facto seem to work in 
a certain way, we may still ask whether the practices that evolve out 
of these reactive attitudes are justified with regard to other moral 
considerations. Further, it may be argued that even though reactive 
attitudes play a central role in human interaction, that does not 
exclude that the ability to analyze and asking for justification of those 
attitudes is central as well. After all, it is plausibly a characteristic 
feature of human psychology that we look for justification and 
rational support for our actions and practices.  
Ayer (1962) complains of “intellectual discomfort” by Strawson’s 
sharp demarcation between participant and objective perspectives. It 
is however not the case that Ayer does not agree with Strawson about 
the meaningfulness of distinguishing between an objective and 
participating perspective on people’s behavior. Even if Strawson 
provides no argument for why the participating perspective is more 
valuable for us as humans than the objective perspective, Ayer 
expresses that he is strongly inclined to side with Strawson on this 
matter. What troubles Ayer is that he does not care for having 
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attitudes that are obviously irrational. One way to judge if an attitude 
is irrational is by measuring the probable consequences of adopting 
it: does the attitude help us to achieve what we want or need? Another 
way to measure the rationality of an attitude is by measuring the 
reasons we have for the belief to which the attitude is attached. If we 
consider a participating reactive attitude such as anger, we are most 
often angry because of something, i.e., we believe that something is the 
case. (If we do not know why we are angry, it is doubtful if the attitude 
can be called “reactive” since it is unclear whether the attitude is a 
reaction to something.) If we, on reflection, see that we have no good 
reasons for accepting the belief connected to the reactive attitude in 
question, this insight becomes a reason for us not only to discard the 
belief, but also the connected attitude. This is the problem that 
troubles Ayer in relation to Strawson’s theory of free will and 
responsibility. Ayer maintains that the concept of desert that we 
normally employ is deeply problematic since it is built upon a 
metaphysical idea of self-determination which Strawson himself 
dismisses as inane (Ayer, 1962, p. 45). Then, if we have no reason to 
accept this belief in self-determination, the belief in desert seems 
unwarranted, too. And since our attitudes such as blame and 
resentment rest upon these beliefs in desert and self-determination, 
Ayer concludes, in sharp contrast to Strawson, that he should refrain 
from adhering such irrational attitudes as far as he can. This said, Ayer 
does not commit himself to treat either himself and others as 
machines. Like Strawson, he sees this outcome as an impoverishment 
of human life – but unlike Strawson, with an accompanying feeling of 
intellectual discomfort (Ayer 1962, p. 46). 
Paul Russell (2008) also expresses slight discomfort with 
Strawson’s view on the incompatibility of reactive attitudes and 
rational thinking. Russell introduces two distinctions, one between 
the “rationalistic” and “naturalistic” perspectives on reactive 
attitudes, and another between “type” and “token” pessimism 
concerning the aptness of reactive attitudes (Russell, 2008, p. 145).  
The rationalistic strategy is displayed in Ayer’s critique of 
Strawson’s theory, where the argument relies on our rational ability to 
recognize that our reactive attitudes are misplaced in some, or all 
circumstances since they rest on unwarranted beliefs. Even if Ayer 
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admits that it seems very hard, if not impossible, to abandon the 
natural reactions to our own and others behavior, it is, nonetheless, 
the rational conclusion we must draw when analyzing the beliefs that 
ground our responsibility practices more closely. The naturalistic 
strategy, on the other hand, entails that it is psychologically impossible 
for us to entirely suspend or abandon our reactive attitudes – they are 
so thoroughgoing and deeply rooted in us so that they are practically 
insulated from sceptic doubts about their aptness. As a feature given 
by the human nature, claims to the effect that our reactive attitudes 
require external justification are mistaken, just as much as it is a 
mistake to ask for justification for the human ability to be afraid. 
Emotions do not require external, rational justification: we cannot, 
through reason, discover that emotional reactions are unjustified and 
then get rid of them. Strawson argues that since emotions is not a 
category that requires justification, emotions cannot be shown to be 
unjustified by scientific findings or rational deliberation, and whether 
they are determined or not does not matter for their justification, 
either.  
According to Russell, Strawson makes a mistake here by 
misrepresenting the typical sceptic argument: Strawson does not 
recognize the difference between being a type-sceptic about the 
aptness of reactive attitudes and being a token-sceptic. Even if 
Strawson is not explicit about what he has in mind, Russell argues that 
it is reasonable to interpret him as if he discusses type-pessimism. But, 
Russell argues, this understanding of the typical sceptic argument 
misrepresents her actual concern. Usually the sceptic does not claim 
that the emotions as such are unjustified. It is not like anger as such, or 
resentment as such, are unjustified kinds of emotions. Instead, what 
the sceptic claims is that, in every individual case, i.e., for every token 
of these kinds of emotions, they seem to co-exist with certain beliefs, 
which are likely to be false beliefs. If this is the case, it means that no 
token of these reactive attitudes has a proper target.  
Both Ayer and Russell criticize Strawson’s argument to the effect 
that reactive attitudes are immune to reason: it does not really bite, 
and the reason is that attitudes, at least when interpreted as tokens, 
simply are not immune to reason. Ayer discusses the intuitively 
attractive idea that when we know that a certain belief most probably 
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is unjustified, then this insight will affect the connected attitude as 
well. Perhaps not in the sense that the attitude is wiped away 
completely, but in the sense that we are less inclined to act on it. 
Russell shares this view, and writes:  
[T]he sceptic finds Strawson’s naturalistic reply both misguided and 
disturbing. What is particularly disturbing […] is that it casts doubts on 
our ability, or capacity to curb or control our emotional life according to 
the dictates of reason. More specifically, it seems clear that, despite 
disclaimers to the contrary, Strawson’s naturalistic strategy invites us to 
accept or reconcile ourselves to reactive attitudes (and their associated 
retributive practices) even in circumstances when we have reason to 
repudiate them. (Russell, 2008, p. 152) 
Neither Russell nor Ayer dismiss Strawson’s claim that our reactive 
attitudes are deeply rooted parts of our human nature – but they reject 
the idea that this part of the human nature cannot be influenced, and 
changed, by rational deliberation.  
I believe Russell’s and Ayer’s critique of Strawson’s account to be 
instructive for the main purpose of this book: to analyze the Revision 
Argument and discuss whether legal retributive punishment is 
justified, and what is required for such a justification. As I said in the 
beginning of this section, I find Strawson’s general approach to free 
will and moral responsibility useful, since we need an account of 
moral responsibility that people in general are inclined to accept: in 
other words, an account of moral responsibility that is, or has the 
prospects of being, supported by folk morality. Otherwise, our theory 
cannot be a candidate for the role of justifying legal punishment 
practice. However, I also agree with Russell and Ayer in their 
complaints that Strawson’s approach misrepresents certain aspects of 
our responsibility practice, and especially the complex relation 
between reactive attitudes and rational thinking. Moreover, 
Strawson’s theory does not take us any further concerning the 
metaphysical discussions of basic desert, but the dialectics between 
Strawson’s account and the objections from Ayer and Russell are 
useful to think about the bigger picture: how our responsibility 
practices reflect both the social nature of human interaction, and that 
they are also proper targets of critical and rational thinking. 
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to agree with Strawson that reactive 
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attitudes have a central role in our social life, but that, in contrast to 
Strawson, this central role is a reason for why we should scrutinize if 
the moral practices that are connected to these reactive attitudes are 
justified.  
These issues will be returned to in chapter six, where the intricate 
relationship between folk morality, folk psychology and science will 
be further discussed.  
4.5 Summary & conclusions 
 In this chapter I have discussed the possibilities of justifying basic 
desert in a compatibilist framework. The background to this 
discussion is Morse’s objection to the Revision Argument, presented 
in chapter 3. In the Revision Argument, it is claimed that legal 
retributive punishment presupposes a libertarian free will for its 
justification. According to Morse, legal retributive punishment 
presupposes neither libertarianism nor compatibilism about free will 
– as a matter of fact, the law does not include assumptions of free will 
at all. Further, if we ask for an external justification for the retributive 
element in the legal system, Morse claims that “only compatibilism 
provides a secure basis for criminal responsibility” (Morse 2013a, p. 
28).  
Since the legal system most plausibly needs external justification, 
the question in this chapter has been whether compatibilism can 
provide a secure basis of criminal responsibility in the sense of 
justifying basic desert. This question was discussed in light of a moral 
principle called “the Principle of Relevant Difference” and two prima 
facie challenges for compatibilism that arise from this principle, given 
that we accept the metaphysical doctrines of determinism and 
physicalism.  
I have discussed two kinds of compatibilist theories. I called them 
“actual sequence compatibilism,” according to which PAP is not 
necessary for moral responsibility, and “counterfactual theories of 
alternative possibilities” according to which a person has the 





I argued that the challenges from determinism and physicalism 
provide problems with regard to the possibility for these compatibilist 
theories to justify basic desert.  
 Towards the end of the chapter, I briefly discussed if P.F 
Strawson’s (1962) approach to moral responsibility can support 
Morse’s criticism. According to Strawson, both incompatibilists and 
compatibilists have misconstrued the nature of moral responsibility. 
In Strawson’s theory, the justification of responsibility judgements 
should not be analyzed in relation to determinism, but in relation to 
their role in social interaction. Some critique of Strawson’s 
perspective was considered: Ayer (1962) complains that Strawson’s 
sharp demarcation between objective and participant perspective 
does not make sense (or rather, that it creates “intellectual 
discomfort”) since both these perspectives are involved in 
responsibility judgements. Russell (2008) put forth a similar objection: 
he suggests that Strawson misrepresents the typical sceptic argument. 
The sceptic does not claim that reactive attitudes as e.g., resentment 
is unjustified as such, but that they co-exist with a certain kind of belief, 
and the belief is, according to the sceptic, mistaken. It is this 
connection between attitudes and (unjustified) beliefs that makes 
responsibility judgements unjustified. In sum, I concluded that 
Strawson’s account cannot, in itself, contribute to the discussion of 
how to justify basic desert as it is discussed in this chapter, that is, in 
the light of the principle of relevant difference and the metaphysical 
constraints of determinism and physicalism.  
I have concluded that none of the compatibilist approaches to 
moral responsibility discussed in this chapter can justify basic desert 
attribution, since none of them satisfy the Principle of Relevant 
Difference in light of the challenges from determinism and 
physicalism. If this conclusion is correct, it means that Morse’s 
compatibilist objection fails to make a convincing case against the 
Revision Argument.  
In next chapter, I shall discuss a view that is a possible problem 
for the arguments that I have put forward in this chapter. According 
to this view, if we accept non-reductive physicalism rather than 
reductive physicalism, then it is conceptually confused to think that 
claims about the brain can tell us something about the mental states 
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upon which our responsibility attributions are based. Thus, the 
Revision Argument, and my arguments in this chapter, would be 
flawed, since they are based on a conceptual confusion. 
 
  
5 Second objection: Conceptual 
confusion about the nature of  
mental states 
 
For Churchland, the mind is the brain and so normativity must be in 
the brain. For Greene & Cohen, the mind is the brain and, so, if 
normativity is anywhere it must be in the brain- but because they do 
not see it there, they conclude it is nowhere. We reject both pictures. 
(Pardo & Patterson, 2014, p. 42) 
5.1 Introduction 
According to the Revision Argument, legal retributive punishment is 
justified by folk psychological and folk moral accounts of free will 
and responsibility. It is claimed that according to these accounts, in 
order to deserve punishment, one must be responsible for one’s 
actions, and in order to be responsible for one’s actions one must be 
able to act freely, and in order to act freely, one must have a libertarian 
free will. But, the argument goes, if we accept determinism, no one 
can have a libertarian free will, since actions are determined by earlier 
events and the laws of nature. The view that human action works 
according to deterministic and mechanical principles is supported by 
neuroscience, since people’s behavior can be accounted for in purely 
neuroscientific terms. In a neuroscientific explanation of action, free 
will in not required in order to make sense of why people act as they 
do. Hence, neuroscience supports the view that (libertarian) free will 
is not involved in human action. 
In their book “Minds, Brains and Law: The Conceptual 
Foundations of Law and Neuroscience” (2013), Michael S. Pardo and 
Dennis Patterson argue that the neurolaw debate is partly shaped by 
conceptually confused claims about mental states. These conceptual 
muddles not only lead to the wrong conclusions of what neuroscience 
can tell us about minds and mental states, but they also lead to false 
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normative claims, for example about responsibility and the 
justification of punishment.  
That brain science is of limited relevance for inquires of free will 
and responsibility is a well-established position in the neurolaw 
debate. This general approach is based on a number of different 
arguments that have much support among philosophers and legal 
scholars alike. The objection that Pardo and Patterson put forward is 
most notably also defended by Maxwell Bennett & Peter Hacker 
(2003), in their well-cited book “Philosophical Foundations of 
Neuroscience”. In this chapter, this position will be interpreted 
specifically as an objection to the Revision Argument, referred to as 
“the Conceptual Objection”.  
In accordance with Morse, Pardo & Patterson claim that “one can 
coherently be a compatibilist and a retributivist, a combination that is 
consistent with current law” (Pardo & Patterson 2013, p. 198).46 In 
the previous chapter, I discussed the possibility of justifying basic 
desert attribution, which is necessary for the justification of 
retributivism, within a compatibilist framework. I concluded that this 
approach was problematic in light of the Principle of Relevant 
Difference and the challenges from determinism and physicalism.  
Pardo & Patterson’s approach to this discussion is that the 
justification of retributivism, i.e., the justification of the attribution of 
basic desert, is intimately connected to mental state explanations. But 
in order to understand how this justification works, it is important to 
understand what mental states are. According to Pardo & Patterson, 
the main problem with the Revision Argument is that it rests upon an 
untenable account of the nature of mental states. This untenable 
account is based on a misunderstanding of how mental concepts 
work. But, they argue, if we scrutinize the nature of mental concepts, 
we will realize that there is a more plausible account of the nature of 
mental states, and that this account can do the job of justifying basic 
desert attribution.  
                                    
46 By “coherently” I take them to mean that retributivism can be justified within a 
compatibilist theory of free will and/or moral responsibility, since they partly frame 
their theory as a defence of retributive punishment against incompatibilist argument, 
such as the Revision Argument.  
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In this chapter, I will discuss my interpretation of Pardo & 
Patterson’s argument, as divided into the following claims:  
 
1. On a correct view of mental state concepts, mental states 
cannot be reduced to brain states. Therefore, mental 
explanations of actions cannot be reduced to explanations in 
terms of brain states (see Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 41). 
 
2.  People can be responsible and deserve punishment (in the 
sense of basic desert) for their actions, if their actions can be 
explained in terms of mental concepts such as choices (see 
Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 202). 
 
3. From (1) and (2) it follows that brain state explanations are 
irrelevant to whether people are responsible in the sense of 
basic desert or not.  
 
The claims above serve as an objection to the Revision Argument, in 
the sense that they reject the idea that neuroscientific explanations of 
actions can inform us about the justification of basic desert-
attribution. Furthermore, they also serve as an objection to the 
conclusion in chapter four, that compatibilism is unable to provide a 
secure basis for retributivism. In that chapter, I argued that in order 
to justify basic desert attributions, there must be a relevant difference at 
the level of brain states between mental states that are the supervenience 
bases of basic desert, and mental states that are not. But according to 
the objection from Pardo & Patterson, this line of reasoning makes 
no sense. With regard to the justification of desert-attribution, the 
relevant differences between someone who has the moral property of 
basic desert and someone who has not cannot be found on the level 
of brain states. I will label this view “non-reductive compatibilism”. 
According to non-reductive compatibilism we cannot look for the 
justification of responsibility and desert at the physical level, since the 
mental states in virtue of which people are responsible and have basic 
desert, cannot be reduced to physical states. In this chapter I will 
discuss whether non-reductive compatibilism is a viable view, and 
whether it can be used to refute the Revision Argument and the 
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arguments against compatibilism about basic desert presented in 
chapters three and four. 
This chapter will run as follows: In section 5.2, I will describe 
Pardo & Patterson’s claim that mental concepts cannot be reduced to 
physical concepts. In section 5.3, I will describe why, according to 
Pardo & Patterson, choices are the basis of responsibility. In section 
5.4, I suggest that their view of mental states is best construed as a 
functionalist theory. One worry with a functionalist theory of mental 
states is that it is difficult to make sense of mental causation, and 
mental causation is central for the explanatory relevance of mental 
states in relation to actions. In section 5.5, I will address this worry, 
and (briefly) discuss two non-reductive approaches to mental 
causation, in order to analyze whether Pardo & Patterson’s 
functionalist view of mental states can be combined with a view of 
mental causation that can satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference 
in light of the challenges of determinism and physicalism. The first 
view I will discuss is that of Donald Davidson (1970), according to 
whom we can keep a monistic physicalist theory of the mental, 
without giving up non-reduction about mental states and mental 
causation. The second view I will discuss is a more recent 
contribution to the debate of how to conceive of mental causation: 
Christian List & Peter Menzies (2017) suggest that mental events 
fulfill two criteria that they claim are central when we think of 
causation, and that both mental and physical events can be complete 
causes (however, not in the same sense of “cause”), of an action. I 
will argue that neither of these views show convincingly why we 
should not look at the level of brain processes when we look for the 
relevant difference between natural properties (e.g., reasons-
responsiveness) that are the base-property of basic desert, and natural 
properties that are not, and that they therefore face the same 
requirements from the Principle of Relevant Difference in light of the 
challenges from determinism and physicalism as the compatibilist 
theories that were discussed in chapters three and four. I will conclude 
that the Conceptual Argument does not refute the Revision 
Argument, or the arguments that I advanced against the 
counterfactual theories of alternative possibilities in chapter three and 
four. A summary of the chapter is provided in section 5.6.  
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5.2 The irreducibility of mental concepts and 
mental states 
The Conceptual Objection is framed as a critique against the Revision 
Argument. The central claim in the Conceptual Objection is that 
mental states cannot be reduced to brain states. Therefore, mental 
explanations of actions cannot be reduced to explanations of actions 
in terms of brain states.  
A clear understanding of how neuroscientific research contributes 
to our understanding of mental states, as well as its potential legal 
application, “requires a clear articulation of psychological concepts 
presupposed by it [neuroscience] and the psychological capacities 
about which the research seeks to provide empirical evidence” (Pardo 
& Patterson, 2013, p. 96). We need to be careful with the distinction 
between the claims “the mind depends on the brain” and “the mind is 
the brain” (p. xiv). To say that the mind depends on the brain implies 
that the brain in some sense is necessary for the mind, but does not 
specify in what sense. The statement that the mind is the brain points 
at a reduction-relation: i.e., one thing is reducible to the other. 
According to this claim, minds are not something separate from 
brains. Hence, in order to understand the nature of minds, we must 
understand the nature of brains.  
Pardo & Patterson explicitly reject this reductionist approach to 
mental states (2013, pp. xiii, footnote 2). To illustrate why, they point 
out several empirical and conceptual issues that need to be considered 
in order to understand the relation between minds and brains. The 
empirical issues concern e.g., the adequacy of the scientific 
explanations for the phenomena that we associate with the mind. The 
conceptual issues are sometimes more difficult to recognize, both 
with regard to the general relationship between minds and brains, but 
also with regard to specific mental categories. For example, in the 
claim “depression is a certain brain chemistry state” it is presupposed 
that the mental state of depression is “located” somewhere and that 
we can “find” this mental state and examine it through brain science. 
But if, in fact, the term depression does not refer to a brain chemistry 
state but to certain psychological states, such as certain experiences 
of sadness, and, Pardo & Patterson argue, to certain actions that are 
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connected to these psychological states, it makes no sense to say that 
depression is a certain brain chemistry state (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, 
p. 113). They admit that we can change the way we use the concept 
of depression, and start referring to a certain brain chemistry state 
instead of a psychological state and behavior. But changing the 
concept of depression does not change the fact that when this 
particular brain chemistry state is actualized, people will experience a 
psychological state of sadness (and behave in accordance with this.) 
And this psychological state, in turn, cannot be explained in terms of 
a brain chemistry state alone: it is not an analytical truth that a certain 
brain chemistry state corresponds to the psychological state of 
sadness and certain kinds of behavior that is connected to this 
psychological state. Pardo & Patterson argue that mental states 
cannot be explained in terms of brain states because mental concepts 
denote a wide range of phenomena, most of them behavioral. One 
example is the mental state of believing something:  
For belief, this includes, for example, that one asserts or endorses what 
one believes, that one acts in ways consistent with one’s believes, that 
one does not believe directly contradictory propositions, and so on. 
This behavior is not only a way to determine whether someone 
perceives or believe something in particular. The behavior also helps to 
determine (indeed, it partly constitutes) what it means to engage in 
these activities. In other words, it helps to provide the measure for 
whether someone is in fact engaged in this activity (not just a 
measurement in a particular instance). (Pardo & Patterson 2013, p. 9)  
According to this view, what it is to have the mental state of believing 
is much more than having a certain brain state. This point can be 
illustrated when we ask for evidence for if someone does or does not 
have a certain belief. Pardo & Patterson point out that we must 
distinguish between criterial and inductive evidence for mental states. 
They state:  
Criterial evidence for the ascriptions of psychological predicates, such 
as “to perceive” or “to believe”, consists in various types of behavior. 
Behaving in certain ways is logically good evidence and, thus, partly 
constitutive of these concepts [...] for belief, this includes, for example, 
that one asserts or endorses what one believes, that one acts in ways 
consistent with one’s beliefs, that one does not believe directly 
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contradictory propositions, and so on. This behavior is not only a way 
to determine whether someone [...] believes something in particular. 
The behavior also helps to determine (it partly constitutes) what it means 
to engage in these activities. In other words, it helps to provide the 
measure for whether someone is in fact engaged [in believing something] 
(not just a measurement in a particular instance.) (Pardo & Patterson, 
2010, pp. 1222-1223)  
Behavioral evidence for beliefs is, of course, defeasible: people can 
assert propositions that they do not believe, and believe things they 
never explicitly assert or act upon. The primary point in the quote 
above, however, is that behavior is not only inductive but also criterial 
evidence for mental states in the sense that it partially determines 
what it means to have e.g., a belief. By contrast, some evidence 
provides only inductive support for whether someone believes 
something. Such inductive evidence could, for example, be a 
correlation between certain neural phenomena and the mental state 
of believing. But, Pardo & Patterson claim, “this inductive correlation 
only works once we know what to correlate the neural activity with” 
(Pardo & Patterson 2010, p. 1224).  
Another example relevant to the legal context is the phenomenon 
of lying. Even though it is an empirical question if a certain person is 
lying on a certain occasion, and also whether a particular brain activity 
is correlated with lying. But in order to investigate these issues, we 
must know what constitutes a lie – and this is a conceptual question:  
The criteria for telling a lie or engaging in deception involve behavior, 
not neurological states. To lie requires, among other things, a false 
assertation (or one that the speaker believes to be false.) Roughly, 
deception involves believing things to be so and saying or implying the 
opposite, and it involves judgements about the beliefs and knowledge 
of the audience. At most, neuroscientific evidence might be able to 
provide well- grounded empirical correlations between this type of 
behavior and brain states. This will be inductive evidence. The 
neuroscience, in other words, may be able to provide a measurement 
regarding lies or deception, but not the measure of it. It is a conceptual 
mistake to conclude that lies take place in the brain; that a particular 
area of the brain chooses to lie; that neuroscience can reveal lies being 
“produced” in the brain; or that it can “peer into” one’s brain and see 
the thoughts that constitute lies or deception. (Pardo & Patterson, 
2013, pp. 100-101)  
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Pardo & Patterson argue that if we acknowledge the difference 
between criterial and inductive evidence for mental states, it is clear 
why mental states cannot be reduced to brain states.  
Further, Pardo & Patterson also point out that we should be aware 
of the hidden assumption in the claim “the mind is the brain”: in 
order to make sense of the “is,” we must think of the brain as a 
substance. This assumption is, they argue, a basic one in a reductive 
physicalist framework – but, as it were, also in the contemporarily 
widely rejected Cartesian dualist framework:  
The Cartesian view relies upon a notion of substance dualism. Under this 
conception, the mind is thought to be some type of non-material (i.e., 
non-physical) entity or thing that is part of the human being and is 
somehow in causally interaction with the person’s body. The non-
material substance that constitutes the mind is the source and location 
of the person’s mental life – her thoughts, beliefs, sensations, and 
conscious experiences. Early neuroscientists were avowed Cartesian 
dualists and set themselves the task of figuring out how the non-
material substance known as the mind causally interacted with the 
physical brain and body of a person. This conception was later 
repudiated by neuroscientists and is typically disavowed by neuro-
legalists. The second conception of mind is that the mind is identical 
with the brain. This is the conception endorsed by Churchland, Greene, 
Cohen, and other neuro-legalists. Under this conception, the mind is a 
material (i.e., physical) part of the human being – the brain – that is 
distinct from, but is in causal interaction with, the rest of the body. The 
brain is the subject of the person’s mental properties (the brain thinks, 
feels, intends, and knows) and is the location of the person’s conscious 
experiences. This conception is deeply problematic. (Pardo & Patterson 
2013, pp. 43-44.) 
In the quote above, Pardo & Patterson point out that a problem for 
the Cartesian dualists, in relation to a physicalist world view, is that 
they believe that the mind is a non-material substance or entity of 
some sort, and this way of thinking made things difficult for the early 
neuroscientists, because they tried to find causal relations between the 
immaterial substance of the mind, and the brain and body. However, 
according to a physicalist world-view, non-physical substances cannot 
have causal impacts on physical entities. Later, neuroscientists gave 
up on the idea that there is a relation between two substances – the 
immaterial mind and the material body, but, Pardo & Patterson claim, 
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they still entertain the idea that the mind is a substance in their 
explanatory framework of the mind. Further, the argue that in 
contemporary neuroscience, the idea that the mind is a substance has 
led to the idea that “the mind is the brain” and by that, people like 
e.g., Churchland and Greene & Cohen believe that we have an answer 
to the questions of what and where the mind is. This means, according 
to Pardo & Patterson, that the basic idea from Cartesian dualism 
about the mind is preserved: namely, that the mind is a substance. 
But, they argue, this does not make any sense. If the mind is the brain, 
does that mean that we can attribute mental predicates to the brain? 
If one wishfully thinks of being on a sunny beach sipping on a cold 
drink, is this wishful thinking something that can be found in one’s 
brain? The idea is absurd, they claim: the brain, in interaction with 
other aspects of the nervous system and the rest of the human body, 
makes this mental state possible. But there is no wishful thinking to 
be found in the brain. Because even if neural activity is necessary for 
us to engage in such mental exercises as wishful thinking, neural 
activity alone is not sufficient for successful employment of the 
mental concept of wishful thinking. What Pardo and Patterson think 
of as a more tenable view of the mind is illustrated in the following 
passage:  
 To have a mind is to possess an array of rational and emotional powers, 
capacities, and abilities exhibited in thought, feeling, and action… 
under this conception, the mind is not a separate part of the person 
that causally interacts with the person’s body. It is simply mental 
powers, abilities and capacities possessed by humans. Likewise, the 
ability to see is not a part of the eye that interacts with other parts of 
the physical eye, the ability to fly is not a separate part of an airplane, 
and a car’s horsepower is not a separate part of the car in causal 
interaction with its engine. Under this conception, the question of the 
mind’s location in the body makes no sense just as the location of 
eyesight within the eye makes no sense. (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 
44) 
As Pardo and Patterson acknowledge, the view of the mental that they 
describe above resembles of the Aristotelian view of the mind. It is, 
hence, not a new way to think of the nature of mental states. The 
Aristotelian view played a profound role for the way European 
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philosophers and scientists thought of the human nature, the mental 
parts included, until the scientific revolution in the 17th century, when 
the Cartesian view of the mental replaced the Aristotelian (Pardo & 
Patterson 2014, p. 44). Pardo & Patterson point out that within the 
Cartesian framework of the mind, the question of how to give a 
coherent account of the mental and the physical arises quite naturally 
since it is presupposed that the mental and the physical are two 
distinct substances. The reductive physicalist still entertains the idea 
that the mind is a substance, even if she disagrees with the dualist that 
this substance is not separate from the physical body. Aristotle 
himself expresses his view of the relation between soul and body as 
follows:  
[…] we should not inquire whether the soul and the body are one, any 
more than the wax and the shape, or, in general, the matter of a given 
thing and that of which it is a matter […] if the eye were an animal, 
sight would be its soul. And the eye is matter for sight, and if this fails, 
it is no longer an eye, except homonymously, like an eye in stone or in 
a picture. (Aristotle, 2017, p. 22) 
If we paraphrase Aristotle’s claim in a more contemporary wording, 
the unnecessary question is the one of whether the mental and the 
physical are identical. According to Pardo & Patterson, this point is 
where reductive physicalism goes astray. People who conceive of the 
mind as a substance may also come to think that the mind is located 
somewhere. But, in Pardo & Patterson’s view, physicalism about the 
mind is fully compatible with the view that mental states are not 
located at any certain point in the body (such as, for example, in the 
brain). To think so is a mistake called “the mereological fallacy” 
(Pardo & Patterson, 2013, pp. 20-21). The mereological fallacy, thus, 
consists in attributing an ability or function to a part that is only 
properly attributable to the whole. In this specific case, it follows from 
the mereological principle that mental states can properly be 
attributed to human beings, but not to certain parts of them (e.g., to 
their brain). For example, claiming that one knows something, 
according to this view, is not to say anything about one’s brain. 
Knowledge cannot be found in the brain, since knowledge is an 
ability: people have knowledge, brains do not. Knowledge, like other 
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psychological attributes, is essentially manifested through behavior. 
Only humans and animals can engage in behavior. Brains cannot 
behave, and behavior cannot be reduced to a particular neural event. 
M. R Bennett & P.M.S Hacker explain it in the following manner:  
A person who knows where the railway station is, what time the next 
train is, whether it is likely to be on time, who else might be on it, etc. 
can answer the corresponding questions. But there is no such thing as 
the brain knowing when…what… whether…etc., and there is no such 
thing as the brain’s answering these questions. It is not the brain, but 
the person whose brain it is, that acquires knowledge by perception, 
reasoning and testimony. (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 152)  
It is also confused, according to this view, to speak of the brain as 
containing or possessing information. The brain is not containing 
information in the same way as e.g. books do:  
It is equally confused to speak […] of the brain’s containing knowledge 
and information, which is encoded in the brain… we may say of a book 
that it contains all the knowledge of a lifetime’s work of a scholar, or 
of a filing cabinet that it contains all the available knowledge, duly card-
indexed, about Julius Caesar. This means that the pages of the book or 
the cards in the filing cabinet have written in them expressions of a large 
number of known truths. In this sense, the brain contains no knowledge 
whatsoever. There are no symbols in the brain that by their array 
express a single proposition, let alone a proposition that is known to be 
true. Of course, in this sense a human being contains no knowledge 
either. To possess knowledge is not to contain knowledge. A person 
may possess, for example, a smattering knowledge about seventeenth-
century woodcuts, but his brain contains none…the brain neither 
possesses nor contains any knowledge. (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 
152) 
According to the view displayed in the above examples, mental states, 
as for example the mental state of knowing, is not “in” the person, 
but it is displayed in certain ways by the person. If we accept this view 
of mental states, it seems at that we can gain limited information 
about mental states through neuroscientific studies of the brain.  
In sum, Pardo & Patterson’s understanding of mental states is 
compatible with physicalism, which is a presupposition in the 
discussions in this thesis, but not with reductive physicalism (which 
is not a presupposition in this thesis.) The relationship between the 
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brain and the mind is, according to Pardo & Patterson, roughly that 
brain states are inductive evidence of the presence of a mental state, 
but they are not criterial evidence of mental states. Mental states are 
not substances, and they are not possible to locate at a special point 
in the body. To say that someone has e.g., a belief is, in Pardo & 
Patterson’s view, not to say that some part of her brain works in a 
certain way: rather, it is more like a description of her that is correct 
if she fulfills certain evidential criteria. In the next section, I will 
discuss their view of responsibility and basic desert. They argue that 
explanations of responsibility and basic desert must be connected to 
mental states, and since mental states are irreducible, we cannot 
investigate the basis of such practices on the level of brain states.  
5.2.1 Choices and actions as the basis of responsibility 
(and basic desert)  
 We have a choice. Is it this choice that is the ground of responsibility, 
which cannot be accounted for in eliminativist terms. (Pardo & 
Patterson, 2013, p. 41) 
Similar with Morse, Pardo & Patterson think that libertarian free will 
is not required as justification for retributive punishment:  
Sufficient control over one’s actions in light if one’s practical rationality 
is sufficient to ground moral desert, regardless of whether the same 
actions may be explained in purely physical (i.e., nonmental) terms. In 
other words, one can coherently be a compatibilist and a retributivist, 
a combination that is consistent with current law…[t]he idea that 
people possess the opportunity to do otherwise is consistent with 
determinism. (2013, p. 198-99)  
Having “sufficient control” means, according to Pardo & Patterson, 
“the presence of both an ability and an opportunity to exercise it [...] 
agents who have the ability and the opportunity to act differently, but 
do not, are properly subject to moral evaluation” (Pardo & Patterson 
2013, p. 199). In their view, this way of thinking makes sense in the 
light of what makes it true that someone has an ability and an 
opportunity to act differently:  
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To possess an ability (e.g., to ride a bicycle) depends on whether one 
satisfies the criteria for possessing the ability. These criteria include 
successfully exercising this ability when one wants to (and has the 
opportunity to) and refraining when one wants to (and has the 
opportunity to refrain). Such criteria can be fulfilled even if one does 
not exercise the ability on the particular occasion in question. (2013, p. 
199) 
To have an ability is, in Pardo & Patterson’s view, at least partly a 
matter of being able to exercise that ability when one wants to. This 
view is similar to the counterfactual theories of alternate possibilities 
discussed in chapter four, according to which abilities are 
dispositional properties: if someone has the ability to ride a bicycle, 
she can do so if she wants to (and the circumstances allow for it.) 
Moreover, Pardo & Patterson point out that there is an important 
difference between the claim that brain states involved in our actions, 
and the claim that our brain states “force” us to act as we do:  
 […] are an agent’s brain states forcing him to act in one way and 
preventing him from acting in another (are they an “external force 
rigging his behavior”) and, thus, depriving him of the opportunity to 
do otherwise? Not necessarily. We presume that if the agent had 
wanted to do something different (e.g., to ride a bicycle or not) then his 
brain states also would have been different. It would have been a 
different story if his brain states caused him to ride a bicycle (or not) 
when he wanted to do the contrary. In such circumstances, there would 
be a breakdown of the type of rational control on which criminal 
responsibility depends. (Pardo & Patterson 2013, pp. 199- 200)  
Even if Pardo & Patterson do not explicitly discuss reasons-
responsiveness, they point at the dispositional ability to do otherwise 
as the basis of basic desert. When these issues were discussed in the 
previous chapter, they were related to the metaphysical constraints of 
physicalism and determinism, in combination with the Principle of 
Relevant Difference. I argued that in order for it to be intuitively 
plausible for reasons-responsiveness to be the supervenience-base of 
the moral property of basic desert, there must be a relevant difference 
between reasons-responsiveness and other natural properties that, 
intuitively, are not supervenience-bases of basic desert. The Principle 
of Relevant Difference is a comparative principle, saying that there 
must be a relevant difference in natural properties between two 
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actions, events, or agents in order for them to differ with regard to 
moral properties. For basic desert, this principle means that ceteris 
paribus, there must be a relevant difference in natural, mental 
properties in order to justify the moral difference between P and Q 
such that P has the moral property of basic desert and Q does not. 
But in an actual situation where P and Q perform identical actions 
and P is reasons-responsive and Q is not, P’s dispositional property of 
being reasons-responsive is not involved in the actual processes that 
lead to the action under consideration, and it seems difficult to pick 
out a difference between the actual mental processes involved in the 
causal process that leads to P’s and Q’s action respectively, such that 
this difference can justify the moral difference between them (i.e., the 
difference that P has basic desert and Q does not.) 
However, this analysis is built upon the supposition that the role 
of reasons-responsiveness for basic desert (or any other dispositional 
property that is sufficient for basic desert) has to do with its causal 
connection to actions, and Pardo & Patterson questions this 
presumption. Not in the sense that causal explanations are irrelevant 
to explanations of behavior, but because explanations that describe 
causal relations in terms of mental events and actions cannot be 
reduced to explanations that describes causal relations in terms of 
physical causes and effects. Consider, for example, the question of 
why a person stops her car at a red light. This behavior, Pardo & 
Patterson contend, has to be explained appealing to a traffic rule. In 
a sense, we want to say that what caused the person to stop was the 
red lamp. But by itself, the red light does not “cause” the person to 
stop (i.e., it is not in virtue of the power of the light waves that 
emanate from it.) Rather, she stops because of the status of the light 
in an important social convention (i.e., the red light is a reason for 
stopping) (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, pp. 40-41). In this explanation, 
Pardo and Patterson argue, we look for what kind of reasons that 
were considered when the person decided to stop the car, not what 
causal, mechanical processes that lead to the pressure of the driver’s 
foot on the brake.  
As I argued in the previous chapter, the central role of mental 
causation in basic desert-attribution forces us to look for the relevant 
differences between a person who has the moral property of basic 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 155 
desert and a person who does not on the level of physical (brain) 
properties. The reason was that if basic desert is ascribed to people 
on the basis of their mental properties, it seems intuitively plausible 
that mental properties that are base properties of basic desert have 
some kind of causal effect with regard to how actions come about, 
that makes a difference compared to how action come about without 
the presence of this mental property. But in Pardo & Patterson’s view, 
this reasoning is mistaken. They argue the causal role of a certain 
mental capacity in relation to actions cannot be equated with physical 
causal relations: the “because of” in a mental explanation of an action 
cannot be reduced to a “because of” in a physical explanation. They 
put it as follows:  
When a bowling ball hits the pins, we say that the pins fell over because 
they were hit by the ball. The reason the pins fell over is that they were 
hit by a bowling ball. One event – the pins falling over – was caused by 
another – the bowling ball hitting the pins [...] Unlike the pins, we 
choose whether to stop at the red light. If we fail to stop, we run the 
risk of sanction. The pins in a bowling alley have no such choice: they 
are “compelled” to fall over by force of the impact of a bowling ball. 
We are neither bowling balls nor pins. We have a choice. It is this choice 
that is the ground of responsibility, which cannot be accounted for in 
eliminativist terms. (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, pp. 40-41.) 
In Pardo & Patterson’s view, there are some fundamental differences 
in explanations of actions, and explanations of mechanical events 
such as when a bowling ball hits some bowling pins. A person’s action 
is due to several factors, such as in the example with the traffic light. 
It is not sufficient to explain the causal process involved in the 
pressure of the driver’s foot on the brake – we must also consider the 
social convention of traffic lights, the driver’s ability to follow the 
traffic rules, etc. Here, the mental states of the driver play a central 
role if we are to understand the relation between her choices, her 
other mental states, and her actions. As mentioned above, someone 
is responsible for her actions, in Pardo & Patterson’s view, if she has 
a kind of rational control over her behavior: they say that “if his brain 
states caused him to ride a bicycle (or not) when he wanted to do the 
contrary [...] there would be a breakdown of the type of rational 
control on which criminal responsibility depends”(2013, p. 200). 
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What distinguishes Pardo & Patterson’s account from the 
reductive physicalist account when it comes to explanations of actions 
is not the idea that we need to take many different aspects into 
account if we want to understand why someone acted as she did. 
Rather, the disagreement lies in how to think about mental states that 
are relevant in action explanations, such as e.g., choices. According to 
the reductive physicalist, the actual choice someone makes in a 
specific situation can be reduced to – and explained by– physical 
mechanisms in the brain. The causal mechanisms involved when we 
make choices are not different from other causal relations in the 
world: there is not “special” kind of causation involved. The 
mechanisms involved when we make choices are governed by natural 
laws and they are, as is a presumption in this discussion, determined 
to their nature. Pardo & Patterson argue that choices cannot be 
reduced in this way. Choices are not brain states. They point out that 
it is true that we must have a brain in order to make choices, but this 
does not imply that a choice is a brain state, or that choices can be 
located in the brain. Therefore, it does not make sense to say that 
neuroscientific explanations of actions can show that people do not 
“really” have a choice: choices are not such things that can be 
identified through brain science.  
In order to evaluate whether this non-reductionist approach is a 
powerful objection to the Revision Argument, and also an objection 
to my argument against the claim that reasons-responsiveness (or 
similar compatibilist-friendly properties) can justify basic desert 
attribution, we need a more detailed picture of in virtue of what some 
people acquire basic desert, and why other people do not. In the next 
section, I will elaborate on how Pardo & Patterson’s account can be 
interpreted as a functionalist theory of mental states, and discuss 
whether such an approach can succeed in evading the worries I raised 
in the previous chapter, against the possibility for compatibilism to 
be a solid ground for basic desert.  
5.3 The Conceptual Objection & functionalism 
In this section I will suggest that Pardo & Patterson’s approach to 
mental states can be interpreted as a functionalist theory, and discuss 
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whether functionalism about mental states can provide a secure basis 
for the practice of legal retributive punishment by providing a non-
reductivist compatibilist account of basic desert. To be successful, the 
account must provide a plausible explanation of why we are justified 
in attributing basic desert when someone chooses to act in a certain 
way, and what the relevant difference is between a free action and a 
non-free action with regard to desert attribution. This discussion will, 
in line with the discussion in the previous chapter, be related to the 
metaphysical constraints of physicalism and determinism and the 
Principle of Relevant Difference.  
In a more general context, a theory of mental states aims to explain 
how mental phenomena fit into one’s overall ontology. For example, 
the theory is supposed to give an account of the nature of mental 
states, and how mental states are related to other objects and 
phenomena in one’s general metaphysics. One central question for 
any theory of mental states is how mental causation is possible (see 
e.g., Mackie 1979, Shoemaker 2001). We often explain people’s 
actions as causally related to mental states. For example, I just went 
to the fridge because I was thirsty, and wanted some cold water that 
I believed was in the fridge. Moreover, mental state explanations seem 
to be relevant also with regard to basic desert. For example, it seems 
plausible to attribute basic desert to someone who intentionally hurts 
another person, but not to someone who hurts another person 
accidentally. For our moral intuitions concerned with basic desert, it 
matters if an action is carried out by purpose or if it is an accident. 
Philosophers such as Donald Davidson (1963) and Alfred Mele 
(1992) have argued that if mental states were causally isolated from 
bodily behavior, then what goes on in your mind cannot explain what 
you do, and then it seems less plausible that mental states matter to 
basic desert attribution.  
Being a physicalist, one’s theory of the mental should ideally 
provide an explanation of how mental states can be causally effective 
in a physical world. As was stated in section 1.3, I follow Jackson’s 
definition of physicalism:  
Physicalism […] claims that a complete account of what our world is 
like, its nature, (or, on some versions, a complete account of everything 
contingent about our world), can in principle be told in terms of a 
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relatively small set of favoured particles, properties, and relations, the 
‘physical’ ones. (Jackson, 1998, p. 6) 
However, this kind of physicalism does not exclude the existence of 
non-physical phenomena. In order to account for them, Jackson 
introduces supervenience, according to which any non-physical entity 
supervenes on a physical entity, and the non-physical entity cannot 
change if the physical entity it supervenes upon does not change. If 
mental phenomena supervene on physical phenomena, any change in 
mental phenomena requires a change in physical phenomena. 
Moreover, Jackson argues that any two worlds that are physical 
duplicates, are also duplicates with regard to non-physical 
phenomena: “any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our 
world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world” (Jackson, 1998, p.12). 
Furthermore, I follow Papineau’s view of causal closure which 
implies that mental causes are physical causes. (However, I will briefly 
discuss an alternative view of causation in a later section of this 
chapter.) 
Pardo & Patterson point to choices as playing a central role in our 
responsibility practice. According to the reductive physicalist, a 
choice can be reduced to brain states, something that Pardo & 
Patterson deny. However, as pointed out by e.g., Davidson and Mele, 
if choices play special role in our responsibility practice, they must 
have some sort of causal effect on our behavior, otherwise it is hard 
to see why choices play that special role. Pardo & Patterson claim that 
mental states, and especially choices, are explanatory relevant in 
explanations of actions and for responsibility attribution, but since 
mental states cannot be reduced to brain states, the causal relationship 
between mental states and actions cannot be understood along the 
same lines as “ordinary” physical causation: “The reason we stop our 
car at a red light cannot be explained in the manner of a bowling ball 
striking a set of pins” (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 41).  
Pardo & Patterson’s view of the mind as an array of rational and 
emotional powers, capacities, and abilities exhibited in thought, 
feeling, and action, goes well together with the idea that mental states 
should be identified with their functions, rather than with physical 
states. A brief overview of functionalism was provided in section 1.5. 
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The form of functionalism that I take to be the most helpful and 
plausible for the purpose of interpreting Pardo & Patterson’s non-
reductive compatibilism is analytical functionalism, as discussed by 
for example Lewis (1972) and Armstrong (1968, 1981). This version 
of functionalism claims that mental terms and concepts can be 
translated into functional descriptions.  
An important distinction in the functionalist framework is between 
role-functionalism and realizer-functionalism (McLaughlin, 2006). We might 
think of e.g., the mental state of pain as something that makes us 
move away from the thing causing the pain, by producing anxiety and 
a desire to get rid of the pain, and we can further assume that the 
functional role of pain in humans is realized by C-fibers firing. But it 
seems that we have two levels of description in this picture: (i) the 
higher-order property of having the relevant functional role, and (ii) 
the lower-level physical realizer of that functional role, in this case the 
C-fibers firing. According to role-functionalists, pain is identified by 
the higher-level relational property that is accessible to the subject. 
But according to realizer-functionalism, a functionalist theory of 
mind provides definite descriptions of whichever lower-level 
properties that satisfy the functional characterizations. In this view, if 
the physical property that occupies the functional role of pain is C-
fibers firing, then pain in humans is identical with C-fibers firing.  
Non-reductive compatibilism is most plausibly interpreted as a 
role-functionalist approach. Even though Pardo & Patterson 
recognize that there are neural correlates to mental states which can 
be discovered by empirical investigation, they claim that it is 
important to recognize that the empirical evidence will be concerned 
with correlations between mental states and neural states. To think 
otherwise, e.g., to think that the neural mechanisms are part of the 
mental state itself, would be a conceptual confusion. However, as 
already noted, Pardo & Patterson does not they deny that brain states 
are involved in mental states and behavior:  
[…] certain neural activity may be necessary to engage in (and play the 
causal role in) the behavior that constitutes the ability to think or 
perceive […]. (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 11, footnote 34) 
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Neural activity is, hence, necessary in the sense that without neural 
activity, at least humans cannot have any mental states at all. But 
neural activity is not a sufficient condition for determining if someone 
has a specific mental state, or a specific mental capacity, since neural 
activity it is not included in the criterial evidence for having a certain 
mental state. Notably, Pardo & Patterson point out, in the above 
quote, that neural activity, although not sufficient for the ascription 
of a mental states and capacities, may play the causal role with regard 
to behavior.  
Functionalism, as a general theory of mental states, remains silent 
about how functional states are realized in the world. Mental states 
might, for example, be realized by something immaterial. But in the 
context of this discussion, physicalism is a constraint for this theory, 
since Pardo & Patterson are physicalists. Hence, insofar as mental 
states have causal power, this power must be due to something 
physical. One of the main advantages of functionalism is that it allows 
for multiple realizability of mental states. Multiple realizability means 
that the same type of mental state can be realized by many different 
physical states, which means that we can ascribe e.g., fear to 
organisms with a nervous system very different from ours, which is 
an advantage for the theory since it seems plausible that two 
organisms with disparate neural systems can both experience fear. 
Also, different organisms can behave in different ways when they 
experience fear. Some organisms will be aggressive; others will be 
more prone to flee from the source of the fear. Functionalism can 
account for both of these aspects of multiple realizability in the sense 
that fear is defined as e.g., a stressful experience and a tendency to get 
out of the situation, either by being aggressive toward the feared 
object/organism, or by fleeing from it.  
Regarding the causal power of mental states, then, if we accept 
both functionalism and physicalism like Pardo & Patterson, the causal 
power of different tokens of the same kind of mental state can, due 
to multiple realizability, be due to different physical states. However, 
Pardo & Patterson argue that in relation to responsibility attribution, 
it is the intentional element of the action that is of explanatory relevance, 
and in order to explain intentional action, we must refer to reasons. 
However, they also note that “[…] no explanation of human action 
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is complete without an account of the role of cause in behavior” 
(Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p.35). It is unclear whether they assume 
that reasons are causes, or if reasons and causes are different 
categories in some sense. In the footnote to the just quoted sentence, 
Pardo & Patterson describe their view of the causal relation between 
mental events and brains states as follows:  
[…] there is a substantial disagreement about whether and how to best 
characterize the causal relationship between mental events and 
behavior […] These philosophical controversies are outside our scope 
– however one comes down on them, the conclusion regarding neuro-
reductionism is the same.  (Pardo & Patterson 2013, footnote 61, p. 35)  
I take this last claim to be unconvincing, at least in one interpretation 
of it. Pardo and Patterson write that regardless of what idea we have 
about the role of causes in an explanation of human behavior we will 
conclude that non-reductionism is more plausible than neuro-
reductionism. But it is not obvious why this conclusion would be 
reached. An important part of Pardo & Patterson’s project is to 
convince us that neuro-reductionism is a conceptually confused 
theory, by arguing for a view of the mental very similar to analytical 
functionalism. But, as noted earlier, one of the central questions for 
any theory about mental states, at least given a general physicalist 
ontology, is how to make sense of the causal relations between the 
mental and the physical, especially with regard to how mental states 
can have causal impact on behavior. This worry is especially 
warranted when it comes to role- functionalism. One of the main 
advantages of neuro-reductionism is that it provides us with a neat 
account of the causal relationship between mental states and 
behavior, because mental states according to this theory cause 
behavior in virtue of being brain states, or at least, their causal power 
is due to brain states. Pardo & Patterson object to this view arguing 
that neuro-reductionism presupposes that mental states are 
substances, but, in their view, mental states are not. When saying that 
someone has a certain mental state, such as a belief, this is to say that 
she e.g., behaves in certain way given certain circumstances. But as 
such, the mental state is not located somewhere in the person’s brain, 
in the way that neuro-reductionism presupposes.  Therefore, mental 
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states cannot be reduced to physical processes (since physical 
processes are always located somewhere).  
However, in order for Pardo & Patterson’s characterization of 
mental states to be a plausible alternative to neuro-reductionism, and 
in particular a theory that can be used to justify retributive 
punishment, they must be able to explain how mental states are 
causally related to behavior. In the next sub-sections, I will (briefly) 
discuss two non-reductive approaches to mental causation, in order 
to analyze whether Pardo & Patterson’s functionalist view of mental 
states can be combined with a view of mental causation that can meet 
the requirements of the Principle of Relevant Difference, in the light 
of the challenges from determinism and physicalism. If it turns out 
that their theory meets these challenges, and satisfies the relevant 
difference condition, I take their objection against the Revision 
Argument to be valid.  
The first view I will discuss is that of Donald Davidson (1970), 
according to whom we can keep a monistic physicalist theory of the 
mental, without giving up non-reduction about mental states and 
mental causation. The second view I will discuss is a more recent 
contribution to the debate of how to conceive of causation: Christian 
List & Peter Menzies (2017) suggest that mental events fulfill two 
criteria that they claim to be central for how we think of causation 
and that both mental and physical events can be complete causes 
(however, not in the same sense of “cause”) of an action. 
5.4 Non-reductive physicalism & mental 
causation 
5.4.1 Anomalous monism and mental causation 
According to Pardo & Patterson, the causal explanation of actions 
can be found in the neural activity that is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for mental abilities. Moreover, they claim that 
neural activity provides inductive (as opposed to criterial) evidence for 
that someone has a certain mental state or a mental ability. It is 
inductive in the sense that the criteria for if someone has a certain 
mental ability, e.g., the ability to lie, are behavioral in nature, and we 
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cannot say that someone is lying solely on the basis of certain neural 
activity: “this inductive correlation only works once we know what to 
correlate the neural activity with” (Pardo & Patterson, 2010, p. 1224). 
Even though this reasoning is intuitively plausible in a sense, for 
example, it seems plausible that the mental ability to lie can 
correspond to multiple physical states, it is unclear how mental states 
qua mental states are causally effective: if mental states are not 
substances, and cannot be located anywhere – how can they have 
causal power? 
One theory (of many) that has provided an account of how to 
think of the causal relationship between the mental and the physical 
without reducing mental events to physical events is Donald 
Davidson’s “anomalous monism”, a theory about the relationship 
between the mind and the body that not only aims to save ontological 
monism, but also to make sense of mental causation without being 
committed to the view that mental states can be described in physical 
terms. The main thesis of anomalous monism is described by 
Davidson as follows:  
Anomalous monism resembles materialism in its claim that all events 
are physical, but rejects the thesis, usually considered essential to 
materialism, that mental phenomena can be given purely physical 
explanations. (Davidson, 1970, p. 119) 
Davidson makes two important moves in the quote above: (1) he 
ascribes to physical monism, i.e., he accepts only one substance in his 
ontology, and (2) he maintains that even though all events are 
physical, mental phenomena cannot be given a purely physical 
explanation. The reason for (2) is not that mental events are not 
physical, but that the relation that holds between the mental and the 
physical is one of token-identity. In Davidson’s theory, the objects 
between which the identity relation holds are found at the linguistic 
level. Despite there being just one ontological category, there are 
mental events and physical events at the linguistic level.47 But what is 
                                    
47 Davidson have defended different views of how to think of the criteria of event-
individuation over time: first, he endorsed a causal criterion of event individuation 
according to which two events are identical if they share all their causes and effects 
(Davidson, 1969) but he later rejected that view in favor of one according to which 
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a mental event if it is only found at the linguistic level? This question 
targets the anomalous character of the mental, as Davidson describes 
it: “The principle of the anomalism of the mental concerns events 
described as mental, for events are mental only as described” 
(Davidson, 1970, p. 119).  
In order for an event to be a mental event, it must answer to mental 
predicates, in the same way as a physical event are such events that 
answers to physical predicates. Mental predicates function differently 
compared to physical predicates. One important feature of mental 
predicates is, according to Davidson, that they are defined at least 
partly in terms of other mental predicates. He takes the example of 
belief to illustrate this point:  
Suppose that we try to say, not using any mental concepts, what it is 
for a man to believe that there is life on Mars. One line we could take 
is this: when a certain sound is produced in the man’s presence (“Is 
there life on Mars?”) he produces another (“Yes”). But of course, this 
shows he believes there is life on Mars only if he understands English, 
his production of the sound was intentional, and was a response to the 
sounds as meaning something in English, and so on. For each 
discovered deficiency, we add a new provisio. Yet no matter how we 
patch and fit the nonmental conditions, we always find the need for an 
additional condition (provided he noticed, understands, etc.) that is mental 
in character… [j]ust as we cannot intelligibly assign length to any object 
unless a comprehensive theory holds of objects of that sort, we cannot 
intelligibly attribute any propositional attitude to an agent except within 
the framework of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires, intentions, and 
decisions. (Davidson, 1970, pp. 120-122) 
So mental predicates are not the kind of predicates that can be given 
a standardized and unique definition; instead, a particular mental 
state, such as e.g. the belief that there is life on Mars, can be attributed 
to a person only in the context of other mental states, which in turn 
depend on other mental states, and so on. These features are part of 
the anomalous character of mental states. Since mental states cannot 
be given a standardized and unique definition, they do not follow a 
predictable chain of events – it is not the case that given certain 
                                    
events are identical if and only if they occupy the same spatiotemporal region 
(Davidson, 1985). The difference between these two make no difference in regard 
to our discussion.  
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preconditions, a certain mental state will be the effect. Davidson 
argues that mental events do not follow any deterministic laws. 
However, he also claims that when there is causality, there must be a 
law: events related as cause and effects always fall under strict 
deterministic laws. This claim, in conjunction with the claim that 
mental states do not follow strict deterministic laws, seems to entail 
that mental states cannot have causal power. But Davidson argues 
that they do: at least some mental events have causal effect on actions. 
The causal power of mental states can be understood only if we 
appreciate the double nature of mental states. According to 
Davidson, mental states are mental only by description, but once 
described, this description cannot be reduced to a physical description 
since the mental and the physical vocabularies work in fundamentally 
different ways. We can conclude a priori that there cannot be strict 
deterministic laws between the physical and the mental, since such 
laws only hold between physical events, described in terms of physical 
predicates. Mental events are mental by description, but there is 
always a physical aspect of a mental event: the mental event is token-
identical with some physical event. And it is in virtue of this token-
identity that (some) mental events have causal power (Yalowitz, 
2014).  
It is not entirely clear that Pardo & Patterson would accept this 
solution to the mental causation problem, since it is not clear whether 
they accept that mental states are physical states even in a token-
identity sense. But the question will now be whether something like 
Pardo & Patterson’s objection (not necessarily exactly as they 
formulate it) to the Revision Argument works if combined with this 
Davidsonian view about mental causation.  
5.4.2 Problem solved? 
As a reminder, the underlying motivation for Pardo & Patterson’s 
project is to show that human action cannot be thoroughly described 
only in terms of physical causes and effects. Daniel Dennett 
formulates the same worry as follows:  
The fear […] is that no naturalistic theory of the self could be given 
that sufficiently distinguishes it from a mere domino in a chain. We do 
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not want to be mere dominoes; we want to be moral agents […] Only 
some of the portions of the physical universe have the property of 
being designed to resist their own dissolution […] only some of these 
have the further property of being caused to have reliable expectations 
of what will happen next, and hence have the capacity to control things, 
including themselves. And only some of these have the further capacity 
of significant self-improvement (through learning). And fewer still have 
the open-ended capacity (requiring language of self-description) for 
“radical self-evaluation”. These portions of the world are thus loci of 
self-control, of talent, of decision-making. They have projects, 
interests, and values they create in the course of their own self-
evaluations and self-definition. How much less like a domino could a 
portion of the physical be? (Dennett, 1984b, p. 100) 
Dennett’s quote nicely describes the central importance of certain 
mental capacities when we distinguish human behavior from mere 
causal interaction of e.g., a chain of dominoes. I guess that most 
people agree with Dennett: there is a quite obvious difference 
between people and domino bricks. This difference is, in itself, good 
evidence for why human action is not as easily described in terms of 
causes and effects as dominoes or bowling balls and pins. However, 
in this discussion, we are not primarily interested in the obvious 
difference between how people and domino bricks, or bowling pins, 
interact with the world. What we are interested in is if we can find a 
ground for basic desert in humans, complex as they are, and more 
specifically, if we can find an intuitively relevant difference between a 
person who is attributed with basic desert, and a person who is not.  
As was pointed out above, Pardo & Patterson’s approach, at least 
in one reading of it, seems to exclude the causal power from the 
nature of mental states. But it seems reasonable that mental states 
have to be causally effective in order to be relevant in action 
explanations, and also for desert-attribution. Davidson’s account of 
mental causation was introduced in order to see if it can help save 
Pardo & Patterson’s overall approach to mental states, by providing 
them with an explanation of how mental states can be causally 
effective even though not reducible to mental states. Davidson’s 
approach to mental causation is connected to his view that mental 
states have, in a sense, a “double nature”: a mental state like e.g., 
believing something is mental only by description, but once 
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described, this description cannot be reduced to a physical description 
since the mental and the physical vocabularies work in fundamentally 
different ways. Davidson claims that the different nature of these 
vocabularies is the reason for why mental phenomena cannot be 
given purely physical explanations – they cannot be combined in a 
way such that an explanation in physical terms can explain mental 
phenomena, or mental causation, for that matter. However, and 
importantly, Davidson does not claim that mental causation is 
something other than physical causation. He claims that insofar as 
mental states are involved in causal relations, this causal relation is 
possible because mental states are (token) identical with physical 
states, and physical states can be involved in causal relations.  
However, this move seems to lead us back to the worry that is 
central in the Revision Argument. As was discussed in chapter four, 
the metaphysical constraint of physicalism implies that differences in 
functional properties must supervene on differences in physical 
properties. And at the physical level, it is hard to find a relevant 
difference between the mental state of choices, or reasons-
responsiveness, or any other mental capacity that the compatibilist 
picks out as sufficient for basic desert, and other mental states or 
capacities. Even if we accept that mental concepts cannot be reduced 
to physical concepts, and even if we accept that different mental states 
have different psychological functions with regard to actions (for 
example, we deliberate of what to do before we make a choice, but 
this is not the case when we act instinctively) the physical states that 
are the base-properties of such mental states that (according to the 
view discussed) are relevant for basic desert do not seem to be 
relevantly different from the physical states that are the base-
properties of such mental states that are not relevant for basic desert. 
In other words: even if we conceptualize certain mental states or 
capacities as relevantly different from other mental states with regard 
to basic desert (such as e.g., the mental capacity of reasons-
responsiveness) what is going on at the physical level when someone 
is deliberating about what to do (i.e., she considers her reasons for 
action) is not relevantly different from what is going on at the physical 
level when someone acts on e.g., an irresistible desire, or the like. 
What is going on, in both cases, is that more or less complex neural 
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systems respond to stimuli, process it, and deliver an output in form 
of behavior. 
It seems that in order to escape this particular problem, Pardo & 
Patterson need an account of mental causation according to which 
mental states cause action not in virtue of being token-identical with 
physical states, but qua mental states. In the next section, I turn to List 
& Menzies’ approach to mental causation, which aims to provide such 
an account.  
5.4.3 A difference-making account of mental 
causation 
So far, Kim’s (2000) “exclusion argument” has been an implicit 
restriction of the discussion of mental causation in this thesis. 
According to the exclusion argument, we should not have more than 
one complete causal explanation of the same phenomenon (except in 
cases of genuine overdetermination.) If mental properties are 
irreducible to physical properties, then it seems as that we have two 
complete, but different causal explanations of the same phenomenon 
(given that actions can be explained both in mental and in physical 
terms.) According to Kim, this double explanation creates an unstable 
situation requiring us to find an account of how the two purported 
causes are related to each other (2000, p. 65).  
List & Menzies (2017) argue that the exclusion argument is 
unsound. If they are right, we do not need to worry about the fact 
that non-reductive physicalism entails that there are two complete, 
but independent, explanations of actions. According to List & 
Menzies, it is unproblematic that the very same event can be given 
both a complete causal explanation in mental terms, and a complete 
causal explanation in physical terms (although these two explanations 
do involve the same notion of “cause”.) 
List & Menzies’ analysis is based on their “difference-making 
account of causation” according to which causation is “[...] a form of 
counterfactual probabilistic dependence: to be the cause of an effect 
is to be the difference-maker of that effect” (2017, p. 277). They spell 
out this thesis in counterfactual terms: C causes E if and only if two 




The positive conditional: If C were to occur, then E would occur. 
The negative conditional: If C were not to occur, then E would not 
occur.  
This account of causation can be contrasted against the “production 
account” which, for example, Kim (2000) defends. When something 
is a cause in the production sense, it produces the effect in some 
metaphysical sense. The cause has, as it were, causal “oomph,” it is 
what makes the effect happen. In the difference-making account, the 
cause need not produce its effect in this sense. Also, as we will soon 
see, something can be a cause in the production sense without being 
a cause in the difference-making sense, since the negative conditional 
is not fulfilled. List & Menzies argue that the most natural way to spell 
out the idea of mental causation is to say that an agent causes an action 
if and only if her mental state is the difference-maker of the action 
(2017, p. 278). (See also List & Menzies, 2009.) 
List & Menzies objection to the exclusion argument focuses of 
how certain concepts allow for multiple realizability, which, they 
argue, makes the realizer state (i.e., the physical state) unable to 
account for the negative conditional in the difference-making account 
of causation. For example, when a flask of boiling water breaks due 
to the pressure, they argue that the difference-maker is the boiling of the 
water, not the motion of a specific subset of water molecules. Because 
the boiling of the water could have been realized by a slightly different 
microstate, but the flask would still have broken. Had the boiling not 
occurred, the flask would have remained intact. Hence, the positive 
and negative conditionals for difference-making are satisfied when C 
is the boiling of water and E is the breaking of the flask. However, 
since it is true that the water could have boiled even if the 
microstructure would have been slightly different, it is not true that 
the flask would have remained intact if the microstructure would have 
been different. Hence, if C is the microstructure, then the negative 
conditional is not satisfied (List & Menzies, 2017, p. 279).  
Similarly, it can be argued that, when mental states cause e.g., an 
action, the mental states, but not the brain states that they supervene 
on, satisfy both conditionals for difference-making. Since mental 
states can be realized by different brain states, the brain state could 
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have been different, and yet the same effect (e.g., the act) would have 
been caused. However, they argue that the base-properties – which in 
the boiling water case is the microstate of water molecules, and in the 
case with mental states is the brain states the mental states supervene 
upon – are causally sufficient for the effect (and may be causes in the 
production sense.) But the supervenient states – the boiling of the 
water, and the mental state, in the current examples –are the difference-
making causes. This reasoning shows, according to List & Menzies, 
that sufficient causes at the physical level can co-exist with distinct, 
higher-level difference-making causes of the same effect (2017, p. 
281).  
5.4.4 Problem solved? 
Can the difference-making account of causation provide what is 
needed to meet the challenge from physicalism, through its idea of 
how mental causation works within a non-reductive framework of 
physicalism? List & Menzies themselves argue in a way that suggests 
that they think so. They claim that what they call “the Neurosceptical 
Argument” fails. This argument is, in short, that since human actions 
and choices are completely caused by neural states and processes that 
are inaccessible to the agent’s consciousness, human choices and 
actions are not free (List & Menzies, 2017, p. 280). This argument 
fails, they argue, since it is the mental states and processes, and not 
the neural states and processes, that cause human actions in the relevant 
sense, that is, the difference-making sense. This reply, in a way, parallels 
Pardo & Patterson’s line of argument that it is a mistake to think that 
the causes of human actions can be found in the brain. Hence, it 
might be suggested that it provides what is needed to substantiate 
Pardo & Patterson’s claim, and, thus, to refute the Revision 
Argument, and my argument that we have to look for relevant 
differences at the level of brain states. If mental states, but not neural 
states (i.e., brain states) that cause actions in the relevant sense, it 
seems reasonable that we do not have to look for the relevant 
difference between actions that are caused in a way that makes the 
agent responsible for them (in the basic desert-entailing sense) and 
actions that are not caused in that way, at the level of neural states.  
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I think, however, that we can, and should, resist this line of 
reasoning. Assume, for the sake of argument, that we accept List & 
Menzies’ view that mental causation is best conceived of as causation 
in the difference-making sense. It still seems that it makes sense to 
ask in virtue of what mental states make a difference. Given physicalism, 
mental states cannot be involved in causal relations in a way that 
violates the causal closure of the physical domain. According to List 
& Menzies, the realizers of mental states are not the difference-
makers, since mental states are multiply realizable. The fact that they 
are multiply realizable, in turn, depends on how mental states are 
identified. List & Menzies endorse functionalism about mental states, 
which basically means that mental concepts are such that something 
(let’s say, some state or event) is classified as a certain mental kind, as 
e.g., a pain, a belief, or a desire, on the basis of its function in the 
overall mental system. Plausibly, having a function involves having a 
certain causal role which means that instances of mental states must 
have a certain causal effect in order to fall under a specific mental 
concept in the first place. Thus, before we can speak of there being 
mental states that can cause e.g., actions (in whatever sense) there 
have to be physical realizers (neural states) that can cause actions – if 
not in the difference-making sense so in the sense of being a sufficient 
cause or a production cause. Consequently, List & Menzies’ view does 
not escape the implication that it is only in virtue of the fact that the 
physical realizers (neural states) cause actions (produce actions or at 
least as sufficient causes), that mental states cause actions.  
To illustrate this point, we can make a comparison with the 
property of being poisonous: for something to be poisonous, it has 
to have certain effects on people: it will, if consumed, make them ill 
or die. “Being poisonous,” then, is a property that is picked out via 
the causal effects something with the property of being poisonous has 
(i.e., the causal effect that someone dies or gets ill if consuming large 
amounts of it.) Thus, in one clear sense, it is not the fact that 
something has the property of being poisonous that in itself causes that 
someone dies. “Being poisonous” is, as it were, a label of substances 
with properties that (independently of the label, as it were) has the 
relevant causal effect. Just like e.g., “desire” (if functionalism is 
correct) is a label of physical states that have a certain effect in terms 
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of e.g., actions independently of the label.48 Mental states, then, turn out 
to cause action in virtue of their physical realizers cause action, precisely 
because mental types are classified based on their functions. In order 
for a function to be in place, there must be something that makes this 
function happen, so to speak.  
Another way to put the same point is this: List & Menzies’ argue 
that, since mental states can be realized by many different brain states 
that tend to cause the same kinds of effects (actions and other things), 
it is to be expected that an action caused by a mental state could have 
been produced by many other brain states than the brain state that 
was actually involved. Thus, the negative conditional does not hold 
for particular brain states in relation to action types. But this very 
argument presupposes that brain states can have the relevant effects, 
since the brain states must have the relevant effect in order to be 
classified as a realizer of a certain mental type. It is only because the 
relevant effects can be caused by many different brain states that the 
brain states do not fulfil the negative conditional.   
If this reasoning is sound, it seems that List & Menzie’s view does 
not help to escape the challenges from determinism and physicalism, 
and, thereby, satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference. Because 
also on their view, mental states cause actions in virtue of their 
physical realizers causing actions. Hence, when we look for the 
relevant difference between actions that are caused in a way that 
makes the agent responsible for them (in the basic desert entailing 
sense) and actions that are not caused in that way, it seems that we 
should look at the level of neural states. And then, determinism poses 
the same challenge as always: how can we make sense of the relevant 
difference between people who are morally responsible and people 
who are not, if everyone’s actions are completely determined? If one 
                                    
48 Beebee (2017) argues in a similar manner, but she also claims also that mental 
states, when defined via their functional roles, end up being epiphenomena. I think 
she is right, but for the purposes of this discussion, it suffices to conclude that List 
& Menzies’ difference-making account of causation cannot exclude brain-states 
from the discussion of mental causation, and hence, not exclude brain-states from 
the discussion of what the relevant difference is between mental properties that are 




wants to put the relevant difference elsewhere, as compatibilists 
usually prefer, the problem is instead the challenge from physicalism. 
According to this challenge, it is difficult (given the current status of 
neuroscience, and our current knowledge of the brain) to find a 
relevant difference on the level of brain states between the mental 
state of choices, or reasons-responsiveness, or any other mental 
capacity that the compatibilist picks out as base-properties of basic 
desert, and other mental states or capacities that are not base-
properties of basic desert. Even if we accept that mental concepts 
cannot be translated to physical concepts, and even if we accept that 
different mental states have different psychological functions with 
regard to actions (for example, we consider our reasons for action 
before we make a choice, but this is not the case when we act 
instinctively) the brain states that realize mental states and capacities 
that (according to the kind of compatibilist views discussed) are the 
base-properties of basic desert does not seem to be relevantly 
different from the brain states that realize mental states and capacities 
that are not base-properties of basic desert. In other words: even if 
certain kinds of mental states and capacities on the conceptual level 
appear as relevantly different from other mental states with regard to 
basic desert (as e.g., the mental capacity of reasons-responsiveness) 
what is going on at the physical level when someone is deliberating 
about what to do (i.e., she considers her reasons for action) is not 
relevantly different from what is going on at the physical level when 
someone acts on e.g., an irresistible desire, or the like. Plausibly, 
different parts of the brain are involved in these different cases, but 
the mechanisms behind these processes are, in fundamental aspects, 
very similar: the way they process incoming input is completely an 
issue of the physical make-up of the neural networks involved, and 
the electro-chemical mechanisms that make these neural networks 
able to process information.  
5.5 Summary & conclusions 
In order to hold that people sometimes deserve to be punished based 
on how they act, human actions have to be special in some way. They 
have to be different from other events that do not ground desert 
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attributions – for example, we do not think that the bowling ball 
deserve blame or punishment because it happened to fall on 
someone’s foot. In the Revision Argument it is claimed that folk 
psychology and folk morality take this difference to be due to that 
people can act freely, in contrast to e.g., a bowling ball. But, the 
Revision Argument goes, neuroscience gives us reason to think that 
people do not, in fact, act freely. A compatibilist answer to this claim 
is that free action is compatible with determinism since it consists in 
people having the right kind of capacities and abilities, and one can 
have these capacities and abilities even though one is completely 
determined to act as one does. In chapter three and four, I argued 
that such compatibilist theories have troubles meeting the demands 
of the Principle of Relevant Difference.  
The Conceptual Objection discussed in this chapter, proposed by 
Pardo & Patterson, claims that the Revision Argument, as well as the 
argument I put forward in chapter 3 and 4, rest on a conceptual 
mistake. Even though all mental states correspond to brain-states, and 
all actions are caused by brain states (physicalism is correct), mental 
state concepts are such that mental states are not reducible to brain 
states. Since the relevant difference between actions that ground 
desert attributions and those that do not is found at the level of 
mental states, and such states are not reducible to brain states, it is 
irrelevant that there is no relevant difference at the level of brain 
states.  
I have argued that in order to evaluate their objection, it is 
important to understand their theory of mental states. Pardo and 
Patterson themselves do not provide a positive account of mental 
causation, but I suggested that it is reasonable to interpret their view 
as an analytic, role-functionalist theory. A worry with this 
interpretation is that mental causation is hard to make sense of in 
traditional functionalist frameworks. And mental states have to be 
able to cause actions in order for mental state explanations to be 
relevant for desert attributions. Therefore, I turned to two different 
non-reductivist approaches to mental causation in order to scrutinize 
whether any of them is able to provide an account of causation 
combinable with Pardo & Patterson’s view: Davidson’s (1970) 
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anomalous monism, and List & Menzies’ (2017) different-making approach 
to causation.  
I argued that neither of these views convincingly shows why we 
should not look at the level of brain processes when we look for the 
relevant differences between natural properties (e.g., reasons-
responsiveness) that are the base-property of basic desert, and natural 
properties that are not. Since neither of these accounts shows that 
mental causation can be at hand without mental states being token-
identical to a physical (brain) states. And if the mental properties that 
are base-properties of basic desert are causally effective in virtue of 
being token-identical with certain brain states, it seems reasonable to 
involve these brain states when we are looking for the relevant 
difference between mental states that are base properties of basic 
desert, and mental states that are not.  
Hence, to the extent that Pardo & Patterson’s view of causation 
resembles any of the two views discussed here (as previously noted, 
they do not provide a positive account of mental causation, so I do 
not know to what extent they would agree with any of them) their 
account of responsibility meet the same requirements from the 
Principle of Relevant Difference, in light of the challenges from 
determinism and physicalism, as the compatibilist theories that were 
discussed in chapters three and four. If Pardo & Patterson do not 
want to subscribe to any particular account of mental causation, a 
worry is that mental events, as they are characterized in their view, 
end up being epiphenomena.   
I conclude that the Conceptual Argument does not succeed in 
refuting the Revision Argument, or the arguments that I advanced 
against the counterfactual theories of alternative possibilities in 
chapter three and four.  
Now, an objection to this fairly abstract reasoning that attributions 
of basic desert must satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference in 
light of the challenges from determinism and physicalism would be 
that this line of reasoning does not correspond to how folk 
psychology and folk morality work. And both the proponents of the 
Revision Arguments and its critics agree that the justification of 
retributive punishment is, ultimately, found in folk psychology and 
folk morality, not in abstract philosophical reasoning that lacks 
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connection to how people actually think. As Al Mele writes, any 
adequate theory of free will [and punishment] should be “anchored 
by common-sense judgements” since any analysis that is completely 
disconnected from what the folk has to say “runs the risk of having 
nothing more than a philosophical fiction as its subject matter” (Mele 
2001, p. 27). I fully agree with Mele in this regard. The complex 
relation between folk psychology, folk morality, philosophy and 
science is the topic of the next chapter.
  
6 Third objection: The limited 
relevance of  neuroscience and 
philosophy for folk psychology, 
folk morality & the law  
 
Neither determinism in general nor neuroscience in particular 
undermines folk psychology in the ways they [Greene & Cohen] 
presuppose […] if moral evaluation depends on folk psychological 
explanations generally, and mental states exist and do causal work, then 
folk psychology is not illusory and provides legitimate foundation for 
moral evaluation. (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 203) 
6.1 Introduction  
In the two previous chapters, two objections to the Revision 
Argument were discussed. According to both objections that the 
Revision Argument is mistaken about what role neuroscience can play 
for our responsibility practices. Moreover, it was argued that a 
compatibilist framework of free will and/or responsibility can justify 
legal retributive punishment. I argued that neither of these objection 
offers a plausible explanation of what the relevant difference is at the 
physical (brain) level between a person who deserves punishment and 
a person who does not. And, I argued, we need to be able to pick out 
such a relevant difference in order to justify retributive punishment, 
or else the conclusion of the Revision Argument stands: the 
retributivist element of our current legal system is unjustified.  
Morse, as well as Pardo & Patterson would probably resist this 
conclusion, and also reject the arguments leading up to it. What I did 
in the previous two chapters was to provide philosophical arguments 
to the effect that compatibilism plausibly is not sufficient to justify 
retributive punishment. Morse and Pardo & Patterson might object 
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to this conclusion by saying that the argumentation is irrelevant with 
regard to the responsibility practice it is supposed to defeat.  
The reason for why it is irrelevant is that the justification of the 
legal responsibility practice and legal retributive punishment is based 
on folk morality and folk psychology and, hence, in a sense, 
“immune” to philosophical reasoning and scientific findings. In 
section 3.3.1, I briefly discussed the interpretation of folk psychology 
in the writings of Morse and Greene & Cohen respectively, and stated 
that I interpret them as understanding folk psychology roughly as the 
ordinary person’s common sense intuitions of why people behave as 
they do, and what considerations that can be brought into an 
explanation of actions. As I interpret Pardo & Patterson, they have 
something like this in mind when they discuss folk psychology as 
well.49 This notion of folk psychology is what I will work with in this 
chapter, too. Neither Morse nor Pardo & Patterson explicitly employ 
the notion of “folk morality”, but they acknowledge that people’s 
views on moral matters are relevant for the legitimacy of the legal 
system. In section 6.4.2, I will distinguish between two types of folk 
morality, in order to show a link between folk morality and 
philosophy. 
According to Pardo & Patterson, the folk psychological view of 
mental states and behavior does not presuppose anything specific 
about the brain. Likewise, when we ascribe moral properties to 
someone from a folk moral perspective, as for example when we say 
that someone deserves punishment because she intentionally 
committed a crime, this does not entail any specific belief about her 
brain. So even though it may be interesting and valuable to explore 
                                    
49 Pardo & Patterson write the following about folk psychology: “The expression 
'folk psychology' refers to our common psychological/mental concepts and our 
ordinary use of words expressing these concepts. The notion of 'folk psychology' or 
'folk psychological concept' is philosophical and controversial. We use the 
expression without endorsing the many uses to which it is put in the philosophical 
literature. However, the concept is a staple of the philosophical literature and, for 
that reason, we employ it. Nothing in our argument depends upon a rejection of the 
idea of folk psychology. Thus, we prescind from the direct controversy over the 
viability and explanatory perspicacity of this notion.” (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, 




the neural correlates to mental states and behavior, that we define in 
folk psychological terms, and evaluate from a folk moral perspective, 
neural correlates do not – and will not – be able to affect the folk 
moral view of what is required for moral responsibility. The fact that 
some kind of neural activity in the brain is required for mental activity 
(as it is defined in folk psychology) is perfectly compatible with the 
folk moral intuition that a certain mental capacity (defined in folk 
psychological terms) is required for a certain normative practice, such 
as responsibility attribution. Crucially, therefore, since the legal 
system is a folk psychological and folk moral enterprise, 
neuroscientific facts and philosophical arguments have very limited, 
if any, relevance for the law, and more specifically in this discussion, 
for legal retributive practices. Morse shares the view that 
neuroscience is largely irrelevant for folk morality and for the legal 
practices, since they, in turn, are fundamentally folk psychological and 
folk moral enterprises.  
In this chapter, I will argue that folk psychology is not immune to 
neuroscientific information regarding mental states and their relation 
to brain states. In fact, such information could, at least in principle, 
be integrated in the folk psychological understanding of human 
thinking and action. Therefore, I argue, we have no conclusive 
reasons to think that neuroscience cannot inform, or correct, or 
change (current) folk psychological assumptions about human 
thinking and action, and that this can affect folk morality, and 
therefore, also legal retributive practices.  
On a general level, the kind of objection to the Revision Argument 
to be discussed in this chapter has the following structure. (1) The 
justification of the retributivist element in the legal system is based on 
a folk psychological understanding of human behavior and folk moral 
approach to normative judgments, (2) Folk psychology and folk 
morality are resistant, or at least sufficiently resilient, to scientific 
information and to philosophical reasoning, (3) therefore, 
neuroscientific information and philosophical arguments cannot 
contribute to – or undermine – the justification of legal retributive 
punishment. I will agree with (1) but disagree with (2). Therefore, (3) 
does not follow.  
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This chapter will run as follows: in section 6.2, I will discuss 
different kinds of justification criteria for legal retributive 
punishment. In section 6.3, I will discuss the view of folk psychology 
defended by Morse and Pardo & Patterson and suggest an alternative 
view. In section 6.4, I will present two different notions of folk 
morality, and argue that if we appreciate this distinction, we can make 
sense of the fact that folk moral intuitions in some cases seem to 
provide contrarious responses. In section 6.5, I will summarize why 
and how philosophy and science are, and are not, relevant for folk 
psychology, folk morality and the law. I summarize the chapter in 
section 6.6.  
6.2 Justification criteria of legal retributive 
punishment 
In this section, different justification criteria for legal retributive 
punishment will be discussed. With justification criteria, I mean 
criteria that must be met in order for retributive punishment to be 
justified. If rationality is such a criterion, then it is a necessary 
condition that someone is rational, if we are to punish her justifiably. 
If libertarian free will is a justification criterion, then a necessary 
condition is that a person has libertarian free will in order for her to 
deserve punishment. When we ask what the criteria are for the 
justification of retributive punishment in a specific system, as for 
example in a legal system, this question can be interpreted in two 
different ways. Either, we can interpret the question as concerned 
with what the legal criteria for retributive punishment are, that is, 
which criteria must, according to the law, be met in order for retributive 
punishment to be justified. The legal criteria are explicitly expressed 
in the law as necessary conditions in order for retributive punishment 
to be justified. Alternatively, the question can be interpreted as 
concerned with the moral criteria of retributive punishment. 
According to this interpretation, the question is concerned with the 
moral basis of the legal practice. In a way, we can think of the latter 
interpretation as a question of to what extent legal retributive 
punishment is morally justified. These two interpretations are thus 
concerned with two different sets of justification criteria – criteria that 
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are internal to the legal practice and criteria that are external, 
respectively.  
The idea of (external) moral justification criteria for legal 
punishment can (also) be interpreted in different ways. Some believe 
that there are objective and absolute moral facts, which then are the 
criteria that a legal practice (and any practice) need to satisfy in order 
to be morally justified, whereas others argue that moral facts are 
relative, or that there simply are no such facts. In this thesis I will not 
take a stand on any such meta-ethical position. Instead, as explained 
in section 2.3.1, for the purposes of the discussion in this book, I 
assume as a starting-point the presumption made by both proponents 
and critics in the debate about the Revision Argument: that the moral 
viewpoint that works as external justification for the legal system is 
the one embraced by folk morality (whatever that might be).50  
Now, in the previous chapters, I argued that there are certain 
philosophical problems with regard to how compatibilism about free 
will and/or moral responsibility can work as the basis for basic desert 
attribution. But it is not philosophical arguments that legitimize and 
justify, and hence not undermine, our legal practices. The parties 
involved in this discussion – Morse, Pardo & Patterson and also 
Greene & Cohen – all agree that it is folk morality and folk psychology 
that do the heavy lifting in this regard.  
Against this assumption, Morse and Pardo & Patterson argue that 
if compatibilism about free will and moral responsibility according to 
                                    
50 This should be seen as a way to delimit the discussion rather than as a substantial 
commitment to folk morality as the final justifier of legal systems. In other words, I 
do not wish to defend the view that regardless of the content of folk morality, a 
certain legal practice is justified as long as the practice goes in line with the content 
of folk morality. But in this particular discussion, I discuss the special relationship 
between a legal practice, folk morality and folk psychology, from the presumption 
that folk morality and folk psychology are necessary elements for the legitimacy of a 
legal system. However, I am open for the possibility that folk morality and folk 
psychology are not sufficient for the legitimacy or justification of a legal system, and 
also for the possibility that legitimacy and justification can (and perhaps should) be 
teared apart, so that a system may be legitimate but not justified, and vice versa. 
However, for the sake of simplicity, I take legitimacy and justification to co-vary 
with regard to the relation between folk psychology, folk morality and legal practices 
in the present discussion. 
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folk psychology and folk morality is sufficient for the moral justification of 
retributive punishment, then it seems that we have what is needed for 
a justified and legitimate legal practice. This justification holds 
regardless of potential philosophical worries about free will and 
responsibility, and regardless of scientific findings about brain states 
– as far as these scientific findings are not conclusive evidence to the 
effect that folk psychological assumptions about behavior are plainly 
false. For example, if neuroscience could show that people do not 
respond to reasons, the folk psychological assumption that people are 
reasons-responsive would be false. But neuroscience does not show 
that.51  
 In this chapter, I will challenge this view. I will not argue that 
neuroscience shows that folk psychological assumptions are plainly 
false, but I will argue that neuroscientific findings and philosophical 
arguments are relevant for folk psychology and folk morality even if 
the scientific findings in question do not show that folk psychological 
assumptions are plainly false, which seems to be what Morse as well 
as Pardo & Patterson require in order for neuroscience to be relevant 
here. Moreover, I will argue that even if compatibilism about free will 
and moral responsibility is sufficient for retributive punishment 
according to (some interpretations of) folk psychology and folk 
morality, philosophical arguments may change people’s views about 
that. 
 The following sections will be concerned with some claims put 
forth by Morse and Pardo & Patterson about how the folk 
psychological (section 6.3) and folk moral (section 6.4) frameworks 
are relatively resistant to scientific explanations and philosophical 
                                    
51 See e.g. Morse (2007): “Laws could not guide people [...] unless people were the 
types of creature who could use laws as premises in their practical reasoning” (p. 
205). Elsewhere, Morse writes that ”folk psychology does not presuppose the truth 
of free will, it is perfectly consistent with the truth of compatibilism […] folk 
psychology presupposes and insists only that human action can at least be partially 
explained by mental states explanations or that it will be responsive to reasons, 
including incentives, under the right conditions” ( Morse, 2013, p. 31). 
Pardo & Patterson put it as follows: “To suppose that praise and blame require 
uncaused causation is to miss (or misconstrue) the normativity in human action […] 
neither determinism in general nor neuroscience in particular undermines folk 
psychology” (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, pp. 202-203). 
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arguments. I will argue that the view they endorse is not obviously the 
most plausible one, and I will provide some examples of why it is not. 
I will also give some examples of what I take to be a more reasonable 
view of folk psychology and folk morality. These examples will, in 
turn, affect the plausibility of the claim that folk psychological 
explanations can figure as justification of a legal practice even though 
there are scientific and philosophical arguments that show that the 
folk psychological explanations in question are problematic or simply 
false. In other words, I will provide some arguments to the effect that 
folk psychology and folk morality are not as resistant to scientific 
findings and philosophical arguments as Morse and Pardo & 
Patterson think they are.  
6.3 Folk psychology 
In this section, I will discuss two different approaches to folk 
psychology. In section 6.3.1, the view defended by Morse, and Pardo 
& Patterson will be described. According to this view, folk 
psychological concepts are quite resistant to the influence of 
neuroscientific findings. Then an alternative view will be presented. 
According to this alternative view, folk psychological concepts are no 
more resistant to neuroscientific findings than common-sense 
concepts in general are resistant to scientific achievements. I take the 
latter view to be more accurate than the former, since there is much 
evidence to the effect that common-sense concepts and views change 
in light of new information.  
6.3.1 The folk psychological framework as resistant to 
neuroscientific explanations 
According to Morse, the law’s view of the person is a folk 
psychological:  
 The law’s psychology must be a folk psychological theory, a view of 
the person as a conscious […] creature who forms and acts on 
intentions that are the product of the person’s other mental states, such 
as desires, beliefs and plans. (Morse, 2013, p. 31) 
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Morse argues that folk psychological concepts are necessary for the 
law’s explanations of why people behave as they do, but also for the 
possibility to “adapt any morals or politics or any legal rule, or to do 
anything at all.” In his view, a neuroscientific explanatory framework 
of behavior is insufficient to explain how and why people adapt their 
behavior to reasons, and it also leaves us with no orientation of how 
to navigate in normative questions:  
Normativity depends on reason, and thus the radical [revisionist] view 
is normatively inert. Neurons and neural networks do not have reasons; 
they do not have a sense of past, present, and future; and they have no 
aspirations. Only people do. If reasons do not matter, then we have no 
genuine, non-illusionary reason to adopt any morals or politics or any 
legal rule, or to do anything at all. Thus, this view does not entail 
consequentialism or a pure preventive scheme of social control. 
(Morse, 2013, p. 47)  
Pardo and Patterson agree with Morse that neuroscientific 
descriptions of the brain tell us nothing about how to handle 
normativity, such as for example whether someone is blameworthy 
or not for an action. They argue that although we can find brain states 
that correlate to what we refer to when we say that someone has 
control over her actions, or we can find out what sort of brain that is 
required for the ability to form intentions, these findings do not, by 
themselves, provide an answer the question of whether someone is 
responsible for her actions:  
Neuro-reductionism has the effect of “flattening” [...] normative 
differences – differences that must be taken into account in any 
sufficiently adequate explanation of responsibility. (Pardo & Patterson 
2013, p. 39). 
Pardo & Patterson think that an important aspect of why 
neuroscientific explanations of actions cannot be integrated in the 
folk psychological explanatory framework is the very nature of the 
psychological concepts – even though the meanings of such concepts 
are not fixed, there are various criteria for applying these concepts 
that limit their employment. In Pardo & Patterson’s view, these 
limitations have to do with what count as criterial evidence and what 
is merely inductive evidence for the phenomenon in question (2013, 
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p. 8). For example, they argue that the criteria for telling a lie involve 
behavior, not neurological states: behavior is, in their view, criterial 
evidence that someone is lying. Neuroscientific evidence could, in 
turn, provide us with well-grounded correlations between this type of 
behavior and brain states. Thus, information about brain states can 
constitute inductive evidence that someone is lying. It would, however, 
be a conceptual mistake to conclude that lies take place in the brain, 
they claim. This mistake can be illustrated if we consider a case in 
which a particular brain state did provide criteria for lies. If these 
criteria were met, i.e., if someone had these particular brain states, but 
without having the intention to lie, would we still say that the person 
was lying? Pardo & Patterson claim that we would not:  
What constitutes “deception” or a “lie” is a conceptual, not an 
empirical, question, and the criteria for the application of these 
concepts are behavioral, not neurological. (Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 
101) 
In sum, Pardo and Patterson argue that we must pay careful attention 
to how folk psychological concepts work (and do not work) in order 
to understand what responsibility attribution is dependent, and not 
dependent, on. This insight is fundamental in order to appreciate how 
neuroscience can be relevant for our responsibility practices. Morse 
does not discuss the nature of mental concepts in detail, but shares 
the view that responsibility attribution is connected to folk 
psychological explanations, and not to neuroscientific explanations, 
of actions. 
As will be made clear in the next section, not everyone subscribes 
to with the view that folk psychological explanations are “immune” 
to neuroscientific discoveries in the sense that e.g., discoveries about 
the neurological underpinnings of behavior cannot be viewed as 
criterial evidence for mental phenomena. I will argue that even if we 
accept Pardo & Patterson’s view that retributive practices are 
grounded in folk psychological concepts and explanations, this view 
does not exclude the possibility that the folk psychological framework 
can incorporate scientific findings of the physical basis of behavior 
alongside explanations in terms of mental states. In other words, 
nothing in their argumentation excludes the possibility for physical 
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facts about behavior to become part of the criterial evidence for 
mental phenomena.  
6.3.2 The folk psychological framework as sensitive to 
(neuro)scientific explanations 
Morse and Pardo & Patterson claim that folk psychology is necessary 
for our normative practices such as responsibility assessments, and 
that neuroscientific explanations of behavior have a very limited 
relevance for our folk psychological understanding of human action, 
and for folk moral intuitions. Neuroscientific explanations of actions 
are, according to Morse, “normatively inert” (2013, p. 47).  
However, the views advocated by Morse, Pardo & Patterson can 
be disputed. One of the most renowned contemporary defenders of 
eliminative reductionism, Patricia Churchland, recognizes, on the one 
hand, the worries about the normative inertness of neuroscientific 
explanations of behavior, but on the other she proposes a positive 
perspective on what a scientific description of our behavior will mean 
to our social practices: 
Those who will suppose that science and humanism must be at 
loggerheads will greet this forecast of the future with no enthusiasm. 
They may tend to see the revision of folk theory and the rise of 
neurobiological-psychological theory as the irreparable loss of our 
humanity. But one can see it another way. It may be a loss, not of 
something necessary for our humanity, but of something merely 
familiar and well-worn. It may be a loss of something that, though 
second nature, blinkers our understanding and tethers our insight. The 
gain, accordingly, may be a profound increase in the understanding of 
ourselves, which, in the deepest sense, will contribute to, not diminish, 
our humanity. The loss, moreover, may include certain folk 
presumptions and myths that, from the point of view of fairness and 
decency, we come to see as inhumane. And among the desirable losses 
may also be a numbered certain widespread and horrible diseases of the 
mind-brain. (P. Churchland, 1986, pp. 482-483) 
According to Churchland, a neurobiological-psychological theory 
(instead of “folk theory”) would improve our normative practices, 
since it would constitute a profound deepening of our understanding 
of ourselves. J.Z Young provides a similar approach: “So my hope is 
that the application of scientific language to describe ourselves may 
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lead to an improvement in powers of communication and 
cooperation, perhaps even to a revolution in their effectiveness” 
(Young, 1978, cited in Churchland, 1986, p. 481). Terrence Chorvat 
and Kevin McCabe express their view of how neuroscientific research 
of behavior likely will influence our legal practices as follows:  
Research shows that human behavior is a function of a complex 
interaction of neural mechanisms. By understanding the neural 
mechanism, which we use to solve problems, we can hope to create 
laws and other rules that will help to foster socially optimal behavior. 
Such research has already given us important insights into behavior. 
However, future research is likely to be able to tell us how to 
significantly enhance compliance with the law at a minimal cost and to 
encourage better forms of social interaction. This research will 
probably completely change the way we view nearly every area of the 
law. (Chorvat & McCabe, 2004, pp. 127-128) 
The question of how neuroscientific explanations of behavior can be 
of use for our normative practices, seems, hence, to elicit different 
intuitions in different people. Morse and Pardo & Patterson argue 
that neuroscientific explanations of behavior are normatively inert, 
whereas Churchland, Young and Chorvat & McCabe hold that 
neuroscientific explanations of behavior will improve our 
understanding of ourselves and each other, and, thereby, influence 
our normative intuitions about what is just and right.  
If we consider these different views in light of our interest in the 
Revision Argument, it may, at first sight, appear that the kind of view 
defended by for example Churchland supports the Revision 
Argument, whereas the kind of view defended by Morse, Pardo & 
Patterson’s does not. More specifically, Churchland argues that 
neuroscience provides us with reasons to abandon certain folk 
psychological explanations in favor of neuroscientific one’s, and that 
this replacement will bring about a change in people’s normative 
attitudes towards other people’s behavior. Morse, as well as Pardo & 
Patterson reject this claim.  
The Revision Argument claims that folk psychological 
explanations of actions presuppose libertarian free will, but it does 
not explicitly claim that folk psychological explanations, in general, 
are false, neither does it explicitly claim that folk psychological 
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explanations of actions should be replaced with neuroscientific 
explanations. An interpretation of the Revision Argument is that 
certain folk psychological concepts need to be adjusted in light of 
neuroscientific explanations of behavior, and that such adjustments 
will have normative implications. For example, take the folk 
psychological concept of fear. It is plausible that this concept has 
behavioral criteria for its correct application: in other words, if we are 
to use the folk psychological concept of fear correctly, some 
behavioral criteria must be met. However, according to neuroscience, 
certain chemical substances are always involved when we experience 
fear, and these substances make us behave in certain ways since they 
have certain bodily effects. According to Pardo & Patterson’s line of 
reasoning, such neuroscientific findings are inductive, but not 
criterial, evidence of fear. But even though chemical processes in the 
brain have, until now, not been part of the criterial evidence of fear, 
why cannot they become part of the criterial evidence of fear?  
If we scrutinize what has been common sense views, or “folk” 
views, in earlier times, such views have tended to change in light of 
new scientific achievements. For example, people believed for a long 
time that the earth was flat as a pancake.52 From our everyday point 
of view – our “common sense” if you like – it certainly looks flat. 
However, at some point in history, scientific techniques made it 
possible for us to discover that the everyday perception of the world 
does not really match with the real form of the earth. It turned out 
that our physical size makes it impossible to directly observe that the 
earth actually is a sphere. This scientific finding, even though very much 
in contrast to our everyday observation, has become part of the folk 
understanding of the world. The idea that the earth is a sphere, is no 
longer considered merely a “scientific” idea, but a fact of common 
knowledge. It has been completely integrated and immersed in our 
folk view of the world, just like the idea that the earth revolves around 
the sun. Yet, still we refer to “sunset” and “sunrise”, acknowledging 
our everyday experience, but simultaneously we are fully aware – on 
a folk level – that the sun is the center of our solar system. So, we 
                                    




seem to be perfectly able to revise our folk knowledge based on 
scientific results. The list of current folk beliefs that were once only 
scientific findings is long: we need the oxygen from the air; lightning 
is electricity; stars are far away and enormously big, in spite of how 
they appear. 
A thorough discussion of what makes beliefs justified would be 
too complex to be part of this chapter, but I think it suffices to say 
that if we assume that folk psychology is a set of beliefs, these beliefs 
have, through history, been sensitive to new scientific information in 
the same way as other common sense beliefs about the world are 
sensitive to new information, even if the information in question is 
“imported” from, for example, neuroscience.  
Eliminativists, like Churchland, aim to eliminate the folk 
psychological vocabulary and replace it with a neuroscientific 
vocabulary. But, if we accept the problem with multiple realizability, 
this replacement is a problematic approach since there may be many 
neuroscientific stories that have to replace the folk psychological 
“place holders”. However, in my view, we need not “eliminate” nor 
“replace” folk psychology. I suggest that the integration of scientific 
ideas in our folk psychological framework is a more plausible option. 
In other words, we may allow ourselves to appreciate neuroscientific 
information of what is happening in the human brain when humans 
e.g., think rationally, without eliminating the folk psychological concept 
of rationality. So, we may enjoy the “sunset”, while fully appreciating 
that it is the earth revolving around the sun, not the other way around. 
Would it be a neuro-reductionist move to incorporate, in our 
everyday understanding, that e.g., sadness in humans necessarily 
involves low levels of certain chemical substances and high levels of 
other substances? Or that experiences of stress necessarily involve 
certain structures in the brain, such as an activated amygdala? 
Regardless of whether we call it reductionism or not, it seems 
plausible that we can learn that certain kinds of brain processes are 
necessarily involved when we, for example, experience fear and 
happiness, and that rational thinking requires certain brain structures, 
and so on (other processes may, for all we know, be involved when 
an alien experience fear, happiness, or thinks rationally). This insight 
must not mean that, for example, the folk psychological concept of 
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rationality changes referent. Rather, we could think of it as having 
discovered that certain brain processes are always involved when 
humans think rationally, and these brain processes have most likely 
always been involved in rational thinking. We have, in some sense, 
discovered something about the mental capacity of rationality, but 
this discovery does not mean that we have “eliminated” the folk 
psychological concept of rationality. It still refers to the same 
phenomenon, which is now supplemented with information.  
In some contexts, such neuroscience-derived knowledge may not 
be relevant, but in others, it may be very helpful. For instance, if we 
come to know that a certain person, who suddenly has changed her 
personality and behaves rude and irrational, has had an accident and 
suffered from a head trauma, we may explain her behavior with 
reference to her diminished cognitive capacities. We can, of course, 
call such explanations for reductionism since it seems plausible to 
reduce the causal relevance of the mental states/capacities in question 
to the causal powers of the involved brain states (see chapter five). 
But, I would say, this sense of reductionism does not mean that we 
need to replace all the behavioral criteria for when someone is polite, 
or rational, with criteria only concerned with brain states.  
As said, an important aspect of what neuroscience can contribute 
to the folk psychological understanding of behavior is that it may, in 
some cases, clarify why some people act e.g., irrationally, or have 
problems with controlling their behavior or act reason-responsively. 
For example, the phenomenon that some people act restlessly, has a 
hard time concentrating, and are more often than others involved in 
social disputes is not new. In earlier times, it may have been thought 
of as a sign of ill will, or perhaps lack of good rearing from the parents 
of a child behaving in this way. In contemporary discussions, this kind 
of behavior is often associated with ADHD. Symptoms similar to those 
of ADHD have, of course, been discussed before the neuroscientific 
description of this mental disorder was at hand. But to say that 
someone has ADHD does not only mean that she has certain functional 
features (for example, it is hard for her to pay attention for a longer 
period of time, she has difficulties with controlling her behavior in 
certain situations, and so on) but it may also be assumed that this 
behavior is related to certain impairments in brain functions, which is 
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information provided by neuroscience. Neuroscientific information 
about the brain mechanisms that are involved in the symptoms of a 
neuropsychiatric disorder does not wipe out our understanding of 
restlessness and concentration difficulties – but it adds information 
about why people with a certain neuropsychiatric disorder have these 
symptoms. Of note, much is still unknown about ADHD53, but 
importantly, folk psychology is also, at least in my view, able to 
integrate uncertainties. Scientific information is coming to us daily by 
all kinds of media sources. This information, like much other 
information, is often accompanied by terms like “possible,” 
“probably,” etcetera. People are very much accustomed to receiving 
such popularized scientific information about all areas of science: 
history, physics, neuroscience, and perhaps most of all: medical 
sciences. People tend also to be aware of the facts that not all findings 
are eternal truth.  
The fact that our folk psychological beliefs about a certain kind of 
behavior have been influenced and supplemented by an expanding 
neuroscientific understanding of the related/underlying brain 
functions does not exclude that we still may have certain attitudes 
towards someone who behaves in a way that we do not appreciate. 
Negative normative judgement towards people acting in ways we 
experience as troubling will most likely persist despite that we have 
knowledge of the physical basis of this behavior. However, it may also 
be the case that we think that certain moral responses towards people 
who behaves in ways we experience as “troubling” are not proper 
responses in light of new information. For example, to blame 
someone for her irrationality may seem less morally justified if we 
know that her lack of rationality is due to her suffering from an earlier 
brain trauma after a car accident. The explanation for why she 
behaves irrational is not that she does not pay enough attention to the 
circumstances, or something like it. She simply does not have the 
resources to think rationally, and to blame someone for her lack of 
such resources seems, intuitively, not to be morally right.  
This reasoning has so far mostly been concerned with showing that 
neuroscientific facts about brains are – at least sometimes – 
                                    
53 This point certainly has to be acknowledged, see e.g., Dehue et al., 2017.  
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informative to our folk psychological concepts. One does not have to 
be a neuroscientist to consider a person’s severe brain trauma when 
thinking of whether to attribute blame for certain behavior. 
Neuroscience may in some cases help us to identify people who do 
not deserve punishment, since we, in our current responsibility 
practice, do not attribute responsibility to people who lack the right 
mental capacities. (But, notably, I have argued that the difference 
between those who, according to the current practice, deserve 
punishment and those who do not is not of the relevant sort in order 
to justify this moral difference.) 
Arguably, the normative relevance of neuro-information can be 
seen in cases when neuroscientific explanations of behavior change 
our intuitions about what is a morally justified reaction to that 
behavior. But, as Greene & Cohen point out, why are some differences 
in the neurobiology relevant for such moral intuitions, but not others? 
If we fully appreciate the fact that people’s behavior is completely a 
consequence of their neurobiology, the apparent moral difference 
between people who are morally responsible, and people who are not, 
fades. Neuroscientific information about the causal underpinnings of 
the behavior apparently influences our intuitions about what is a 
morally justified response to certain kinds of behavior. But since 
neuroscientific information about the causal underpinnings of 
behavior can be had in all cases of behavior, the idea is that if such 
information influences our moral intuitions in some cases, it should 
influence our moral intuitions in all cases. Since arguably, the reason 
for why the neuro-information in question influences our moral 
intuitions in this way, is that if behavior is completely caused by some 
neurobiological processes, then it seems counterintuitive to hold that 
it is “up to” the person how she acts. This conclusion holds for all 
people, and all kinds of actions, at all times.  
This above line of reasoning can be related to the point made by 
Pardo and Patterson: that neuroscientific explanations “flatten” the 
normative differences that must be taken into account in any 
sufficiently adequate explanation of responsibility attribution. 
Perhaps it is not the case that neuroscientific explanations “flatten” 
these normative differences, but rather, that we, when we consider 
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neuroscientific explanations of actions, realize that there were no 
grounds for such normative differences to start with.  
However, according to Morse, and Pardo & Patterson, folk 
morality is plainly what people in general think is right or wrong, and 
these judgments have very little to do with what they think about 
brains. Therefore, facts about the brain have limited relevance for folk 
morality, and hence, facts about the brain have a very limited 
relevance for the moral justification of legal retributive punishment.  
In this section, I have argued that folk psychological concepts are 
more sensitive to neuroscientific information than Morse and Pardo 
& Patterson acknowledge and that this sensitivity affects folk moral 
judgments. However, the claim that folk morality will change in light 
of such information requires a certain view of the nature of folk 
morality. In the next section, I will address this subject. I will suggest 
that the view of folk morality that is present in the writings of Morse 
and Pardo & Patterson is too simplistic. I will make a distinction 
between two conceptions of folk morality, which, I argue, makes the 
dismissal of the relevance of philosophy and neuroscience to the 
justification of current legal retributive punishment less plausible.  
6.4 Folk morality 
In this context, “folk morality” refers to common attitudes and 
responses to moral questions and dilemmas that people in general 
tend to have. A frequently used method to uncover folk moral 
intuitions is to ask people what they think about moral cases and 
dilemmas. In chapter three, some results from experimental 
philosophy were discussed, concerned with the question whether folk 
morality is compatibilist or incompatibilist regarding moral 
responsibility. Some of the results suggest that folk morality is 
compatibilist, whereas other results suggest that folk morality is 
incompatibilist.  
In chapter four and five, I argued that compatibilism fails to 
account for an intuition that I take to be reasonable, namely, that 
there must be a relevant difference, or, a difference of a certain kind 
between properties that are desert entailing and properties that are 
not. But in what sense would a philosophical argument of that sort 
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be relevant to folk morality? This is the question I intend to address 
in this section.  
To start with, the claim that there must be a relevant difference 
between properties that are desert entailing and properties that are 
not, relies on the moral intuition that (sufficiently) like cases should 
be treated alike. To the extent that people in general agree with me 
that this moral intuition is a reasonable one, then this intuition is also 
part of folk morality. However, the principle that there must be a 
difference of a certain kind, and also beliefs about which differences 
that are relevant and which are not, may not always be considered 
when people assess moral cases and dilemmas in an everyday context, 
or when they report their intuitions regarding moral cases and 
dilemmas in experimental philosophy. It is conceivable that we 
embrace a lot of different moral principles and fundamental beliefs 
that we are not necessarily aware of, or do not consider, when we 
engage in particular moral situations. For example, one may find 
oneself blaming a dog for behaving badly even if one, when keeping 
one’s head cold, do not think that dogs are really blameworthy for 
their behavior – after all, they are animals that act on impulses and 
instincts.  
6.4.1 Reactive & reflective folk morality 
The line of reasoning in the section above leads to the suggestion that 
when analyzing folk moral responses, it makes sense to distinguish 
between people’s “gut-reactions” in concrete moral situations, and 
the moral principles and beliefs that they embrace. For example, if we 
ask people to give moral responses to a concrete case, such as whether 
someone deserves punishment for something she has done, they may 
answer in a way that is compatibilist regarding free will, responsibility 
and desert. In the following section, “gut-reaction” responses to 
concrete cases will be discussed as reactive folk morality. In contrast, 
reflective folk morality encompasses moral intuitions that we have when 
we take a step back from our immediate reactions to particular cases 
and reflect on them, and the moral beliefs and principles that govern 
these gut-reactions. Hence, reflective folk morality includes not only 
moral responses to concrete cases, but also general moral principles 
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that people find intuitively plausible. Such a principle could be that 
every person is equally morally important, that it is wrong to punish 
someone unless she deserves it, that you should not be blamed for 
something you had no control over, and so on. As I think of it, 
reflective folk morality also encompasses intuitions about particular 
cases when we consider them in the light of intuitions about general 
moral principles and considered beliefs about the world (e.g., 
scientific beliefs.) It might turn out that the intuitions that we have 
about a particular case after such reflection are different than our 
spontaneous gut-reaction intuition. In other words, it is not 
necessarily the case that the gut-reaction responses – i.e., reactive folk 
morality – tracks the beliefs and intuitions embraced by reflective folk 
morality. 
If it is true that the reactive folk morality is compatibilist regarding 
free will, responsibility, and desert, the philosophical arguments that 
I presented in chapters three and four point out a problem for reactive 
folk morality. I argued that given a physicalist and deterministic 
world-view, it seems as that there is no relevant difference between 
the natural properties that compatibilists put forth as base-properties 
of desert-attribution and retributive punishment (as for example, 
reasons-responsiveness), and natural properties that are not viewed as 
base-properties of basic desert (as for example, the ability to identify 
redness). In this section I will argue that these philosophical 
arguments are indeed based on an intuition that is already present in 
reflective folk morality.  
Knobe & Nichols (2007) suggest that depending on the 
characteristics of an experimental case in, diverging moral responses 
will be triggered. In their study, when people are asked an abstract 
question about whether people can be morally responsible in a 
deterministic universe, this commonly triggers incompatibilist 
intuitions. But when the scenario instead describes a person 
performing a bad act (e.g., someone who is cold-heartedly killing his 
children), and people are asked whether he is morally responsible – 
still in a deterministic universe – this scenario triggers compatibilist 
intuitions (in this case, that he is blameworthy despite that he was 
determined). Their idea is that the latter kind of scenarios trigger 
emotions in us in a way that abstract reasoning does not. And when 
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people respond to examples that triggers emotional responses, they 
tend to give compatibilist responses, in contrast to the responses they 
give when they engage in abstract reasoning.  
The experimental results from Knobe & Nichols show that there 
are measurable patterns in people’s responses, but that these patterns 
vary depending on if people think abstractly about the scenario, or if 
they assess the experimental case from an emotional perspective. One 
way to interpret these results is that they reflect the distinction 
between reactive and reflective folk morality. The idea is that when 
we assess moral situations in an everyday context, or are presented 
with concrete moral experimental cases, our emotions are triggered 
to a higher extent compared to when we assess moral questions 
through engaging in an abstract mode of thinking.  
But how is the distinction above relevant for the present purpose: 
to assess if, and if so to what extent, folk morality is sensitive to 
philosophical arguments and scientific facts? It is uncontroversial that 
folk morality is a normative enterprise, and as such, it is occupied with 
attitudes, judgements, and beliefs about what is right and wrong, good 
and bad, and so on. As mentioned earlier, one potential worry 
concerning the arguments in chapters three to five is that Morse and 
Pardo & Patterson might reply that they fail for the following reason: 
The legal system’s understanding of behavior is folk psychological, 
and it is legitimized by folk morality. Consequently, as long as folk 
morality is consistent with a compatibilist justification of retributive 
punishment, then philosophical arguments of the sort that I discuss 
in chapters three and four – to the effect that such a compatibilist 
justification is problematic – are irrelevant. However, the distinction 
between reactive and reflective folk morality provides us with the 
following reply to this reasoning: it may be true that reactive folk 
morality is compatibilist in the relevant sense, but as I have argued, 
the Principle of Relevant Difference is part of reflective folk morality. 
Hence, folk morality seems to encompass both the intuition that a 
compatibilist free will can justify retributive punishment, but also the 
intuition that there must be a relevant difference in natural properties 
in order for there to be a difference in moral properties. In chapters 
three to five, I argued that the relevant difference condition is hard to 
satisfy when it comes to desert-attribution, if considering the 
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challenges from determinism and physicalism. Hence, philosophical 
reasoning makes us see that if the Principle of Relevant Difference is 
supported by (reflective) folk morality, then a compatibilist view of 
free will and/or responsibility cannot provide what is required (i.e., 
the relevant kind of difference) for the justification of basic desert 
attribution, and, therefore, folk morality does legitimize legal 
retributive punishment. 
The distinction between reactive and reflective folk morality 
resembles, in a sense, of Ayer’s (1962) and Russell’s (2008) criticism 
of P.F Strawson’s view of responsibility, and the justification thereof, 
discussed in section 4.5. Strawson argue that responsibility judgments 
must be understood in light of our reactive attitudes, which are “ […] 
essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or 
indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and 
actions” (Strawson, 1962b, p. 67). Ayer and Russell both object to 
Strawson’s view that reactive attitudes do not call for justification, and 
argue that factual beliefs and reactive attitudes are related in a sense 
that Strawson fails to pay attention to. For example, if we have a 
reactive attitude of resentment towards someone, and this attitude 
involves the belief that she has done something wrong and deserves 
punishment, this belief is in turn connected to beliefs of what it takes 
to deserve something, and so on. If we realize that our notion of 
desert is connected to an untenable view of free will, this insight 
should, if we are rational creatures, affect the reactive attitude in some 
sense.  
The disagreement between Strawson on the one hand, and Ayer 
and Russell on the other hand, can be understood as reflecting the 
difference between reactive and reflective folk morality: reactive 
attitudes are part of reactive folk morality, in which people’s “gut-
reactions” govern what seems to be proper moral responses. As 
Strawson points out, pure normative intuitions do not call for 
justification in the sense that beliefs do. Ayer’s and Russell’s reply to 
Strawson consist in that there are beliefs connected to moral 
intuitions, and these beliefs can be true or false. Therefore, we may 
be epistemically justified, or unjustified, in having these beliefs. Some 
beliefs may be directly connected to the moral intuition (she deserves 
to be punished because she did wrong, for example) but other beliefs 
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may not be included in, or directly inform, the normative judgments 
(e.g., someone deserves to be punished only if she acted freely, and in 
order to act freely, one must be able to act otherwise). Such beliefs 
that are relevant to, although not directly included in, reactive moral 
judgments belong to reflective folk morality. Hence, within the 
framework of reactive and reflective folk morality, Ayer’s and 
Russell’s criticism can be described as that they think Strawson fails 
to acknowledge that when we reconsider our reactive attitudes in our 
reflective folk morality, this reflective enterprise most plausibly 
affects our reactive moral judgments. 
6.5 Why & how philosophy and (neuro)science 
are (and are not) relevant for folk 
psychology, folk morality and the 
justification of legal punishment 
In the previous sections, I have elaborated on how, and why, folk 
psychology and folk morality may be sensitive to scientific findings as 
well as philosophical arguments. In this section, I will provide a 
summary of my arguments, and spell out the consequences this 
reasoning has for the Revision Argument and the objections 
discussed in the previous chapters.  
Morse, as well as Pardo & Patterson all argue that neuroscience 
and philosophy have a (very) limited relevance to law. They claim that 
the revisionists are not only a mistaken regarding the definitions of 
free will and mental states, but they are also a making a more 
fundamental mistake by using scientific facts and philosophical 
reasoning in order to undermine a practice that fundamentally relies 
on folk psychological and folk moral intuitions. But as I have argued, 
both folk psychology and folk morality seem to have embedded 
normative standards making them sensitive to both scientific facts as 
well as to philosophical arguments and therefore, using science and 
philosophy in order to scrutinize practices that rely on folk 
psychology and folk morality is not a mistake at all.  
In section 6.3.2, I argued that even though neuroscience may not 
provide us with any exact information about what kind of brain 
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processes that are involved in specific kinds of mental states (due to 
multiple realization) neuroscience can provide a rough understanding 
of what has to be the case in terms of brain processes in order for 
certain mental states to be realized. Furthermore, I mentioned some 
examples of when neuroscientific findings add information to why 
people behave as they do, and that this information in certain cases 
seems to alter our intuitions of what is a justified moral response to 
the behavior in question – not necessarily in the way that we will lose 
negative emotional responses towards behavior that we do not 
appreciate, but in the way that it may affect our intellectual reasoning 
about what is a justified moral response to such behavior. As an example, 
I pointed out that a person that has suffered from a brain trauma 
might behave in a way that evokes certain reactive attitudes in us. But 
if we know that such a behavior is due to a brain trauma, we may be 
less prone to blame her for her behavior since she may lack certain 
relevant mental capacities.  
Another point I made was related to Pardo & Patterson’s 
observation that neuroscience is “flattening” the normative 
differences that are present in folk psychology. According to Pardo 
& Patterson, this “flattening” effect is a reason to think that 
neuroscience is insufficient as a source of information with regard to 
our responsibility practices. I disagree. Even though I agree that 
neuro-scientific descriptions of behavior do not provide us with 
direct moral information, for example, we cannot see how certain 
brain processes are related to basic desert, I argue that neuroscientific 
descriptions of the brain can provide us with information that makes 
us inclined to withdraw certain moral judgments, since we, in light of 
the new information, no longer regard certain moral judgements as 
justified. More specifically, I argued in chapters three to five that we 
might realize that the difference between people that we judge as 
responsible in the basic desert sense, and people that we judge as not 
responsible in this sense, lack the relevant kind of difference with 
regard to the physical realizers of the base properties upon which 
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these (moral) classifications rely. Therefore, I argue, we have reason 
to rethink these judgments.54 
In the section on folk morality, I argued that there are in fact two 
kinds of folk moral assessments: reactive and reflective. I argued 
further that even if reactive folk morality may seem to take 
compatibilism about free will and responsibility to be sufficient for 
retributive punishment, this does not entail that the same holds 
according to reflective folk morality. If the intuition that there must be 
a relevant difference in nature in order for a moral difference to be at 
hand is generally accepted, then it is a part of reflective folk morality. 
If so, then philosophical reasoning may help us tease out that there is 
a tension between the moral intuitions that are embraced by reflective 
folk morality, and the responses that are present in certain reactive 
folk moral intuitions.  
However, even if I claim that philosophy and neuroscience are 
relevant for the justification of legal punishment (in ways that 
supports the Revision Argument) we should, of course, also 
acknowledge that there are a number of ways in which neuroscience 
cannot be used in the context of folk morality, folk psychology, and 
the law. In different places, Morse, and Pardo & Patterson have made 
the following points:  
 
1. Neuroscience does not provide answers to normative 
questions, such as, for example, who is truly morally responsible 
(Pardo & Patterson, 2013, pp. 57-63; Morse, 2006, p. 400, 405).  
 
2. Neuroscience has not shown that people do not act for reasons 
(Pardo & Patterson, 2013, p. 76; Morse, 2013, pp. 31-32).  
 
                                    
54 Note that the lack of a relevant difference with regard to basic desert does not 
mean the moral practice is generally unjustified. I do not think there is any problem 
with dividing people, actions and mental states into different moral categories, since 
different moral properties rely on different base-properties, and hence, we need to 
look for different kinds of differences depending on what moral property we are 
concerned with. In this particular case, I am only concerned the practice of basic 
desert-attribution in combination with retributive punishment.  
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3. Neuroscience cannot show, independently of any normative 
standards, that our current legal practice is unjustified (Morse, 
2013, p. 46, Pardo & Patterson, 2013, pp. 186-198).  
 
Each of these claims is fully compatible with the Revision Argument, 
and with the arguments that I have put forth in the previous chapters. 
Regarding claim (1), responsibility is, of course, not something that 
can be found in the brain. However, if we have a definition of what 
is required for responsibility, and this definition has some connection 
with brain states, neuroscience might be a valuable resource.  
Regarding claim (2) I want to stress that I fully agree that 
neuroscience has not by any means shown that people do not act for 
reasons. The Revision Argument, and the arguments that I have put 
forward to its defense in this thesis, are fully compatible with the view 
that people are reasons-responsive and also with the claim that 
reasons-responsiveness has a special function in the overall cognitive 
system. The concern in the previous discussions has been to what 
extent reasons-responsiveness is a sufficient ground for retributive 
punishment, and I have argued that reasons-responsiveness, in 
combination with free will compatibilism, does not suffice as such 
ground, because of moral intuitions that are part of reflective folk 
morality. The final claim, (3), is that neuroscience cannot, 
independently of any normative standards, show that our current legal 
practice is unjustified. This claim captures the point that descriptive, 
factual claims about the world, such as, for example, claims about 
how the brain processes information, cannot in itself provide any 
guidance in normative matters. In order for neuroscience to be 
relevant in such matters, the normative practice in question must be 
sensitive for descriptive information of a certain kind. In this chapter, 
I have argued, in contrast to the third objection to the Revision 
Argument, that folk psychology and folk morality are sensitive to 
descriptive information in a way that makes neuroscience relevant for 
our legal responsibility practices. Hence, the conclusion of the 
Revision Argument stands.   
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6.6 Summary & conclusions 
In this chapter, I have discussed what I think is a viable objection to 
the relevance of my arguments in chapters three to five, given the 
positions defended by Morse and Pardo & Patterson. This objection 
was divided in the following claims: (1) The justification of the 
retributivist element in the legal system is based on a folk 
psychological understanding of human behavior and a folk moral 
approach to normative judgment, (2) Folk psychology and folk 
morality are immune, or at least sufficiently resilient, to scientific 
information and to philosophical reasoning, (3) therefore, 
neuroscientific information and philosophical arguments cannot 
undercut the justification of legal retributive punishment. I agree with 
(1) but, as explained in this chapter, disagree with (2). Therefore, I 
have argued that (3) does not follow.  
The central argument for why (2) does not hold is that I claim that 
folk psychology is an approach to human behavior that is much more 
sensitive to scientific facts than Morse and Pardo & Patterson seem 
to appreciate. I am not convinced by Pardo & Patterson’s argument 
that the criteria for the correct application of mental concepts are 
such that they exclude information of the brain. Insofar as they are 
right, their argument fails to convince that facts about the brain 
cannot become included in the criteria for what it means to have a 
certain mental state, if such facts provide us with a more nuanced 
picture of the mental state. The problem with multiple realizability is 
one reason for why brain states should not be included as criteria for 
what it means to have a certain mental state, but as I argued, it seems 
reasonable to think that human brains have at least certain 
fundamental similarities. Such similarities can be included in our folk 
psychological understanding of behavior – and arguably, that kind of 
information is already part of folk psychology. For example, people 
in general (i.e., not only neuroscientists and philosophers) accept that 
e.g., brain trauma, neuropsychiatric disorders, etcetera, are facts about 
a person that contributes with explanatory relevant information about 
her mental states and behavior, and may change our normative 
attitudes towards the person.  
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As we all know, scientists are asked to testify in court regularly. 
One group that is of particular relevance to responsibility practices, is 
psychiatrists, particularly regarding the question of criminal 
responsibility and legal insanity. In their testimony, they may well 
refer to neuroscience, since they make use of neuroscience in their 
assessments. Why are scientists asked to testify in court? A plausible 
suggestion is that it is because folk morality demands that when we 
are to make morally significant decisions, we must ground them in 
justified beliefs, and science can add information that is relevant for 
us to form such justified beliefs. 
As noted, the claim that neuroscience may inform us in a way that 
make us reconsider some of our moral judgments does not imply that 
we will, when having considered the neural causes of behavior, stay 
indifferent with regard to all kinds of behavior. We may still dislike 
certain kinds of behavior, and dislike people who behave in certain 
ways – put in Strawson’s terms, we may still have reactive attitudes 
towards certain people and certain kinds of actions. However, these 
reactive attitudes, which are included in (but do not exhaust) what I 
call “reactive folk morality” can be scrutinized in a more reflective 
approach to normative questions, and the judgment that comes out 
of such a reflective approach is included in what I call “reflective folk 
morality.” When arguing that our legal responsibility practices are 
legitimized by folk morality, we ought to take both reactive and 
reflective folk morality into consideration. We use our reflective 
moral intuitions to scrutinize our reactive moral judgments, and 
reflective folk morality is, or so I have argued, sensitive for scientific 
facts as well as philosophical arguments.  
All in all, in my view, there is good evidence to conclude that the 
concerns I raised in the previous chapter are relevant to legal 
retributive punishment, and that the Revision Argument has not been 
refuted by the objections to it considered in this thesis.

  
7 Summary & concluding remarks 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will provide a summary of the most important points 
that have been made in this thesis., and briefly discuss the 
consequences of my conclusions. I will close the chapter with some 
notes about what parts of the thesis that would benefit most from 
more thorough discussion, and what I would like to analyze further. 
In this thesis, I have discussed some objections to what I call “The 
Revision Argument” which I introduced and discussed in chapter 
two. The Revision Argument is a version of an argument originally 
put forward by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen in their article 
“For the law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything” 
(2004). The central message in the Revision Argument is that we lack 
moral justification for retributive elements in legal punishment 
practices. The main reason for why such justification is lacking is, 
according to the Revision Argument, that legal retributive 
punishment relies on a folk psychological understanding of actions 
according to which people have a libertarian free will. But, the 
argument goes, we have no – or insufficient – reasons to believe that 
people have libertarian free will, and furthermore neuroscience 
provides support to this belief, since neuroscience provides us with 
resources to explain human behavior in purely mechanistic terms. As 
Greene & Cohen put it, “neuroscience turns the black box of the 
mind into a transparent bottleneck” (Greene & Cohen, 2004, p. 
1781). 
According to retributivism, we are justified in punishing someone 
if (and only if) she deserves to be punished. There are different ideas of 
what it means to deserve something. In this thesis I have focused on 
basic desert, which is a notion of desert according to which someone 
deserves blame or punishment (or praise, or rewards) just because she 
has performed (a morally relevant) action, given that she has the 
properties required for being a person that can be blamed or punished 
MINDS, BRAINS, AND DESERT 
 206 
(or credited) for what she does. In other words, the notion of basic 
desert is connected to intrinsic properties of the person and her 
actions, and not to consequentialist or contractualist considerations. 
Basic desert must, as I have argued, be in place in order for retributive 
punishment to be justified. To be morally responsible in the basic 
desert sense is to be such a person that can deserve, in the basic desert 
sense, blame and punishment when she commits wrongful actions.  
According to the Revision Argument, legal practices are 
legitimized by folk psychology and folk morality. Furthermore, our 
current legal retributive practice is justified with reference to a folk 
moral view of responsibility that requires that people have a 
libertarian free will in order to deserve punishment.  This claim is 
highly contested, and in this thesis, I have discussed three objections 
to it, to the effect that the Revision Argument is mistaken about that 
folk psychology and folk morality require libertarian free will for 
retributive punishment to be justified. All these objections accept 
physicalism and determinism as constraints in the discussion of what 
makes retributive punishment justified. In other words, they aim to 
defend the view that retributivism can be justified within a 
compatibilist framework of free will and/or moral responsibility. 
In order to justify retributive punishment within a compatibilist 
framework, constrained by determinism and physicalism, it must be 
possible, I have argued, to specify some intrinsic property belonging 
to the desert subject that is sufficient for attributing the moral 
property of basic desert to her. Furthermore, I argued that the 
property that is picked out as sufficient for basic desert must satisfy 
what I call “the Principle of Relevant Difference” (this goes for any 
theory, both compatibilist and incompatibilist ones.) This principle is 
based on the moral intuition that two states of affairs cannot have 
different moral properties (or, in other words, different ethical 
character) without being relevantly different with regard to natural 
properties, since moral differences in a physicalist framework 
supervene on natural differences. Further, it is also intuitively 
plausible that not any natural difference will do as the supervenience-
base of a moral difference: in order for two states of affairs to differ 
with regard to moral properties, there must be a natural difference 
between them of a relevant kind. This is the content of the Principle of 
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Relevant Difference (introduced in chapter three). The moral 
intuition that there must be a natural difference of the relevant kind 
between two states of affairs in order for there being an ethical 
difference between them, is also related to the moral intuition that I, 
following Kim (1984), call “the consistency requirement” which is the 
requirement that like cases should be treated alike. In this thesis, I 
have specified this to be the requirement that sufficiently like cases 
should be treated alike – as was pointed out in relation to the relevant 
difference condition, not all natural differences between two cases are 
morally relevant in the sense that they plausibly make a difference to 
the ethical character. This means that the consistency requirement 
does not only cover two states of affairs that are alike in all aspects – 
it also covers cases that are sufficiently similar.  
Since the involved parties in this discussion accept physicalism and 
determinism, these metaphysical doctrines restrict what can be picked 
out as a relevant difference with regard to basic desert. In chapter 
three, I introduced and discussed these restrictions as “the challenge 
from determinism” and “the challenge from physicalism”, 
respectively. In chapter four and five, I discussed whether the 
objections to the Revision Argument put forward by Morse and 
Pardo & Patterson can satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference 
and meet the challenges from determinism and physicalism. In the 
two sections to come, I will summarize my arguments to the effect 
that the objections to the Revision Argument that I have discussed in 
this thesis fail to meet these challenges and satisfy the Principle of 
Relevant Difference.  
7.2 The challenge from determinism 
The challenge from determinism is perhaps the most commonly 
discussed challenge to compatibilist theories of free will and moral 
responsibility. The central worry of this challenge is that if all events, 
both mental and physical, are equally determined, it is hard to see how 
it would make sense that some of them are such that the agent having 
them could be held morally responsible for them in the basic desert 
sense. In chapter four, Van Inwagen’s (1981) consequence argument 
was introduced as a version of this challenge. The Consequence 
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Argument more specifically states that if we are not responsible for 
the facts that lead up to what we do (i.e., we are not responsible for 
how the world has been, from the distant past up to the time of our 
action) we cannot be responsible for our actions or the consequences 
of our actions, either. Some proponents of PAP – The Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities – argue that determinism blocks the, for free 
will and/or moral responsibility, necessary requirement of alternative 
possibilities, and that therefore no one can be morally responsible in 
the basic desert sense.  
As was discussed in chapter four, Frankfurt (1969) as well as 
Fischer (2002, 2012) defend a kind of compatibilism that I called 
“actual sequence compatibilism” according to which determinism, in 
fact, is not a threat to moral responsibility, since in their view, we 
should reject PAP. They argue that what really matters for moral 
responsibility is the kind of psychological process that leads to the 
action – in Fischer’s vocabulary “the actual sequence” that is involved 
when the action comes about – not whether we have a genuine 
possibility to do otherwise than we actually do. For example, if the 
psychological mechanism that leads to an action is reasons-
responsive, then one might be morally responsible for the action, 
which is not the case if the mechanism was not reasons-responsive.  
Reasons-responsiveness may, at a first glance, indeed seem to be a 
relevant difference with regard to basic desert. However, when we 
scrutinize the “actual sequences” that led to action in two persons 
who both have committed a criminal action, it is hard to see the 
relevant difference between them with regard to basic desert 
attribution, even if, at the time of the action, one of them was reasons-
responsive and the other was not. The sequences in both persons 
were very similar in the respect that they, under the circumstances at 
hand, were determined to lead to a criminal action. (Admittedly, this 
conclusion is most likely not accepted by the compatibilist. I return 
to this issue shortly.)   
I also discussed some compatibilist approaches that I called 
“counterfactual theories of alternate possibilities” according to which 
PAP is a necessary requirement for moral responsibility, and that e.g., 
reasons-responsiveness constitutes a relevant difference with regard 
to basic desert since it meets the requirement from PAP. According 
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to these theories, what it means to have an alternate possibility is that 
one, at the time of an action, had the capacity to do something else in 
a nearby possible world. In response to such theories, I argued that a 
dispositional property cannot do any causal work in relation to the 
actual action. And when we look at the actual physical processes that 
lead to an action in this world, the criticism that I put forward to 
Frankfurt’s and Fischer’s accounts, applies to these theories as well.  
In chapter five, I discussed another objection to the Revision 
Argument according to which the assumption that determinism 
threatens moral responsibility presupposes reductive physicalism 
about mental states. According to the objection, reductive 
physicalism is an untenable view of mental states, since it is based 
upon a confused understanding of mental concepts and if these 
confusions are straightened out, it will become clear that the moral 
judgments connected to mental state explanations of actions are not 
challenged by determinism. I argued that this objection has troubles 
escaping the challenge from physicalism, and I will summarize why in 
the following section.  
7.3 The challenge from physicalism 
If determinism is correct, then the difference between actions that the 
agent is responsible for (in the basic desert sense) and other actions 
(and non-actions), cannot be that the former actions (or the choices 
that precede them) are not caused, but rather that the different actions 
are caused by different mental processes and states. For example, 
according to one popular suggestion the relevant characteristic 
property of a responsible agent (that is, the base property of basic 
desert) is that her actions are based on mental processes that involve 
reasons-responsiveness or rationality. So, the relevant difference has 
to do with how the action is mentally caused. Further, if we accept 
physicalism, then mental causation must be found in physical 
processes since, according to the causal closure of the physical, all 
physical effects must have physical causes. Therefore, the difference 
between people that we think of as responsible (in the relevant sense) 
and others, has to do with the fact that their actions are caused by 
different kinds of brain-processes (or, in other words, brain processes 
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with different roles in the overall cognitive system). But when we look 
for a difference at the physical level of brain processes, it is hard to 
find one which is intuitively relevant with respect to basic desert. 
Because all brain processes work in accordance with the same input-
output principles: they are sensitive to input, they are processing input 
in a certain way depending on the preconditions at hand, and deliver 
output. All outputs are products of incoming stimuli in combination 
with the preconditions in the system that receives and processes the 
input.   
Without a relevant difference, choosing one brain process as the 
base for basic desert, over another that seems sufficiently similar, 
would violate the consistency requirement. This is the challenge from 
physicalism. At this moment in time, there is no scientific or 
philosophical theory available that explains what constitutes the 
relevant difference regarding blameworthiness at the brain level. 
However, the claim that the Principle of Relevant Difference must 
be satisfied at the level of brain states is contested. One objection to 
this line of reasoning is that, even if physicalism is correct, and even 
if responsibility attribution, and basic desert, is intimately connected 
to mental state explanations of actions, such explanations cannot be 
reduced to brain state explanations. Therefore, the relevant difference 
between someone who is morally responsible and someone who is 
not must be explained in terms of mental concepts, and mental 
concepts are irreducible to physical concepts.  
In chapter five, I discussed Pardo & Patterson’s (2013) argument 
to this effect. If we are to assess their argument, I argued that we must 
understand their theory of mental states, but they do not elaborate 
their view on this matter in much detail. In order examine their 
argument, I suggested that their view had similarities with Donald 
Davidson’s “anomalous monism” according to which mental 
explanations are irreducible to physical explanations. This 
irreducibility is due to multiple realizability of mental states, which 
gives mental states their anomalous character. However, Davidson 
accepts that the causal efficacy of mental states must be found at the 
level of brain states and, which means that the problem returns: at 
that level it is hard to satisfy the relevant difference condition. Hence, 
Pardo & Patterson’s theory require, in order to not be vulnerable for 
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the same criticism as was directed towards the compatibilist theories 
discussed in chapter four, an account of causation that does not place 
the causal efficacy at the level of brain states. One such theory is 
defended by List & Menzies (2017), who argue that the most plausible 
account of causation is a difference-making account. According to such an 
account, an event is the cause of an effect if and only if is satisfies 
both a positive and negative conditional. C causes E if and only if: if 
C were to occur, then E would occur and If C were not to occur, then 
E would not occur (List & Menzies, 2017, p. 277). According to List 
& Menzies, even if both conditionals are satisfied by a mental event 
causing an action (E), only the positive is satisfied by the brain event 
that realizes the mental event. Since mental events are multiply 
realizable, the actual physical realizer event could have been absent, 
and E would still have occurred since the mental event could have 
been realized by some other physical event.  
I argued that List & Menzie’s account of mental causation does 
not escape the challenge from physicalism. Rather, I claim, List & 
Menzie’s account actually presupposes that it is brain states that are 
causally efficacious in mental causation. They claim that the reason 
for why mental states, but not brain states, fulfill the negative 
conditional is that mental states are multiple realizable, that is, a 
mental type can be realized by many different brain states. That 
mental states are multiply realizable is, in my view, an unproblematic 
assumption, but the fact that they are multiply realizable, in turn, 
depends on how mental states are identified. List & Menzies endorse 
functionalism about mental states, which basically means that mental 
concepts are such that something (let’s say, some state or event) is 
classified as a certain mental kind, as e.g., a pain, a belief, or a desire, 
on the basis of its function in the overall mental system. Plausibly, 
having a function involves having a certain causal role which, in turn, 
means that tokens of mental states must have a certain causal effect 
in order to fall under a specific mental concept, or to be identified as 
a specific mental type, in the first place. Thus, before we can speak of 
mental states that can cause e.g., actions (in whatever sense) there has 
to be physical realizers (neural states) that can cause actions – if not 
in the difference-making sense so at least in the sense of being a 
sufficient cause or a production cause. Consequently, List & Menzies’ 
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view, I argued, does not escape the implication that it is only in virtue 
of the fact that the physical realizers (neural states) cause actions 
(produce actions or at least as sufficient causes), that mental states 
cause actions. This means that the causal efficacy, also in their view, 
is located at the level of brain states, and that we, therefore, must seek 
for relevant differences between cases where we attribute moral 
responsibility and cases where we do not, at the level of brain states. 
Consequently, the challenge from physicalism is not tackled. 
In sum, non-reductive physicalism of the kind Pardo & Patterson 
defend falls prey to the same criticism that was directed towards the 
compatibilist theories in chapter four: in order to satisfy the Principle 
of Relevant Difference, we need to find a relevant difference between 
the brain states that play the causal role in events for which we 
attribute moral responsibility, and brain states that play the causal role 
in events for which we do not. But as I have argued, it is difficult to 
find such a relevant difference.  
Some people may find it convincing that “we just do not know at 
this moment in time, but we may find the brain-level difference 
between blameworthy and non-blameworthy actions in some point in 
time in the future.” This may very well be the case. However, what I 
have argued for in this thesis is that at this point in time, we have not 
discovered such a difference. And in my view, if we want to justify 
our current retributive punishment practices – which involves 
intentionally, and often seriously, harming another person only because 
he or she allegedly deserves it – today, we have to be able to justify this 
practice referring to what we currently know, not on what we may (or 
may not) know in the future. That is the assumption that motivates 
my analysis about the Relevant Difference. I realize that some may 
find it a heavy burden of proof that I place on retributivist practices, 
but intentionally harming other people merely because they “deserve 
it”, requires a strong and clear basis in order to be justified.  
7.4 Folk psychology, folk morality and the 
justification of retributive punishment 
A possible objection to my arguments in chapters three to five is that 
legal retributive practices are not legitimized by philosophy and 
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science: a legal practice is, rather, legitimized by folk psychology and 
folk morality. In chapter six, I discussed this objection in form of the 
following claims: (1) The justification of the retributivist element in 
the legal system is based on a folk psychological understanding of 
human behavior and folk moral approach to normative judgment (2) 
Folk psychology and folk morality are immune, or at least sufficiently 
resilient, to scientific information and to philosophical reasoning, (3) 
therefore, neuroscientific information and philosophical arguments 
cannot undercut the justification of legal retributive punishment. If 
this is correct, one might claim that both neuroscience, as well as my 
philosophical arguments in chapter three to five to the effect that 
retributivism cannot be based on compatibilism, fail to show anything 
about the actual justification of retributivism in the legal system. I 
argued against this conclusion. I agree with (1) but disagree with (2). 
Therefore, I argued that (3) does not follow.  
The central argument for why (2) does not hold is that folk 
psychology is an approach to human behavior that is much more 
sensitive to scientific facts than Morse and Pardo & Patterson seem 
to acknowledge. For example, information about the neurobiological 
underpinnings of behavior may influence, and change, folk 
psychology and folk morality, even though neuroscience does not 
show that the folk psychological beliefs that we had before we knew 
anything about these underpinnings were plainly false. I claim that 
information about what is happening in the brain when having certain 
kinds of mental experiences may become integrated in the criteria for 
what it means to have a certain mental state, if this provides us with 
a more nuanced picture of the mental state. The problem with 
multiple realizability is one reason for why brain states should not be 
included as criteria for what it means to have a certain mental state, 
but as I argued, it seems reasonable to think that human brains have 
at least certain fundamental similarities. Such similarities can be 
included in our folk psychological understanding of behavior – and 
arguably, that kind of information is already part of folk psychology: 
people in general (i.e., not only neuroscientists and philosophers) 
accept that e.g., brain trauma, neuropsychiatric disorders, etcetera, are 
facts about a person that contribute with explanatory relevant 
information about her mental states and behavior.  
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With regard to folk morality, I distinguish between “reactive” and 
“reflective” folk morality. Reactive folk morality consists of “gut-
reaction” responses to moral questions and dilemmas, whereas 
reflective folk morality encompasses moral intuitions that we hold 
when we take a step back from our immediate reactions to particular 
cases. As I think of it, reflective folk morality is in play when we 
consider particular moral questions and dilemmas in the light of 
intuitions about general moral principles (such as, for example, the 
principle “treat like cases alike”); in the light of considered beliefs 
about the world (e.g., scientifically informed beliefs, e.g., that certain 
illnesses give raise to deviant behavior); and in the light of what we 
take as relevant distinctions (e.g., distinctions between different moral 
categories such as wrongness and blameworthiness, or subjective and 
objective wrongness.) It might turn out that the intuitions that we 
have about a particular case after such reflection is different than our 
spontaneous gut-reaction intuition, i.e., it is not necessarily the case 
that the gut-reaction responses – i.e., reactive folk morality – tracks 
the beliefs and intuitions embraced by reflective folk morality. 
If it turns out that reactive folk morality is compatibilist regarding 
free will, responsibility and desert, the philosophical arguments put 
forth in chapter three to five point out a problem for this part of 
reactive folk morality. Moreover, I argued that this critique is not a 
philosophical argument that is completely detached from folk 
morality. Rather, it is supposed to be an argument that stems from 
another folk moral intuition – an intuition that belongs to reflective 
folk morality. The fact that different scientific experts are, on a regular 
basis, asked to testify in court points, or so I argued, to the fact that 
according to folk morality, we should ground morally significant 
decisions on justified beliefs. And science can add information that is 
relevant for us when forming such justified beliefs. 
Given this view of folk psychology and folk morality, there is, in 
my view, good evidence to conclude that the concerns I raised in the 
previous chapters are relevant to legal retributive punishment, and 
that the Revision Argument has not been refuted by the objections to 
it considered in this thesis.  
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7.5 Implications for the legal system 
Given that the compatibilist theories that I have discussed in this 
thesis fail to provide a base property of basic desert that satisfy the 
Principle of Relevant Difference, the Revision Argument is not 
refuted and the retributive element in the legal system lacks 
justification. What has been picked out as the base-properties of basic 
desert (I have mostly focused on reasons-responsiveness) does not 
meet the requirements of the Principle of Relevant Difference in light 
of the challenges from determinism and physicalism.55  
As described in section 2.3.2, the notion of desert that has been 
relevant for the purposes of this book is “basic desert” (following e.g., 
Pereboom, 2014 and Smilansky, 2000) and the notion of moral 
responsibility that has been in focus has been “retributive desert 
moral responsibility” (following Caruso & Morris, 2017.) It has been 
a presupposition throughout this book that it is this kind of 
responsibility, and this kind of desert, that has to be in place in order 
for retributive punishment to be justified. However, it seems plausible 
that there are other notions of moral responsibility that are not 
essentially connected to desert. As was pointed out in section 2.5, the 
view that moral responsibility and justified punishment can be had 
without accepting that people deserve anything in the sense of basic 
desert has been embraced by a number of philosophers, as for 
example J.J.C Smart (1961), Daniel Dennett (1984b), Saul Smilansky 
(2000) and Derk Pereboom (2014). David Hume can also be 
interpreted as defending this view (Russell, 1990, p. 560). In such a 
responsibility practice, what makes moral responsibility attribution 
justified, as well as the subsequent response (blame, praise, 
punishment, reward, and so on) is that this practice has consequences 
we consider valuable. In such a responsibility practice, basic desert 
has no place, but there may be room for what has been called derived 
                                    
55 It might, of course, be the case that there are compatibilist theories that I am 
unaware about, that can satisfy the Principle of Relevant Difference, as well as it 
might be features of the brain that we don’t know about yet, but that satisfies the 
relevant different condition on the level of brain states.  
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desert (see e.g., Pereboom 2001, 2014.)56 Within such a practice, 
punishment may be justified in a similar way as in a practice in which 
punishment is justified with reference to basic desert– it is justified to 
punish someone only if she deserves to be punished – but the desert 
that has to be in place in order for punishment to be justified is 
derived desert, not basic desert. The fundamental difference between 
these two notions of desert is that the base property of derived desert 
is not an intrinsic property of the person – that is, that she has a 
property that is sufficient for her to deserve punishment just on the 
basis of what she has done – but rather a relational property: the 
property of being a person (or a kind of person) that it has desirable 
consequences to punish. 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to keep these two 
notions of desert apart. Pereboom (2014) points out that some 
philosophers identify themselves as compatibilists because they think 
that some non-basic notion of desert and responsibility is compatible 
with determinism. For example, Dennett says that his compatibilist 
notion of free will “can play all of the valuable roles free will has 
traditionally been invoked to play” (Dennett 2003, p. 225, cited in 
Pereboom, 2014, p.3), and Jackson expresses a similar idea, stating 
that compatibilist arguments do not show that “[…] free action as 
understood by the folk is compatible with determinism, but that free 
action on a conception near enough to the folk’s […] does the 
theoretical job we folk give the concept of free action in adjudicating 
questions of moral responsibility and punishment, and in governing 
our attitudes to the actions of those around us, is compatible with 
determinism” (Jackson, 1998: pp. 44-45, cited in Pereboom, 2014, pp. 
2-3). But, as Pereboom notes, if compatibilism is defined so that also 
non-basic notions of desert and moral responsibility are compatibilist, 
“[…] virtually everyone in the debate stands to be a compatibilist” 
(Pereboom, 2014, p. 2). A reason for why this is problematic is that it 
is hard to identify the disagreement between those who argue that 
basic desert is possible, and those who argue that it is not, if we do 
not keep these notions of desert apart, and discuss both views under 
                                    
56 Feinberg (1970) also talks about “basic” and “derived” desert, but the distinction 
that I have in mind here is different from his.    
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the label of compatibilism. And there is no doubt that there is a 
disagreement regarding moral responsibility, what it is and what it 
requires. And, perhaps more importantly, it is of moral importance to 
be clear about what kind of desert we have in mind when punishing 
people in the legal system, if one notion of desert is likely to be 
unjustified. As Jackson and Dennett note, basic desert and derived 
desert may provide similar outputs from one point of view, but they 
have fundamental moral differences. These similarities and 
differences can be identified when distinguishing between what 
Moore calls “internal” and the “external” questions (Pereboom, 2014, 
p. 49). Rawls defends a similar distinction, arguing that it is important 
to distinguish between justifying a practice, and justifying a certain action 
falling under it (Rawls, 1955, p. 3). As Rawls notes, this distinction has 
“frequently been made” and is central to works of Hume, Austin, 
Mill, and others (Rawls, 1955, footnote 2, p. 3). 
If we return to the discussions of this thesis, I have argued that a 
compatibilist justification of legal retributive punishment lacks 
justification. The justification that I have in mind is what Moore calls 
“external” justification, or what Rawls talks about as “justifying a 
practice.” However, it does not necessarily have any fundamental 
implications for how the “internal” justification looks like, or in 
Rawls’ words, how we justify the specific act of punishment within 
the legal punishment practice.  
If we think that the practice of punishing people with reference to 
their desert has more desirable consequences than it would be to give 
up this practice, we can (justifiably) go on doing this also if we accept 
that no one has the properties required for basic desert: we can 
replace the notion of basic desert with the notion of derived desert. 
The relevant difference between the one who deserves to be punished 
(in the derived sense) and the one who does not must then be that 
the one who deserves to be punished has a property such that it makes 
her a person that, if she is punished for her misdeeds, this will lead to 
certain desirable consequences. Given that the law is an action-
guiding enterprise, reasons-responsiveness might play an important 
role when we distinguish between those who deserve (in a derived 
sense) punishment, and those who do not. Because people who are 
reasons-responsive may be more prone to change their behavior in 
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the desired way when exposed to certain kinds of interventions (such 
as punishment), compared to people who are not reasons-responsive. 
If so, reasons-responsiveness may be sufficient for desert, not 
because it is relevantly different from other capacities with regard to 
its nature, but because it is required in order for legal punishment to 
have the intended consequences.  
The debate about the implications of neuroscience for criminal law 
is likely to continue. I hope to have contributed to this discussion by 
showing that the Revision Argument is probably more relevant than 
sometimes acknowledged. In addition, I have sketched a view of folk 
psychology and folk morality that allows for these enterprises to be 
more open for scientific findings and philosophical arguments than is 
appreciated by Morse as well as Pardo & Patterson. This openness 
has, in turn, implications for the argument that the law is a folk 
psychological and folk moral enterprise, in the sense that although 
this may very well be the case, these frameworks allow for, and in 
some cases even require, that scientific findings and philosophical 
reasoning are employed in order to reinforce and legitimize our 
everyday moral practices.  
7.6 Suggestions for future research 
I have argued that legal retributive punishment based on basic desert 
cannot be justified in a compatibilist framework. In my arguments, I 
have presupposed determinism and physicalism. Of these two, I take 
physicalism to be the least controversial. However, I think that a more 
detailed definition of physicalism may contribute to the clarity of my 
argument, and to the general thesis that moral facts supervene on 
natural facts. In section 1.5.2, I provided a (very) brief overview of 
some libertarian accounts of free will. I have not related any of the 
discussions in this thesis to such a libertarian account, but I think it 
would be fruitful to analyze how different libertarian accounts of free 
will in relation to moral responsibility and basic desert can handle the 
Principle of Relevant Difference in light of the challenge from 
physicalism.  
The arguments put forward in this thesis hinges to a large extent 
on the notion of mental causation. Mental causation is a well-
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discussed philosophical issue and there are many aspects of this 
discussion that have not been addressed in this thesis. A detailed 
account of mental causation requires metaphysical footwork – 
causation in itself is a much-disputed phenomena, and when we 
discuss mental causation, we add the much-disputed nature of the 
mental – and I have not had the space for elaborating on these 
discussions in this thesis. However, as was illustrated in the 
discussions concerning mental causation and functionalism, it is 
important to know what one is looking for in one’s theory of mental 
causation. For example, is it, as in List & Menzie’s theory, intended 
to describe the way we think of causation given the multiple 
realizability of mental concepts, or are we interested in the substances 
that do the causal work, regardless of how the concepts work? In 
future work, I think that my arguments in this thesis could be further 
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